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Aircraft family design and production is a complicated process that includes numer-
ous decisions across various disciplines, where these decisions should be made in a coor-
dinated manner to maximize the program value. Successful commercial aircraft programs
hint that increasing the commonality between different products is not necessarily the goal,
but a common and a useful tool for aircraft manufacturers to introduce multiple products
to the market with reduced research, development, and production time, uncertainty, and
costs. However, in order to make sound and value-adding decisions throughout the family
program lifecycle, engineering aspect of the family design problem should be considered
concurrently with the manufacturing and marketing aspects.
The large commercial aircraft market, specifically the narrow-body market, consists
of unique features that must be captured in order to provide a realistic model. Most
importantly, due to high entry costs, there are only a few firms that offer a variety of
products sharing common parts to serve different segments. Historically a duopoly, over
the last years, new firms have been entering the narrow-body market encouraged by the
fast growth of the total market demand. From an entrant’s perspective, the evolution of
the market must be analyzed for multiple decades before an entry decision is made as any
value-oriented firm will try to ensure, even before initiating the R&D investment, some
anticipation for a positive balance at the end of a program. These observations extend the
market-focused product family design problem, which naturally includes the commonality
and commercial value considerations, to also account for segment-level entry/exit options,
competitive reactions, as well as endogenous and exogenous uncertainty associated with
the firm-specific and market-specific dynamics. The analyses required for such a complex
problem are not included in the traditional design methodologies.
To bridge this gap, a competitive product family design methodology is created. At the
core of the framework is a multi-product, multi-firm dynamic market simulation featuring
xix
two types of players: the incumbent firms and the new entrants. The main motivation
of these players is to maximize the family program value by making economic and finan-
cial decisions under uncertainty and strategic competition. The stochastic game in that
stage is modeled as a competitive Markov Decision Process in which the players act non-
cooperatively and make value-maximizing decisions based on the aforementioned elements.
The model utilized in this stage is an Ericson-Pakes class Industrial Organization model
which allows the firms to enter/exit at segment level and decide on strategic control variables
for the in-production aircraft. It is hypothesized that the combination of an Industrial Or-
ganization model with Monte Carlo Simulations will allow the designers to better estimate
the expected program value and quantify risk in the early design phase.
In the example case study, an experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis via com-
parative assessment. It is demonstrated that the standard Net Present Value methods, the
benchmark, would lead to different decisions compared to the outcomes of the methodology
presented in this thesis. It is also shown that the existing methods fail to quantify the risk
which is defined as the probability of the program not breaking even. For certain technology
scenarios, it is also demonstrated that the benchmark method could result in opposite signs
of perceived returns for the program possibly influencing the top-level decisions.
From a managerial perspective, the capability to estimate the added program value
related to a new technology or a certain design change, before the information is clearly
revealed, can yield a significant strategic advantage. Within this context, a Value-Driven
Design paradigm is well-suited to the aircraft family design problem since increasing the
overall market success of the family is the default goal of such family-oriented studies; the
program value can work as a single and meaningful representation as a metric for success.
The capability of the framework to directly and indirectly handle both exogenous and
endogenous uncertainty will enable the top-level decision makers to avoid risky platform




1.1 Motivation of Thesis
Aircraft family design and production is a complicated process that includes numerous de-
cisions across various disciplines, where these decisions should be made in a coordinated
manner to maximize the program value. In today’s commercial aircraft industry, strong cost
competition forces many of the manufacturers to meet the operational demands of airlines
via aircraft families with members sharing common parts. Even though the current com-
mercial aircraft market is dominated by families of aircraft instead of independent designs,
most family vehicles are known to perform less efficiently compared to their unique design
counterparts [88]. Despite these inefficiencies, successful commercial aircraft programs hint
that increasing the commonality between different products is not necessarily the goal, but
a common, and potentially useful tool for aircraft manufacturers to introduce multiple prod-
ucts to the market with reduced research, development, and production costs. However, in
order to make sound and value-adding decisions in the initial phases of the design process,
engineering aspect of the family design problem should be considered simultaneously with
the manufacturing and marketing aspects. During this complex process, the design engi-
neers act as the liaison in between. When the design problem is extended to include the
commonality and commercial value considerations for the entire family program lifecycle,
competition, just as endogenous and exogenous uncertainty associated with the firm-specific
and market-specific dynamics, becomes an unavoidable reality. The methodology required
for such a complex problem may exceed the capabilities and even conflict with some of the
existing traditional design philosophy.
The large commercial aircraft market has some unique features some of which are com-
mon in both narrow-body and wide-body aircraft segments. First of all, due to high entry
costs, there are only a few firms which offer a variety of products in different segments. Also,
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the steep learning curve is an important element shaping the competition especially in the
first few years after the introduction [103]. These observations occur in a market where
it is not exactly clear if these oligopolistic companies are competing in price, or quantity
[114]. In addition to these observations, narrow-body market has some of its own unique
properties. Historically a duopoly, over the last years new firms have been attempting to
enter this market [22]. Any firm that aims to be successful in this market must adjust its
strategies in the light of those properties and design the entire product line with market
success in my mind.
Sharing the same wing, empennage, cockpit, and fuselage cross-section are some of the
most common practices observed in the aircraft families today. This a priori knowledge helps
reduce the complexity of the product family design problem from the numerical optimization
point of view, but even so, the framework proposed in this thesis targets to quantify market
demand, which is still uncertain and depends on some other factors out of the designer’s
control. That being said, the marketing aspect of the design problem requires analyzing
and reacting to the strategic actions of the competitors following the guidelines of the
customer requirements. Literature review indicates that such an approach can be enabled
by combined usage of theoretical considerations alongside the empirical market attraction
models which can simulate the vehicle acquisition practices of airlines and approximate the
actual demand of a given vehicle for a given market segment under competitive reactions
[143]. Within this framework, the firm strategy on the demand side is assessed concurrently
with the supply side which deals with the commonality and manufacturing considerations.
In the commercial aircraft industry, in which the economies of scale dominate the cost
mechanics, this is a critical step for companies as effects of learning by doing over the
program lifetime must be incorporated to the model to make effective and realistic use of
benefits. Apart from the manufacturing cost benefits, it is documented that the derivative
design from an existing vehicle needs less research and development (R&D) effort making
it easier for incumbent companies to expand their product line giving them a significant
advantage in the fixed costs [90]. Though from an entrant point of view, the evolution
of the market must be analyzed for multiple decades before an entry decision is made.
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That is mainly due to the high sunk costs associated with market entry in the industry as
any value-maximizer firm will try to ensure, even before initiating the R&D investment, an
anticipation for a positive balance at the end of a program. Due to the importance of timing
and the change of the market over the years as well as the number of products and firms,
literature has shown that the static and deterministic analysis of the commercial aircraft
market is insufficient to explain some of the market observations [43].
1.2 Objective of Thesis
This research seeks to identify the main drivers for the design decisions made by the aircraft
manufacturers and quantifying their effects on the overall program value for an uncertain
future in the presence of competitors. The overall program value, which is used synony-
mously with the family program value, is the combined value obtained from all of the
family members within the market. Shortly, the primary research question of this thesis is
as follows:
Research Question 1: For a given oligopolistic market system with inherent uncertainty,
how can an aircraft manufacturer evaluate the expected family program value? How can we
use this valuation technique to assess program risk of a new design?
It is possible to break down this complex question into its core elements. Assuming
that the identification of the key market dynamics is paramount to achieve market success,
one of the initial steps to answer to the fore-mentioned question is to observe and model
the current state of the market. Ensuring future success in the market implies the need for
taking the dynamics of the market into account. At this point, it may also be necessary to
differentiate between the need to model the current industry dynamics and the need to find
the sources of the uncertainty. Assuming that the uncertainty exists both at the market
and the firm level, they need to be quantified and properly addressed so that it is possible
to attempt a tangible answer to the research question. Therefore, the supporting research
question becomes:
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Figure 1: Research Questions
In the primary research question, the implication is that the problem is covered from
the aircraft manufacturer point of view. If the main question in mind is to find effective
ways to boost the market presence, it is necessary to identify the possible actions or policies
that can be controlled by these firms.
Research Question 1.a: What are the main types of actions controllable by the aircraft
manufacturers before and after entering the market?
Finally to encompass these fundamental questions, it is necessary to define the program
value:
Research Question 1.c: How can we define the value from the aircraft manufacturer point
of view? Once it is defined, what are the enablers to quantify it?
The following chapters will present the background, existing literature and the proposed
framework as an attempt to answer these questions. Figure 1 displays the hierarchy between
the primary and supporting research questions.
1.3 A Brief Overview of the Experimental Setup
To answer the primary research question, a competitive product family design methodology
is proposed within this thesis framework. In the first stage a multi-product, multi-firm
dynamic market environment is simulated in which the players are the incumbent aircraft
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manufacturers or new entrants. The main motivation of these players is to maximize the
family program value by making strategic and rational marketing decisions under uncer-
tainty and competition. The stochastic game in that stage is modeled as a competitive
Markov Decision Process (MDP) in which the players act non-cooperatively with the sole
purpose of maximizing their own expected rewards. The players within the environment
have imperfect information regarding each other’s entry/exit decisions. On the other hand,
they have the same knowledge about the uncertainty for future exogenous market demand.
At each node, a rational decision is made after assessing the state of the market, actions
of the competitors, future uncertainty, and some shock associated with internal and exter-
nal firm dynamics. Cross elasticity of demand is also incorporated to the model in order
to demonstrate strategies for smaller firms to possibly capture some of the demand from
the other sub-segments the firm is not operating in. We present the subgame in the form
of a Bertrand competition of prices. Within this work, the LCA market is divided into
narrow-body (single-aisle) and wide-body (twin-aisle) aircraft market segments and we fo-
cus on a notional narrow-body market. Classes of different aircraft sizes within each of
these segments are further divided into sub-segments.
Around the fore-mentioned first stage is a sizing and synthesis tool that is responsible for
evaluating the common design variables among the family members, estimating performance
and cost responses for different technology scenarios. This second stage considers the first
stage as a black box and provides the vehicle performance receiving program value as an
output. For the scope of this thesis, the design decisions will be limited to the technology
selection problem. For an infinite time-horizon game, we can obtain the state transition
matrices of the industry evolution from the first stage analysis. Then we conduct Monte
Carlo Simulations (MCS) to obtain trends of Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) that can help
create distributions of Net Present Value (NPV). In this case, MCS will provide useful
insights to assess the risk. Since the firms actively react to different stochastic elements,
same scenario can result in different market outcomes if the simulation is run multiple times.
This thesis presents an integrated approach to the aircraft family design and valuation
problem in a dynamic market. This is mainly because of the fact that this research questions
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the main drivers for design decisions made in the early conceptual design of an aircraft
family for a scenario where the family is intended to stay in a competitive market with
potential entrants over a span of multiple decades. The value-driven approach emphasizes
on increasing the program value, instead of more traditional ways of reducing the Take-off
Gross Weight (TOGW), fuel burn, etc.. It is believed that the Value-Driven Design (VDD)
paradigm is well suited to the aircraft family design problem, since increasing the overall
success of the family is the natural goal of such family-oriented studies and the program
value can work as a single and meaningful representation as a metric for success. From
an executive perspective, the capability to estimate the added program value related to a
certain design change or a firm marketing policy before the information is clearly revealed
can give a significant strategic advantage. This information can then break down to subject-
matter experts and technology developers to make specific trade studies on justifying the
R&D effort in means of its impact on the overall program value. The capability of the
framework to directly and indirectly handle both exogenous and competitive uncertainty
enables the identification of risky designs in the early conceptual design phase. There
are existing methodologies that can handle this problem, however when a product family
problem is considered, a more comprehensive technique such as the one proposed in this
thesis is required. Market-focused design using stand-alone approaches of real options or
game theory have certain weaknesses and Industrial Organization models help target a
research gap.
The experimental setup at the core of this framework can allow different scenarios to be
simulated as well as players’ reactions to both incumbent and entrant firms. At each decision
epoch, the players can decide on the price of the products for the active segments, to enter
a new market segment with a derivative aircraft, or exit an existing non-profitable market
segment to prevent further loss. Another important aspect of the aircraft families is the
order of introduction of different derivatives. The setup takes this observation into account
and can estimate the best course of action in introducing different family members with a
certain chronological order. Instead of offering a large variety of products based on the same
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platform, it may be better for entrants to offer fewer products, possibly for the popular sub-
segments with more specialized platforms. Entry strategies for firms with certain advantages
or handicaps, such as lagging or leading technologies, can also be determined, as well as the
incumbent firm’s reactions to these threats.
1.4 Document Roadmap
This thesis document consists of seven chapters with each chapter including the following
elements:
• Chapter I: Motivation and the overall objectives
• Chapter II: Key concepts and fundamental literature
• Chapter III: Observations from the industry and formal problem definition
• Chapter IV: Specific literature review and overarching hypothesis with the corre-
sponding methodology
• Chapter V: Details of the parametric sub-components for the framework
• Chapter VI: Experiment to test the hypothesis




The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the key elements that are proposed
within the thesis framework. Even though this chapter identifies some of the fundamental
literature, more specific literature review is presented in Chapter 4. In addition, the readers
are informed about some of the advantages and disadvantages of product families as well as
some unique characteristics some of which form the motivation of the proposed research.
2.1 Opening Remarks
In today’s competitive market, it has become essential to maximize the commonalities
between similar products while trying to provide solutions for the different market segments
at the same time. In the last few decades, this problem has received a considerable attention
from the community as the customer requirements have become more and more demanding.
Historically, some of the product families have been very strong competitors in various
markets. By definition, products that share a common platform form the product family
[196]. The common platform should have specific features and functions that can satisfy
the needs of different customers.
Generally speaking, the design projects are summarized in five categories [194]:
• Variation of an existing product
• Improvement of an existing product
• Development of a new product for a low-volume production run
• Development of a new product for mass production
• One-of-a-kind design
A product family design process may or may not include the baseline design as a low-volume
or mass production product. However at all times, the variation and/or improvement of an
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existing product is an essential part of the family design activities. Definitions of variation
and improvement in this context are not highly distinguishable from each other. Within
the context of this classification, it is implied that improvement is a bigger, major change
in the design compared to a variation. The term improvement can mean integration of
new enabling technologies whereas variation can mean only configurational changes within
available resources.
For maintaining an effective competition in the long term, offering a large variety of
products is suggested to be a very useful strategy since the customers will be able to choose
closer options to their exact demands and wishes [110]. It is also possible to argue that
in a market environment in which requirements, main drivers, and even key enablers can
change in a very short period of time within the design process, capability to offer multiple
solutions for the changing needs can be a significant advantage. It should also be emphasized
that as a result of these practices, it is very likely that the manufacturer will be able to
increase the market share for the overall product category. In the long run, the whole
market demand can also be affected in a positive way benefiting multiple stakeholders.
Concentrating on the design of a single product one at a time results in “a failure to
embrace commonality, compatibility, standardization, or modularization among different
products or product lines” [141]. Common platforms also tend to increase the equipment
familiarity for crew and can bring additional benefits that are initially not foreseen [172].
Benefiting from various advantages of mass production efficiency while satisfying individual
customer requirements introduces the field called mass customization [165]. For many of
the consumer products, success in fast cycle industries depends on faster introduction of
new product replacements and model longevity [176]. Based on the example of the Sony
Walkman family which is a remarkable design effort supported with continuous innovation in
features, capabilities and flexible manufacturing; authors argue that novel and long-lasting
architecture creation by Sony which were also fast in replacing the aging designs were the
key enablers. Successful design of a product family brings a bigger challenge for designers
compared to the design effort of a single product since it has all the difficulties of a traditional
point design with the complexity of maintaining the design of multiple products to “increase
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commonality across the set of products without compromising their distinctiveness” [183].
Several different methods have been proposed for solving the complicated optimization
problem of a family design that have received significant approval from both the academia
and the industry; however, the difficulties in the modeling of manufacturing costs, impacts
of new technologies and other types of uncertainties make it difficult to realize the true
value of the product families for the future while making the decision-making process even
more challenging. Therefore, it is quite important for the designer to realize the specifics of
the market the product is intended to serve. All of the methodologies proposed for helping
the product family design process includes at least one of these following steps [155]:
• Market segmentation
• Creating the product family architecture
• Determining the attributes of the common components defining the product platform
• Choosing the optimal combination and adaptation of components
• Evaluating the effectiveness of the product family in means of cost and performance.
It is also critical to be able to not only use an existing architecture for the creation of a
new one but also to be able to use the design knowledge acquired during the creation of the
first product [72]. Two of the most significant advantages of such methods are saving time
and money by preventing the execution of a very similar but a separate research effort.
Preventing unnecessary variety is often recognized as the second common benefit. The
ultimate aim of all these practices is to develop more valuable products with less resources
and effort [184].
2.2 Domains of Product Family Design
A comprehensive product family design process incorporates elements of a conventional
single product design, but additional complexity arises due to the multi-dimensional nature
of family products. One of the modern approaches to forming a product family design
framework was introduced as an extension of the existing Georgia Tech (GT) Integrated
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Figure 2: The Product Family Oriented IPPD Methodology [86]
Product/Process Development (IPPD) methodology [86][135]. The need for the suggested
product family methodology was aimed at filling the gap in addressing complex System-
of-Systems (SoS) where the component commonality is not known. Therefore, the primary
focus was the extraction of potential family platform configuration. For the proposed ap-
proach in this thesis, this is not the primary goal; however, the modification of the existing
GT IPPD methodology is a progressive effort to systematically list the key steps of product
family design.
The Product Family oriented IPPD methodology can be summarized in these following
steps:
1. Establish the Need: This step includes extensive research of customer needs and
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market analysis. Analyzing the market dynamics as well as the historical acquisition
practices of customers can also be used to identify customer requirements which can
also be labeled as “must-be qualities”. There are also “attractive qualities” which pro-
vide satisfaction when provided but do not cause dissatisfaction if not achieved [198].
Unlike most of the military systems design projects, competition in the commercial
aircraft markets require adaptive strategies and policies to attract more customers.
As a result, in a competitive scenario, the concept of “establishing the needs” ex-
pands to include not only introducing the products that can operate in the existing
environment and stay in line with the mandatory customer requirements and official
regulations but also reducing the acquisition cost, improving the operational efficiency
etc. to increase customer preference toward a certain product.
2. Define Family Architectures: Depending on the context, the word “architecture”
may have several different meanings. Apart from the differentiation of the terms
“physical architecture” and “functional architecture”, when multiple stakeholders and
their own individual motivations are involved; even for the same set of physical prod-
ucts and corresponding functions we may need to define a new perspective. For
instance, the architecture for an aircraft family from the manufacturer point of view
involves dealing with the commonalities and the technical aspects of the aircraft de-
sign etc.. However, from a customer point of view, such as the way airlines utilize
these vehicles, very similar products can perhaps be perceived in a different way such
as the fleet composition etc.. The family architecture, to better serve the aims of
this thesis, is identified as the commonality and the corresponding common design
variables between the members.
3. Establish Value Objectives: Creating a tangible and non-subjective value objective
is important especially for the commonly used optimization procedures. The main
concern of an individual product design or a whole product line design is irrelevant;
there is usually a need to simplify the complex multi-attribute decision problem to
traceable values. This step is needed to emphasize the critical needs and requirements
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from the optimization point of view and relevant for achieving acceptable trade-offs
between different members of a product family.
4. Generate Feasible Alternatives: For creating new and alternative product family
designs, a modeling and simulation environment is usually needed. This enables a
more extensive exploration compared to what can be done with historical data. The
result is the capability to calculate the effect of specific design variables on the high
level requirements.
5. Commonality Identification: The principal aim of this step is to process the dif-
ferent module spaces and to identify similarities between products. For identifying
the commonalities, the observations from the industry are heavily relied on. Chapter
3 is intended to present these findings.
6. Evaluate Alternatives: This step is suggested to use high fidelity tools to analyze
most likely candidates to narrow down the number of candidates for the final selection
step. In a stochastic market environment, the performance of alternatives should
perhaps be identified as a probabilistic distribution of outcomes instead of a single
number.
7. Make Decision: The final goal building on and utilizing the previous steps is to make
an informed decision and select the best family design among the possible alternates.
The decision-making in this framework is two-fold: The design decisions and the
market decisions. As proposed in Chapter 4, the focus of this research is identifying
the design decisions that are enablers to more profitable marketing decisions.
The framework introduced in this thesis on the other hand, focuses on all these seven steps
except step 5 which has been extensively studied by Freeman [86]. However, this framework
doesn’t necessarily aim to complement the previous study. Instead a more market-oriented
approach is presented. Despite that, these steps are recognized as fundamentals of a rigorous
product family design approach.
To provide a comparison to generic product family design approaches, we demonstrate
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Figure 3: General View of Product Family Design and Development [106]
the segmentation of product family methods as performed by Jiao, Simpson, and Siddique
on their review [106]:
In this thesis, the expected contribution to the existing literature of product family
design methodologies is made through focusing on the combination of the techniques for
identifying on the product family design by addressing the corresponding front-end issues.
However, this unique approach extends the front-end issues by taking the approach from
a static and deterministic context to a dynamic and uncertain environment which involves
Industrial Organization (IO) and usage of empirical models. The back-end issues are only
passively considered to come up with a viable business plan as cost is considered. However,
endogenous cost dynamics, which are specific to the firm’s internal structure, shape the
firm policies in the market. Therefore, it is possible to summarize this methodology as a
concurrent approach that combines active front-end issues and passive back-end issues with
the product platform optimization core. The real challenge in an IO model is to embrace
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the existence of uncertainty and the competition. Chapter 3 shows some of the historical
examples from the aerospace industry which actually indicates that the LCA market is
formed by what can be called as “battle of aircraft families”.
2.3 Classification of the Product Family Design Optimization
In this section, some of the aspects and extensions of existing product family design opti-
mization techniques will be introduced. In the literature of product family design optimiza-
tion, different ways of classification exist. Fujita groups product family optimization into
three main classes [88]:
• Class I: Maximize product performance with respect to product design variables
subject to product requirements and component commonality constraints.
• Class II: Maximize product performance and component commonality with respect
to sharing decision variables subject to product requirements and component com-
monality constraints.
• Class III: Maximize product performance and component commonality with respect
to product design variables and sharing decision variables subject to product require-
ments and component commonality constraints.
Apart from the original classification made by Fujita, an additional third dimension is
proposed [116]. This third dimension accounts for restricted versus generalized common-
ality. At first glance, it may be difficult to distinguish between the platform selection and
commonality dimensions. Knowing which components to share and then designing those
shared components alongside the unique components would introduce the Class I problem.
On the other hand, restricted commonality brings an additional constraint to the platform
selection. In the case of restricted commonality, product platform is fully defined including
the common design parameters.
A more detailed classification scheme for the product family design problem is also in-
troduced [181]. In this classification, different problem formulation approaches are grouped
with the help of the following questions:
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Figure 4: Classification of Product Family Optimization Formulations [88]
1. Module-based or scale-based family: Module-based product families are formed
by adding, removing or replacing modules from the platform whereas scale-based prod-
uct families are formed by stretching or shrinking the platform. In the literature, they
are also named as configurable and parametric product family designs respectively.
2. Based on whether the platform is specified a priori: Class I formulations
can help reduce the design space and simplify the optimization process at the risk of
converging to a sub-optimal solution.
3. Single-objective versus multi-objective: Most of the real-world problems involve
simultaneous consideration of different attributes such as maximizing revenue, mini-
mizing risk etc. However, as in any other optimization problem, it is possible to find
ways to combine different objectives into one at the expense of certain shortcomings.
4. Based on whether the manufacturing cost is modeled: Most of the time firms
have to balance the costs and the benefits associated with family-oriented product
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design. A comprehensive approach should also involve the back-end of the product
development which includes the production processes [183].
5. Based on whether the market demand is modeled: Modeling the market de-
mand forms the front-end of a complete product family design. It is a mandatory step
for competitive family design for different market systems.
6. Based on whether the uncertainty is considered: There are different ways to
incorporate uncertainty into product family design. Existing literature mostly deals
with uncertainty in the market demand.
The number of stages within the design process is also another way of classifying these
optimization approaches:
1. Single stage: Optimizing the product platform and family of products simultane-
ously
2. Two stage: Optimize the platform first and then the family members
3. Multi-stage: More than two stages in various orders
In the field of product family design, multiple optimization algorithms have been used.
However, the most common algorithms are sequential linear programming (SLP), sequential
quadratic programming (SQP), nonlinear programming (NLP), genetic algorithm (GA)
and simulated annealing (SA). Chapter 4 will involve the classification of the proposed
methodology in the light of these classifications as well as grouping some of the specific
literature similar to the thesis area. The classifications suggested by Fujita and Simpson
are top-level studies that do not necessarily involve the detailed break-down of the existing
literature[88, 183]. In the case study of a narrow-body aircraft family, design variables are
screened as well as a value metric is defined so that the numerical burden of such design
optimization procedures are bypassed.
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2.4 Necessity of the Design
2.4.1 Understanding the Market
In a customer-focused design environment, understanding the specific needs of different
customers is crucial. The unique paradigm of a common product platform creation requires
attempting to enter multiple market segments simultaneously or in a certain chronological
order. Single product designs are more likely to result in program failures compared to
product family designs[141]. In such a system it is very likely that such isolated groups will
act independently according to their own lifecycle elements. However, the beginning of the
life of a new design for both individual designs and groups of multiple similar designs contain
the definition of the market. Defining the market and dividing it into multiple segments
forms the initiative step of the engineering design process as any failure at this particular
stage could fail in the competition even though the final product is a good performer of the
intended purposes. The meaning of the “intended purpose” of a commercial aircraft is a
satisfactory economic performance of the mission profile by the vehicle while maintaining
the regulatory obligations and safety limits.
Marketing for engineering design has two major aspects [160]. The first step, market
research, is more important for the conceptual designers at the first glance since it involves
identifying the customer needs, product opportunities, and an understanding of the market
segments. The second step includes the introduction of the aircraft into the marketplace
and continuing customer relations which is excluded within this thesis. For example, spare
parts and global customer support network are two very important elements that influence
airlines’ decisions of aircraft choice as well as creating an obstacle to new players in the
LCA market.
This framework focuses on a combination of technology push and market pull. Different
technologies are investigated and the added value for each are quantified. The framework
can also be considered to assess different scenarios of market pull in a way that the product
platform can provide the means to enter different segments. For such markets, it is possible
to argue that these two strategies go hand in hand. In simple terms:
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• Market pull: The instance of a product being developed as a response to an identified
market need.
• Technology push: The situation where a company has a proprietary technology
that can be used to penetrate different market segments [195].
This framework examines the usage of common modules for the later derivatives or scaling
the existing parts such as stretching an existing fuselage. Scale-based platforms for pene-
trating different market niches will be explained in the following section. As an example,
Boeing has developed many of the commercial transport aircraft as “series” or “variants”
derived from a baseline aircraft. Stretching the aircraft has been a common method of
accommodating more passengers or carrying more cargo payload as well as different modi-
fications to increase the flight range [172]. The product family typically addresses a market
while specific products or groups of products within the family target niches within that
market. The target niche can be a market segment which can be defined as a specific market
area where unique customer requirements exist [141]. Market segmentation is an important
activity in a customer demand environment which is diverse and varying [186].
2.4.2 Market Segmentation
The market-driven approach to the introduction of a new family of aircraft for the current
market should be supported with tangible market analysis. Division of the existing market
into multiple segments and identifying the needs and the actual operations will allow to
specify the products that can serve in those specific markets. Specification of the design as
an initial and essential stage for the single point design process, depending on the situation,
can be the most difficult part of the conceptual design. Since one of the main goals of a
product family is to introduce multiple products to cover more market segments with less
effort. The question succeeding this motivation may be: “What should be the capabilities
of my family members?”. This phase, also known as the problem definition or requirements
definition can also be summarized as “creating a statement that describes what has to be
accomplished to satisfy the needs of the customer” [36]. In this case, the main focus will be
on a clear and realistic specification of the mission profile as well as the performance and
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Figure 5: Leveraging Strategies for Product Family Design [66]
geometric constraints imposed on commercial aviation.
Meyer gives an example of a basic market segmentation grid in which the vertical axis
represents the cost of the product while the horizontal axis represents different market
segments which are not necessarily better or worse than others but essentially represent
different product types [141]. Common platform leveraging strategies are classified in three
main categories [66] :
• Vertical leveraging: Changing the product platform for serving different segments.
• Horizontal leveraging: Sharing common platforms across the segments.
• Beachhead Approach: The implementation of the initial common platform towards
various market segments.
Vertical leveraging can usually be considered as a higher risk and higher return strategy.
Common components and technology may still be used and it is not possible to claim the new
product is completely independent from the previous ones as occasionally a new product is
created simply by removing certain components and functions. However, some components
may have certain characteristics that will make scaling, enhancing, or degrading, etc. as
difficult as designing that new component from scratch. On the other hand, horizontal
leveraging is often seen as a more profitable strategy. This strategy is a way of introducing
multiple products across the market while reducing the development costs significantly
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although sharing common modules can also result in a series of products sharing common
problems. As previously mentioned, one of the main benefits of having a product family is
the increase in the production volume for certain components and unforeseeable problems
can easily be spread all across the market. In today’s market, this alone represents a
huge problem since many companies have suffered economically and in terms of perceived
company image from problems related to commonality. However, for the scope of this study,
such an analysis and assessment will not be possible since risk/reliability analysis is usually
not seen as an essential part of the traditional conceptual aircraft design. The beachhead
approach is often considered the most difficult and ambitious strategy [66].
Considering three different classes of leveraging strategies, historical examples of aircraft
families exhibit different types of characteristics. For a given passenger class e.g. 110-seat
class, there is not a high-end or a low-end vehicle; although, the vehicles may perhaps
be differentiated by different acquisition and operational costs potentially due to different
technology levels. Still, high entry costs shape some of the leveraging strategies similar
to horizontal leveraging strategies observed from the industry. Vertical leveraging strategy
can be demonstrated in the aircraft families by potentially introducing a brand new wing
design to better serve some of the market segments. This will be supported in details by
observations in Chapter 3.
2.4.3 Market Demand
Introduction of a flexible baseline vehicle is necessary for profitable module-based enhance-
ments to increase the utilization of the whole product family. Each step will require careful
consideration of the alternatives so that a competitive line of products can be selected con-
sidering certain noise factors. Analysis of the market demand is also one of the main areas
of interest to shape the evolution of a new line of aircraft by giving clues about potentially
profitable strategies of attacking various niche markets.
“Market demand” is a term that may have multiple meanings depending on the context.
For a certain segment with fixed customer requirements, it may mean the total quantity of
products that will be purchased by the customers regardless of the number of manufacturers,
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design qualities or pricing. However, in most of the literature, the primary implication is the
number of products the manufacturer can sell within the existing market segment based on
the actions of the competitors assuming the company can decide on its designs and pricing
or quantity policies. Estimating the market demand is a mandatory and crucial link to
combine marketing and engineering efforts and forms one of the critical elements of this
research.
Overall, manufacturers want to develop and build products that are desirable. This
can be a useful enabler to maximize the profit in a competition environment. Once the
customer expectations are specified, the manufacturers can work on those metrics to im-
prove the desirability; however, this may not always be a simple and straight-forward task.
Volatile market conditions, diverse customer preferences, and the competition among simi-
lar products make it a difficult task [107]. There are multiple methods in the literature that
attempt to model the complex behaviors of customers in the product acquisition phase and
those are detailed in Chapter 4.
Although variety of distinctive methods exist to estimate the market demand for a given
product at a given time, those methods are usually implemented for maximizing the margin
between the customer-perceived utility and the cost or price of a product [113]. Other
metrics that can be used independently or relevantly include the maximization of profit, the
market share, or the seller’s welfare. Unless supported by detailed cost analysis, these goals
may not be achieved in a realistic manner; therefore, detailed modeling of manufacturing
cost characteristics is an equally important step for this research.
2.5 Structure of the Design
2.5.1 Commonality
In a sector like aerospace industry in which the economies of scale are dominant compared to
others, commonality is a powerful enabler for reducing the cost of products. The complete
and finalized products may not be common among different market segments but the shared
components can still give significant advantages to each variant. Therefore, commonality
is not necessarily the goal but may be a useful tool in the presence of competition. The
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Figure 6: Optimality between Design Tactics [89]
difficulty of designing and introducing product families is mainly a result of the tradeoff
between product commonality and distinctiveness. Commonality doesn’t only offer reduced
production costs but also decreased lead-time and risk during product development [191].
Generally speaking, an increased commonality leads to a higher production efficiency.
This often comes at the expense of compromised individual product performance. The tech-
nical assessment of commonality must be done in conjunction with the market segmentation
and the evaluation of performance metrics. Figure 6 is a representation of how different
leveraging strategies target different spectra of customer needs in more “optimal” ways [89].
In this representation, “optimality” is not defined in a quantifiable or objective way and in
fact defining the objective function is usually regarded as another topic on its own. The
main implication is that if the grouped customer needs differ significantly from each other,
this may translate into diverse engineering requirements which in the end may handicap
the performance of highly common product lines.
In this thesis framework, commonality is not necessarily forced in the aircraft family
design although the term “aircraft family” suggests the usage of common parts and modules.
However based on historical examples, commonality is recognized as a very profitable tool
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for the primary stakeholders. This is perhaps valid as long as the market study is conducted
properly and it is also decided that the customer needs do not differ from each other greatly.
Successful examples from the industry include the following:
• Sony Walkman Family: Sony utilized common platforms and modular design to
accomplish variety. Their incremental innovation strategy allowed them to target
different market niches with different models [176].
• Xerox Copier & Typewriter Family: Xerox eased the development process be-
tween different generations by intentionally increasing the number of modules that
could be carried over to the next generations [77].
• Swatch Swiss Watch Family: Swatch was able to produce a large variety of Swiss
watches by implementing modular design. Most of the models were created by a small
selection of modules.[195]
• Black & Decker Power Tool Family: Black & Decker produced an entire range
of power tool products using standardized components. This allowed the reduction of
production cost and lead-time.[127]
• Boeing Commercial Airplane Family: Boeing’s strategy on commercial airplanes
is regarded as “strategic stretching” to accommodate various passenger capacities and
flight range. [172]
In Chapter 3, the commercial aircraft family example is going to be detailed with observa-
tions from both the narrow-body and the wide-body markets. It is quite trivial to come up
with general labels and classifications when the product families as a way of design norm
are observed in so many different areas. So, the conclusion is that the commonality should
be assessed by critical analysis per each industry. The specific dynamics of how the com-
monality influences overall market success is assumed to differ even within a certain market
depending on the segmentation.
24
2.5.2 Extent of the Conceptual Design
Intelligent design of a product line is one of the methods to add value to a program. In that
sense, the scope of this research effort has to be defined with clear boundaries. Therefore,
the extent of the design involved in this framework is limited to “conceptual design of a
product family”. This phase was originally defined by Asimow as the first stage of seven
phases of design as also called “the morphology of the design” [36]. In the light of his work,
conceptual design has been identified by “the process in by which the design is initiated,
carried to the point of creating a number of possible solutions, and narrowed down to a
single best concept” [67]. Not necessarily specific to the aircraft design, this phase usually
requires the greatest creativity, involves the most uncertainty, and requires coordination
among different entities involved. The pillars of the conceptual design phase are listed as:
• Recognition of a need
• Definition of the problem
• Gathering information
• Developing a design concept
• Choosing between competing concepts
Raymer defines the scope of conceptual design to the minimum of sizing of the aircraft to find
the new take-off gross weight (TOGW), fuel weight, wing size, engine thrust etc.[169]. The
main topics in question are usually the overall cost, weight, and the related tradeoffs during
this iterative process. During this process, a clear understanding of the requirements is
necessary to come up with a configuration that can meet the demands. In this context, rough
definition of the configuration when completed means the top-level geometric specifications
of the aircraft are specified. This is a valid assumption for this framework however, this
more traditional approach of solely focusing on minimizing the TOGW is found insufficient
by more recent approaches [134].
At this point, it is crucial to recognize that the common phases of product design (con-
ceptual design, preliminary [embodiment] design, detailed design) may in fact have fuzzy
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Figure 7: Cost, Knowledge, and Freedom throughout the Design [79]
boundaries. For the optimization approach and the performance models utilized within
this framework, certain common and unique design variables are selected. These will be
explained in Chapter 4 based on observations from the practices of aircraft manufacturers.
Regardless of the number of design variables within the consideration, it is critical to rec-
ognize that a modern design approach should always incorporate future uncertainty [194].
Decisions made in the conceptual design process can have a big influence on the overall
success of the program. That phase is also the stage where quality can be embedded into
the design. However, it is a difficult task to build quality into the design when only limited
information is available. Building cost-effective and competitive products requires proper
assessment of uncertainty that can be enabled by the selection of right tools and methods.
Similar to a single product design, these challenges are also valid for the family design. In
fact, designing a product line comes with the increased uncertainty that comes with specifics
of each market segment and other commonality related compatibility issues that are not
inherent to the common single product design procedures.
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2.6 Effectiveness of the Design
In order to conduct a complete market-focused design study, it is imperative to find ways
to measure the effectiveness of the design.
2.6.1 Defining the Effectiveness
The initial problem is perhaps to figure out a method to identify and measure “the effective-
ness” for different stakeholders. As a simple example, it is possible to consider a customer
buying a car. Some main factors that would be considered are the acquisition cost, future
maintenance costs, fuel efficiency etc.. It is also possible to argue that the customer may
be interested in something that is not easily identifiable, quantifiable, or observable such as
the aesthetics or the appeal of the vehicle to the customer. This, in fact, is another research
area. For the car company, the effectiveness of the design starts from the cost analysis and
then extends to the demand of their product. An effective design from the car company
point of view perhaps has characteristics such as easiness to manufacture, attractiveness to
the customer, competitiveness in the market. It is then easy to recognize “the coupling”
between the effectiveness of the design from the customer and company perspectives. The
car designer should always keep in mind how the product is eventually going to serve the
needs of customers which is only a part of the problem. The designer should always make
trade-offs between the cost and the performance. This short example so far doesn’t possess
the specifics of a family design.
In reality, the market will have a variety of customers that can choose not only between
different brands but also segments according to their personal interests. Exterior factors
such as a steep increase in the fuel prices can suddenly make a fuel-efficient car more
appealing whereas the aggressive strategies from the competitors such as discounts and
extra features for free can decrease the demand for the product. It has been emphasized
previously that the interactions between different market segments and commonality should
be assessed simultaneously but in order to measure the effectiveness as an objective, the
stakeholder in consideration should be identified as well as an objective metric for the
occasion. For this research, the focus is on “the overall family program value” from the
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Table 1: Steps in a Product Lifecycle [67]
Premarket Phase Market Phase
1. Idea Generation 9. Product Introduction
2. Idea Evaluation 10. Market Development
3. Feasibility Analysis 11. Rapid Growth
4. Technical R&D 12. Competitive Market
5. Market R&D 13. Maturity
6. Preliminary Production 14. Decline
7. Market Testing 15. Abandonment
8. Commercial Production
manufacturer perspective. Program lifecycle for aircraft design projects are described in
the next section.
2.6.2 Program Lifecycle
In the context of this research, there are two lifecycle considerations. One is the aircraft
lifecycle, that of a vehicle, which considers the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of
the aircraft as well as the revenue generated by it. That is the perspective of the management
of a certain aircraft by airlines. Although this aspect is indirectly included in this study,
the main focus here is in the product lifecycle from a designer and manufacturer point of
view. Dieter [67] presents a generic program lifecycle grouped into premarket and market
phases:
The suggested program lifecycle is intended for the design of a single product. Family
programs have substantially different amounts of contributions from different elements of
lifecycle cost and the corresponding schedule. First, R&D expenses are higher compared
to independent point designs since at least two vehicles are being designed. However, for
the example of a two vehicle design, in most cases the expenses are not twice as much as
the cost of a single vehicle development [104]. The development effort is also more likely to
take longer. The potential benefit of spending more for a longer duration is the possibility
of staying in the market for longer and serving a larger market share perhaps resulting in
a higher program value. In that sense, the family programs can be considered as “higher
risk-higher return” projects compared to individual aircraft programs. Figure 8 represents
that approach.
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Figure 8: Notional Cash-flow for an Individual Product versus a Product Family
Due to the longer time-span nature of aircraft family programs, the situation requires
more careful planning. As the engineers plan later and later into the final stages of the
program, the uncertainty may grow to unmanageable magnitudes. Therefore a wide variety
of alternatives must be considered and lack of detailed information must be assessed using
adequate tools. Although the program success depends heavily on the decisions made in the
pre-market phase, proper management and assessment of the competitive environment in
the market phase can still make a program more valuable and successful. This is supported
by examples in Chapter 3 and techniques for implementing this approach are suggested in
Chapter 4.
2.7 Value-Driven Design
Value-Driven Design (VDD) is “an improvement to the systems engineering process that
employs economics to enable optimization thinking at every level of engineering design” [57].
The VDD approach to large and complex aerospace systems is motivated by the history
of cost overruns in both commercial and military aircraft programs which average about
50% in cost and 33% in schedule [37]. It is not possible to add value when the critical
and non-negotiable requirements are not met [101]. The remainder of the requirements are
flexible but certain attributes may increase the customer value.
The key benefit of the VDD, the ability to formally and repeatably compare different
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designs to each other regardless of their environment, has many uses [62]:
1. Ability to conduct trade studies accurately to show which option is better, by how
much and why.
2. Ease of optimization via simplifying the objective functions. For example, the project
Net Present Value (NPV) can act as a single-objective metric for the optimization
routine (i.g. project with the highest NPV is selected). NPV, and similar metrics will
be defined in the next section.
3. Better understanding of the design space via obtaining the value surface. This may
be a necessary step to help in obtaining robust designs.
4. The value of a change made to the design can be obtained in a quantitative manner.
For example, if the baseline system has a value V and adding a technology increases
it or decreases it to V’, then the value added by the technology implementation is
V’-V.
In this context, different perspectives for “value” should also be defined:
• Manufacturer perspective: The value of the overall aircraft family program
(Shareholder value)
• Airline perspective: The value of a certain vehicle based on the airline operations
(Customer value)
The perspective assumed in this research is the manufacturer’s point of view. However
there is an obvious linkage between the customer and shareholder value calculations. In
fact, forming that linkage is a challenge on its own especially when there are competitive
reactions. In practice, every design problem encountered will have its own specifics and it
is the responsibility of engineers and managers to identify those specifics and come up with
a suitable approach. VDD provides a way of thinking in means of quantifying the result
of design changes and firm policies to create value and product differentiation [63]. The
ability to compare independent projects using a common value such as monetary values is
a huge benefit for top-level decision makers.
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Figure 9: Notional Wing Planform Examples Optimized for Different Parameters
Even though the point of view is fixed to the manufacturer perspective, due to the
close relations of value between different entities involved in the process; manufacturers
may use different goals of optimization. Following the guidelines of Johnson, the notional
demonstration of the effect of using different optimization parameters on the wing plan-
form is expanded by adding the program value [109]. In Figure 9, the effects of fuel burn
minimizing, Direct Operating Cost (DOC) minimizing, Lifecycle Cost (LCC) minimizing,
TOGW minimizing, and Acquisition Cost (ACQ) minimizing as well as the program value
maximizing wing designs are representatively shown. At this point, it is important to high-
light the fact that all of these notional wing designs are capable of meeting the customer
requirements and the regulations of commercial transport. Therefore, the same missions in
question can be performed with varying cost elements and efficiency.
The “value” is notionally demonstrated as a separate objective that may favor certain
configurations over others. There is uncertainty involved with all of the designs correspond-
ing to different goals. For example, for the DOC-optimized design, higher fuel prices may
result in a bigger aspect ratio wing to increase the fuel efficiency. The uncertainty that
would alter the value-driven wing design comes from many different sources, perhaps more
than any other designs in the presented example. Since VDD involves revenue management
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which in return depends on competitor actions, it is even more complicated. An IO model
will be utilized to simulate active managerial policies even after the product is introduced
to the market to ensure optimal strategies for maximizing the expected profit with the
assumption of “for-profit” firms.
2.7.1 Metrics for Value-Driven Design
Today, the commercial program’s success is quantified by the profitability of the products.
To do so, the bridge between the three main disciplines should be formed: economics,
optimization, and systems engineering. If the value of a project is to be maximized, a
meaningful metric for the maximization problem should be chosen. This metric is to be used
as an output of an “objective function” in which the inputs are the design attributes and the
output is a single value. This overall system objective function is also called a system value
model [115].This selection is a relatively difficult component of any VDD process as each of
these metrics have their own advantages, disadvantages, and underlying assumptions. The
following are the most common metrics used in value-driven design problems:
• Net Present Value (NPV): NPV is calculated as the summation of all the dis-
counted cash flows of a project. The accuracy of this metric depends on the accuracy
of the discount rate but it is useful as it provides a consistent comparison metric across
different projects.
• Decision Tree Analysis (DTA): DTA is the NPV analysis with different future
scenarios. The final calculation is made based on the probability of each scenario
happening.
• Internal Rate of Return (IRR): IRR is defined as the discount rate at which the
sum of the discounted cash flows for a project is zero. A major inconsistency with
the IRR approach is the possibility of having multiple values for the same project and
also the difficulty of interpretation.
• Payback Period: The metric for the projected length of time before the initial
investment of a project is recovered. This metric doesn’t consider the profile and the
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magnitude of the positive cash flow after the initial expenditure is neutralized.
• Discounted Payback Period: The payback criterion modified to account for the
time value of money.
Now that the final metrics of the candidate project performance are listed, a fundamental
step towards calculating any of these metrics requires the ability to first identify and then
model the quantifiable attributes of a system. An expansion to this key step is adding
the dynamics of a certain environment with multiple options and/or competitive analysis
[63]. As an example to these extensions, Briceno uses NPV based competitive analysis to
make design choices under uncertainty and competition using principles of game theory [50].
VDD approach has been shown to be well-suited to strategic decision making problems due
to the benefits listed. Application of business dynamics on VDD based foundations is not
uncommon as Pfaender and Cheung et al. have demonstrated different additions showing
how design changes affect the perception of the product value from the customer perspective
[164, 57].
2.8 Games and Competition
A driving force in the commercial aircraft market is the competition. By definition “A game
is any activity that involves more than one individual, where the actions of each individual
in the game affect others who are also in the game” [95]. Game-theoretic studies can
be generalized as the implementation of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation
between intelligent and rational decision makers [152]. In this research, the interest is in
analyzing the competition. Competition is the state observed when people or entities have
utilities, interests, and preferences that conflict with one another. A more specific economics
definition of competition is “Rivalry in which every seller tries to get what other sellers are
seeking at the same time: sales, profit, and market share by offering the best practicable
combination of price, quality, and service” [12]. Among applications of game theory, there
are research activities focusing on modeling product family design problem as “a coalition
among family members” [148, 147]. That type of research, however, is very sparse.
33
Figure 10: A Conceptual Framework for New-to-the-world Product Innovation [38]
The importance of the proper assessment of competitiveness when introducing a new-
to-the world product innovation is crucial and complicated. Innovation is “the adoption of
ideas concerning processes or systems that is considered new by the adopting unit” [64].
These main factors that shape the innovation process are proposed by the framework of
Augusto and Coelho [38].




Narver and Slater define the market orientation as an “organizational culture” that defines
the necessary behaviors for the creation of superior value for buyers and therefore, supe-
rior performance for the business [185]. Customer and competition orientation deals with
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collecting the necessary information about the customers and competitors and its implica-
tion to the firm. Inter-functional coordination, the third item for the market orientation,
is the study of coordination of efforts to create superior value for the buyers based on the
fore-mentioned information.
Firm innovativeness is an organization’s inclination to “engage in innovative behavior”
[140]. Firm innovativeness is mainly the openness of the firm to new ideas, novel approaches
and the ability to get stimulated by market needs and challenges. This behavior usually
involves risk-taking and needs an active attitude. As a result, the level of innovativeness for a
firm determines the company’s tendency to use available market information for incremental
or innovative products.
Competitive strength is “an indication of the business unit’s advantages or position in
the market vis-a-vis major competitors and its ability to compete” [51]. It can be achieved
in three ways [75]:
• Differentiation: Introducing a product of superior quality, higher value and reputa-
tion
• Cost: Offering products that are cheaper than the competition
• Agility: The speed which the company responds to market demands
Apart from these, the firms compete in an environment which doesn’t only include the other
competitors but also the inherent uncertainty. In fact, the environment as a whole governs
the success of a new market entry and their corresponding strategies. In Augusto and
Coelho’s framework, environment has two additional elements: technological turbulence is
“the extent to which the industry is characterized by rapidly changing technologies” and
competitive intensity is the extent to which companies face competition [121][40].
In a competition environment, where all the factors should be analyzed simultaneously,
focusing on one aspect can lead to very risky or poor decisions. For example, designing a
product only focusing on the customer needs without proper assessment of the competitors
is a dangerous endeavor. One interesting fact that motivates this research is the assessment
of uncertainty that is related to technological turbulence. Long-term strategic planning
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in the existence of technological turbulence is already a difficult task but at the same
time, requires rapid decision-making. In such a fast-paced decision making environment,
coordination between different departments in a firm is also difficult.
For achieving a successful design, the elements of competitive strength are in fact the
primary control variables. In this context, the turbulence is the primary noise factor. The
firm’s ability to anticipate the customer preferences and competitor actions is important
and the proper assessment of uncertainty is a necessity. In fact, any study aiming to
introduce a competitive product to today’s market should incorporate these elements. For
these purposes, Porter’s definition of competitive strategy is used: “a combination of the
goals for which the firm is striving and the policies by which it is seeking to get there” [166].
This definition divides competitive strategy into two critical elements: defining the goal,
and identifying the policies.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to defining the thesis problem and explaining the game type
proposed in details as a prior step to presenting tools that can help solve the problem. The
game is an asymmetric, non-cooperative, non-zero-sum, sequential (dynamic), multi-stage,
imperfect information, discrete-time, stochastic game with finite number of players. A brief
introduction to dynamic programming, an optimization technique used for solving certain
types of dynamic games will also be provided in Section 2.10.
2.9 Strategic Flexibility
Neumann and Morgenstern define strategy as “sequence of individual decisions geared to-
wards a certain goal [197]. Dynamic and competitive product markets are characterized
by high levels of uncertainty about the future value of aircraft programs due to the fact
that “products, manufacturing processes, markets, distribution channels and competitive
boundaries are in a state of continuous flux” [78]. This makes the selection of a single
“best” solution an unrealistic strategic objective [174].One strong benefit that motivates
the introduction of product families is the flexibility to account for changing requirements
and the market environment. However, from the flexibility point of view, the way to eval-
uate the value of the flexibility is through the proper assessment of uncertainty as in fact a
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flexible decision is the decision that manages the uncertainty. In this context, the strategic
flexibility following the guidelines of Sanchez et al. is considered [175]. Strategic flexibility
is the firm’s ability to respond to various demands from dynamic and uncertain competitive
environments and it is composed of two elements:
1. Resource flexibility: Resource flexibility is the ability to use a certain product
platform to effectively develop, manufacture, distribute, and market for different range
of needs and segments.
2. Coordination flexibility: Coordination flexibility is the use of existing resources to
adapt to the uncertainty in the competition and the market needs.
This decomposition of strategic flexibility suggests a two-stage approach to the product
family design from a managerial point of view. In product families, managers can “coor-
dinate” various decisions such as canceling the entire program, exiting a certain segment,
entering a certain segment and quantities to be produced. Managers can also decide on
the design of a new platform following the abandonment of the previous one. Due to the
stochastic nature of real-life decision making problems, at any decision epoch, managers
may also decide to wait for more information to become available. This is rarely observed
as especially for aircraft programs, the sunk cost is usually to high to allow a new risky
endeavor. The possibilities of coordination flexibility of a manager is bounded by the ca-
pabilities of a given platform resource, therefore it can be concluded that these two stages
are interdependent and in fact, coordination flexibility can be seen as a part of resource
flexibility when the “optimal coordination” is performed by the managers.
At this point, it is important to introduce the term “robustness” and make a clear
distinction between robustness and flexibility which are sometimes used interchangeably.
Robust design methods such as the Robust Design Simulation (RDS), which was intro-
duced by Mavris et al. propose a new paradigm claiming the traditional design methods
“fail to address the presence of uncertainty at numerous levels of the design hierarchy”. The
new approach enables robustness at the system level by incorporating uncertainty to multi-
disciplinary design optimization (MDO) [139] . The way flexibility differs from robustness
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Figure 11: Flexibility and Robustness as a Function of the System Objectives and Environ-
ment [173]
as applied to this methodology is on the same page as Saleh et al. [173]. Flexibility is
the platform’s ability to satisfy changing requirements (entering different market segments)
whereas robustness is the platform’s ability to satisfy a certain market segment despite
changes in the market environment.
Using the wing design example in Section 2.7, now another notional example is intro-
duced to demonstrate ways to incorporate flexibility into the wing design. The notional
deterministic program value-driven wing planform design for a single aircraft design is ex-
tended to first recognize that the robust design may differ from the deterministic point
design as suggested by numerous studies. Based on this, a representative comparison of
this VDD for a single small aircraft (1) is extended to a VDD for a single, large aircraft
(2), a VDD for small and large aircraft family program with the a priori certain knowledge
of both segments will be entered (1+2) and finally a VDD for a flexible program in which
the manufacturer is certain to enter the smaller aircraft segment “1” but uncertain about
the future and may enter the segment “2” depending on the conditions (1→2). The future
conditions may be based on the uncertainty related to the program, market dynamics as
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Figure 12: Notional Example of Wing Planforms Optimized for Different Scenarios
well as the actions of the competitors.
The notional example of a flexible product platform presents a paradigm that is similar
to the approach of Lim [130]. In Lim’s work, the main focus is on enabling future feasibility
by trading current sub-optimality. In this thesis, similarly, the value generated only by the
baseline vehicle is not of primary importance. This thesis focuses on maximizing the overall
family program value by extending the initial platform to developing and introducing new
derivatives in the search of a program level optimality.
To sum up, for the next generation product family designs, a myopic policy will fail in the
existence of competition and uncertainty [123]. It is not an enhanced decision making tool,
but almost a design requirement given the complexity of real-world market environments
[177]. This thesis follows a similar paradigm shift, the paradigm shift that resulted in birth
of robust design via extension of traditional design, and extends the robust design into a
VDD, flexible design paradigm in the presence of competition.
2.9.1 Real Options
High-level corporate decisions are made in dynamic environments and managers have the
options to consider. These options are used to adapt to changing environment and take
advantage of new market opportunities. All of these options to modify projects are called
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Figure 13: Notional Cash-flow for an Individual Product versus Strategically Introduced
Product Family
“real options”. Dixit and Pindyck recognize the analogy between valuing financial options
and investments in real assets or real options that consider irreversible expenditures and
uncertain future payoffs [68]. Traditional methods based on DCF usually fail in analyzing
projects with future uncertainty such as the research problem proposed in this thesis. The
option theory is an analytical tool that can be used in such cases to evaluate the projects
and help both the design and investment decisions [151].
Observations from the LCA industry suggest that the simultaneous introduction of fam-
ily members is not common. Instead, a certain version is introduced to form the precursor
to other derivatives. Even though the development of a second aircraft heavily based on
the first may not be that challenging, this may result in an overlap of marketing and pre-
marketing for different designs. Value-maximizing manufacturers will perhaps aim not to
delay the introduction of a vehicle that is already designed while designing the derivatives
that are cheaper and quicker to develop. This observation is also shown in Figure 13.
Miller and Clarke have implemented Real Options Analysis (ROA) to the R&D process
of a new aircraft model [145]. The authors have divided the R&D process into three seg-
ments: the preliminary studies, the preliminary design and the product development for
which in between these stages, the managers can proceed, wait to proceed or completely
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halt the project similar to the approach of Huchzermeier and Loch [100]. This is enabled
by the availability of more information as time progresses and the uncertainty for the same
time in the future is reduced. These types of decisions must be in complete loop with not
only the uncertainty caused by market risk or firm-specific shocks but also the decisions
of other players. These factors, when considered together, affect the optimal strategy of a
given player and the corresponding timings. Trigeorgis has expressed that the market may
force a company to invest early which erodes the flexibility value of a deferred investment
strategy [193]. Two well-known approaches for valuing a risky investment using real options
theory are:
• Contingent claims (CC) with risk neutral valuation
• Dynamic programming (DP) using a constant risk adjusted discount rate
For an example scenario combining the flexibility and dynamic programming supported
decision making, utilization of commonality can be framed as real options [133]. If a baseline
vehicle that hosts the common platform is developed, the manufacturer develops the option
to introduce a derivative vehicle for another market segment at a reduced cost and the
manufacturer’s choice of time. The price of the option is the present value of additional
profits the firm would receive if a point design instead of a derivative was produced. From the
flexibility point of view, the firm can still develop another point design with no commonality
but in such a case, exercise price of the option is higher by the amount of cost savings from
commonality.
The next section deals with the fundamentals of stochastic dynamic programming, the
technique utilized in this thesis to value an aircraft family program under uncertainty and
competition. Insley et al. compare the CC and DP approaches for their applications to
pure, stand-alone real options approach [102]. At decision epochs though, managers will
immediately make use of the positive value of flexibility by adding the value to the portfolio.
Another work from Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory’s (ASDL) research also fo-
cuses on adopting flexibility as a useful strategy and to quantify these benefits by comparing
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flexible designs to design alternatives which did not have an embedded flexibility [82]. Fer-
nandez found that the flexibility is more valuable when the uncertainty is high, however
the author’s application of real options to the flexibility in aerospace programs did not
involve competitive reactions. One of the examples presented included a winglet option on
an airliner.
Adner et al. limit the practical applications of NPV approach to low uncertainty and
low irreversibility projects [27]. Low irreversibility, within this context, may mean a project
that requires little investment to enter. The same researchers also limit the usage of real
options to fixed target market and fixed technical agenda problems. Both of these assump-
tions are not valid for the problem presented in this thesis. First, the target market is a
dynamic market with potential entrants and competition. Second, the technical agenda
is not fixed as firms keep the option to design and manufacture a potential derivative.
These factors do not completely rule out an application of real options, but clearly indicate
that approaches utilizing stand-alone real options techniques are not sufficient to cover all
potential strategies.
2.10 Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Most stochastic games are competitive MDPs where there are two or more controllers or
players whose fortunes are coupled either because the probability transitions are coupled or
because their rewards are coupled, or both [83]. MDP is defined as a “stochastic sequential
decision problem in which the set of actions, the rewards, and the transition probabilities
depend only on the current state of the system and the current action selected; the history
of the problem has no effect on current decisions” [167]. The underlying assumption is
that the players have complete knowledge of these coupling functions but they act non-
cooperatively. As described previously, this non-cooperative mindset leads to non-collusive,
selfish strategy of maximizing own payoff value. Dynamic stochastic games have always
been considered and used to analyze the strategic interactions of forward-looking players in
dynamic environments [71]. In addition to this, MDPs are recently more popular among
real options applications due to two advantages: they allow endogeneity of firm’s decisions
42
and the unobserved heterogeneity of firms [92].
The design problem in this thesis framework is solved by identifying a certain exten-
sion of discrete stochastic dynamic programming as a useful tool to conduct the market
simulations. First, a single agent, non-competitive, finite horizon, stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming is introduced in the guidelines of Bertsekas [45]. The fundamentals are as follows:
Time is discrete and indexed by t= 0,1, ..., T < ∞. The uncertainty is introduced through
zt, an exogenous random variable that follows a Markov process which follows a transition
function Q and the initial value for the random variable is known z0:
Q(z′, z) = Pr(zt+1 ≤ z′ | zt = z)
At the time t, zt is known. The objective function u is the expected sum of instantaneous
returns discounted by the discount factor β . The return function u is a continuous and
bounded function of the state variable xt and the control variable ct . The “law of motion”
of the state with x0 known is:
xt+1 = f(xt, zt, ct)
The function gt is referred to as decision rule. The action ct in each period depends
only on the current states through the time-varying function gt(xt,zt). Expected discounted
present value of a feasible policy πT=(g0, g1,..., gT) from the initial time to the final time
T is:




The stochastic dynamic programming problem is to choose a policy π*T that maximizes
WT by solving:
maxπtWT (x0, z0, πT )
s.t.
xt+1 = f(xt, zt, gt(xt, zt))
gt(xt, zt)εC(xt, zt)
x0, z0, Q(z′, z) given
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Theorem of the Maximum states this dynamic programming problem has a solution
using the Feller property [187]. A possible application of stochastic dynamic programming
algorithm is the dynamic games which is covered in the following subsection.
2.10.1 Dynamic Games
In dynamic games, multiple agents dynamically optimize their policies when their actions
affect the welfare of others [146]. For the representation purposes, it is more useful to be
consistent with the notation structure of the references used. In a Markov m-agent game,
at each decision epoch the agent p observes the state of an economic system s element of
S and takes an action xp element X , earning a reward fp(s,xp,x-p). This time the actions
of the other m-1 agents, x-p, also define the state for the agent p. This time, state of
the economic system is a jointly controlled Markov process by both the exogenous random
shock and the previous state of the system as well as the actions of the agents.
The non-cooperative Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) are the equilibria that yield a
Nash equilibrium in every proper sub-game. Considering that the agents are aware of the
state at time t and the actions of all other m-1 agents but not the exogenous random
shock, a perfect information condition occurs. Following this, MPE is a set of m policies of
state-contingent actions xp*: S→X, p=1,2,..., m such that the policy xp* maximizes the
present value of agent p’s current, expected future rewards when the other agents follow






st+1 = g(st, xt, εt+1)




fi(s, x, x∗−p(s)) + βEεVp(g(s, x, x∗−p(s), ε))
}
where Vp(s) indicates the maximum current, expected future rewards of agent p that
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can be obtained while all the other agents follow their equilibrium strategies x-p*. Bellman’s
equation is needed in order to reduce a problem involving a sequence of decision rules to a
sequence of choices for the control variable. This reduces the dynamic problem to a sequence
of static problems. Bellman’s principle of optimality states: “An optimal policy has the
property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions
must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision”
[41]. Finite horizon dynamic programming problems are usually solved by a procedure
called backward induction. The procedure relies on functional equations used in an iterative
fashion in order to calculate the optimal total value function and the corresponding optimal
policy.
2.11 Dynamic Stochastic Industrial Organization Models
2.11.1 R&D, Market Entry and Exit
Since different industries have different characteristics, there is not a single IO model that
can capture the key interactions between the firms and the market environment. For this
purpose, in Chapter 3, the industry characteristics are observed to characterize certain
industry-specific features. For the case considered, based on the assumed description of the
“product lifecycle”, one of the key elements is the sunk cost related to R&D investment
required and the value-oriented firms must ensure a positive cash-flow before making such
a risky decision. The managers and top-level decision makers should also consider the
uncertainty caused by the time-lag. R&D investments are inherently dynamic and uncertain
due to these reasons. This results in a greater option value for a new entrepreneur than it
has for an already operating (incumbent) business. Risk increases the option value which
pushes some entrepreneurs to high-risk R&D industries such as aerospace industry [47].
Any innovation resulting from the R&D effort changes the structure of the market which
can potentially alter the payoffs and perhaps the optimal policies for the remaining players.
However, R&D efforts in real life are not really “one-shot decisions” [171].
For dynamic industries that are described by long-run equilibria, market-wide shocks
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can significantly affect firm entry and exit decisions. Shifts in consumer preferences, un-
expected changes in the manufacturing costs and the introduction of new technologies via
new entrants are some of the factors that can affect these decisions. Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson find “substantial and persistent” differences in entry and exit practices. They ob-
serve that the entry and exit rates at a given time for a given industry are highly correlated
[73]. Caves recognizes the existence of a stochastic market process based on the evidence of
many firms facing “infant mortality” due to both system-wide and firm-specific shocks [55].
Similarly, a Booz Allen Hamilton study observes that 35% of all newly introduced prod-
ucts fail despite initially anticipating positive NPV at the time of market entry [48]. Olley
and Pakes have also related the entry and exit patterns to the firm characteristics [154].
This clearly defines the need for a comprehensive technique to enable proper decision aid
methodology where managers can still make decisions after the product platform is defined
and competition and uncertainty is present.
2.11.2 The Need for Industrial Organization Models
Real-world problems require the simultaneous assessment of endogenous and exogenous
uncertainty. The three fundamental approaches: NPV, real options analysis, and game
theory fail to fully address some of the needs in the industry. Despite this fact, they come
with certain advantages and disadvantages [58].
Among these three approaches, Industrial Organization (IO) has benefited from the
listed advantages of all three and can be seen as a more complex methodology that combines
their strengths. IO is a subset of microeconomics that deals with the structure of industries
in the economy and the behavior of firms and individuals in these industries [74]. Unlike
most microeconomics approaches though, IO focuses on oligopolies where there are a few
firms (but not too many as in competitive markets, or only one as in a monopoly) thus
deviating from monopoly and perfect competition [192]. Mostly, it is a game-theoretical
approach as it has received most benefits from the developments in game theory. At this
point, classification of decision situations is necessary to enhance the understanding of the
overall picture [58].
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Table 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Stand-alone Approaches [58]
Approach Advantages Disadvantages
Standard NPV Easy to use, convincing logic,
widely used, easy to communicate
Assumes precommitment to a given
plan of action, often treating
investment as a one-time decision
(“invest now or never”), ignores
flexibility to adapt to unexpected
market developments or strategic
interactions
Real Options Incorporates market uncertainty
and managerial flexibility,
recognizes that investment decisions
can be delayed, staged, or adjusted
under certain future contingencies
Typically applied to the valuation
of a monopolist or proprietary
option, ignores (endogenous)
competitive interactions











Static Net Present Value
Discounted Cash Flow
Static Industrial Organization
Dynamic Deterministic Resource extraction
Forest economics
Dynamic Industrial Organization
Stochastic Real Options Analysis Option games
Dynamic Stochastic IO
Brennan and Trigeorgis distinguish static, dynamic, and real-options vs. game-theoretic
valuation models [49]. In static models, the stream of decisions is specified with no man-
agerial flexibility. In dynamic models, projects can be actively managed to adopt to an
exogenous uncertainty. This can be done via decision-tree analysis, dynamic programming,
and ROA models that incorporate strategic interactions with dynamic and stochastic ele-
ments. In real-options game-theoretic models, firms condition their decisions not only on
the resolution of exogenous uncertainties but also on the actions of competitors. There-
fore, the future value is an outcome of a game including multiple players and the market
environment.
In this thesis, dynamic and stochastic IO models are used. The following chapters
will present the observations from the industry leading to the justification for this choice.
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It is hypothesized that certain characteristics of such markets can be better modeled and




INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed research framework is motivated by some of the key and unique aspects of the
commercial aircraft market, therefore it is crucial to identify these properties as a precursor.
In the first section of this chapter, the observed industry characteristics are identified along
with some aircraft family examples. Examples include a military case (Joint Strike Fighter)
as well as a commercial case (Boeing 737). This thesis focuses on the commercial aircraft
families only, so it is necessary to differentiate between the dynamics of commercial programs
and military programs. This differentiation will also enable potential extensions to the
framework to account for military applications. Observations indicate that, within the
commercial aircraft market, the dynamics in wide-body market and narrow-body markets
exhibit different properties. Therefore, it is felt necessary to distinguish between them.
Later on, focusing on the narrow-body market, a further discussion on the possible market
entry and exit scenarios is made, however, most of these scenarios need serious accounting
of uncertainty for the whole program lifecycle. Thus, the emphasis will be on how to collect
uncertainty data, quantify it, and use it for value-driven designs. The final Section 3.8,
“Formal Problem Formulation”, then converts these “real-life” observations into a design
problem. Chapter 4 builds on these essentials to suggest a solution framework.
3.1 LCA Industry Characteristics
For many years, commercial aircraft have been one of the main exports of United States
(US). Only in 2012, the aerospace industry contributed $118.5 billion in export sales to
the US economy with a net balance of $70.5 billion which is the largest trade surplus of
any manufacturing industry. This is achieved by the high 64.3 percent export rate of the
American aerospace production. Also on a global perspective, considering the total amount
of annual sales, it is straightforward to assume it has been an important economic element
for both European Union (EU) and US economies. This industry is usually identified as a
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Figure 14: World Market Share of LCA by Value of Deliveries 1974 to 1999 [22]
“strategic” industry, meaning it is critical for the welfare of a nation as well as a source of
national pride as an indicator of technological superiority. This argument can be supported
by the fact that 500,000 people are employed in aerospace-related scientific and technical
jobs across the US and more than 700,000 people are supported in related fields. For the
next 20 years, the rough estimates indicate that the number of large commercial airplanes
will increase by 3.5% annually for a total of 34,000 at $4.5 trillion [25].
Commercial aircraft market has constantly gone through changes which are usually
shaped by the merger activity. Many of these merger activities have been triggered when
the future viability of the weaker firm is debatable. Regardless of the reason, such merger
activity has lead to a market structure with high concentration. High concentration is not
only caused by these activities as the need for large capital investments, leading technical
capabilities, and an ability to serve the customers worldwide can be listed as additional
factors [52]. The additional difficulty to enter the market due to the size of required capital
investments will be detailed in Section 3.4. The Figure 14 shows the merger activity prior
to 2000 [22].
The last decade in the commercial aircraft industry has exhibited some duopoly prop-
erties with two main players: The Boeing Company of US and the Airbus Industrie of EU.
This was mainly a result of the merging of Boeing with McDonnell Douglas Corporation in
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Figure 15: Number of Aircraft Ordered from Airbus and Boeing from 2003 to 2013 [20]
1997 leaving the Western airliners with two aircraft manufacturers. The data presented in
Figure 15 clearly shows that these two players have enjoyed very even market shares start-
ing around the year 2000. This data, even on its own can indicate some fierce competition
between the duopolists.
Competition within the commercial aircraft industry’s unusual structure motivated by
its strategic importance has usually triggered governmental trade policies to be implemented
on this industry. For example, Airbus-Boeing rivalry has caused trade disputes between
US and EU [103]. 1992 US-EU agreement on the trade of civil aircraft has limited the
government subsidies which as a result increased the aircraft prices by about 3.7%. Airbus
has constantly penetrated into Boeing’s market space since it began production in 1970s
with substantial financial assistance from European governments.
The policymakers have recently been discussing if US can sustain its powerful position in
this fast-growing industry. The narrow-body market has been threatened by possible entries
of numerous foreign manufacturers as early as 2017. This is a critical market segment that
encompasses about half of all commercial aircraft revenues and more than 60% of commercial
aircraft deliveries. Many agree that the long-standing duopoly of Boeing and Airbus is over
especially in the narrow-body market [15]. Section 3.6 is dedicated to the observations made
on potential entrants.
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Overall, the observations from the LCA industry is inconsistent with what the static
analysis would suggest. Benkard specifically notes the common occurrence of pricing prod-
ucts below the level of static Marginal Cost (MC) especially after the introduction of a
new aircraft [43]. The justification is based on the analysis of detailed cost and price data
for Lockheed L-1011. Benkard also uses detailed cost data to introduce an organizational
learning and forgetting model, which is used for better explaining the fore-mentioned in-
dustry dynamics [42]. Learning curves exist in many industries [35]. Aerospace industry
and aircraft production is one of the first documented examples [202].
Observation 1: Aircraft production is the first published case of Learning by Doing (LBD)
also known as the learning curve. Economies of scale are enormous relative to small market
demand. Recurring costs are reduced through utilization of similar parts across different
vehicles.
Learning curve effects can also ease the predatory pricing. Predation is a set of actions
which are unprofitable for the firm that executes them but they potentially contribute to a
competitor’s exit [156]. Cabrat and Riordan demonstrate how learning curve effects create
equilibrium incentives for predatory pricing [53]. They also present that the high industry
concentration and aggressive competition in LCA industry are partially caused by steep
learning curves. Seitz et al. have found out that out of 22 commercial airplanes developed,
only Boeing 707, Boeing 727, and the DC-8 have been profitable [178]. This is a valuable
information as on many occasions, aircraft manufacturers try to keep this sort of data
confidential.
Observation 2: Static models fail to represent some of the observations in the LCA in-
dustry.
3.2 Examples of Existing Aircraft Families
In this section, some of the observations from two aircraft families will be presented: Joint
Strike Fighter and Boeing 737.
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3.2.1 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
The motivation to initiate the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was simple: In June 2000,
Defense Secretary William Cohen wrote a letter to Congress stating:
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is critically important to the modernization of
United States conventional forces and is the cornerstone of tactical aircraft modernization.
It will replace 1,763 Air Force, 480 Navy, and 609 Marine Corps aircraft; 2,852 aircraft
in total. The JSF’s stealth, advanced avionics, and ability to carry a full array of modern
precision munitions will make it much more capable than the legacy aircraft it replaces when
operating under challenging circumstances against modern air defenses. It is also critical
to the modernization of our ally forces for coalition welfare.
The primary selling point of the idea has been serving diverse needs of the Air Force,
Navy and Marine Corps with different types of aircraft sharing commonality to reduce the
unit cost. The three planned versions of JSF had the following requirements:
• Air Force CTOL Version (F-35A): A conventional take off and landing (CTOL)
multi-role aircraft to replace the F-16 and A-10 and to complement the F-22
• Marine Corps STOVL Version (F-35B): A short take off and vertical landing
(STOVL) aircraft to replace the AV-8B and the F/A-18
• Navy Carrier-Suitable Version (F-35C): A carrier based (CV), first day of the
war, survivable strike fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F
The initial statement by the Air Force emphasized on the commonality and advanced tech-
nologies to meet the cost and performance requirements:
The F-35 program will develop and deploy a family of highly capable, affordable, fifth
generation strike fighter aircraft to meet the operational needs of the Air Force, Navy, Ma-
rine Corps, and Allies with optimum commonality to minimize lifecycle costs. The F-35 was
designed from the bottom-up to be our premier surface-to-air missile killer and is uniquely
equipped for this mission with cutting edge processing power, synthetic aperture radar inte-
gration techniques, and advanced target recognition. The F-35 also provides “leap ahead”
capabilities in its resistance to jamming, maintainability, and logistic support[157].
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The Department of the Navy statement similarly stated:
The commonality designed into the joint F-35 program will minimize acquisition and op-
erating costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and allow enhanced interoperability
with our sister Service, the United States Air Force, and the eight partner nations partic-
ipating in the development of this aircraft. This aircraft will give combatant commanders
greater flexibility across the range of military operations. A true fifth generation aircraft,
the F-35 will enhance precision strike capability through unprecedented stealth, range, sensor
fusion, improved radar performance, combat identification and electronic attack capabilities
compared to legacy platforms. It will also add sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities,
as compared to the legacy platforms it will replace, and will tie together disparate units
scattered across the battlefield, in real time[157].
The program presents a clear example of an aerospace program that attempts to utilize
the commonality for various benefits. Different branches of the military, as well as allied
nations, were included into the program to eventually reduce the unit costs through in-
creasing the production volume. With certain tradeoffs between the performance and cost,
a common ground was found between different customers with the overall aim of maturing
advanced technologies as well as components and production processes.
Most of the avionics, the canopy, and radar are common in all three variants while
the fundamental differences are caused by different modes of take off. As an example, the
internal structure of the naval version is stronger to withstand the high stresses of catapult-
assisted carrier launches and tail-hook arrested carrier landings. The marine version has a
lift fan which increases the empty weight and reduces the fuel capacity.
Observation 3: Creating a common platform to satisfy a diverse set of customer require-
ments may result in reduced program value.
Some of the difficulties faced in developing the JSF can imply that the additional family
design challenges can always be faced due to diverse set of customer requirements. This may
be supported by the fact that the program already resulted in a 26% cost increase, as well
as a 5 year delay from the baseline established in 2007. The average unit price has almost
doubled and the lifecycle cost is expected to be much higher than initial expectations[190].
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Figure 16: Commonality among Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Variants [14]
Apart from the increased cost, and possibly additional cost caused by the delay of delivery
to the partners, performance problems are also experienced throughout the variants.
Observation 4: Managers of aircraft family programs can still actively be involved and
make value-adding decisions even after the design is fixed. For different programs, there are
different means to reach that goal.
The JSF program is a difficult, and risky project, not only due to the fact that diverse
needs are satisfied by a common platform, but also due to the integration of advanced
technologies. Therefore, it is not straightforward and clear to attribute the problems expe-
rienced in the development program to the strategy of using a common platform for such
different needs. Various aerospace programs throughout the history have shown that the
difficulties, and the risk associated can come from all different sources. However, Depart-
ment of Defense’s (DOD) strategy of decoupling F-35B tests from F-35A and F-35C tests
to prevent a complete program slowdown may suggest that the problems related to the
JSF program may partially be related to satisfying the demanding needs of Marine Corps
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as F-35B has been under-performing in the flight tests. The JSF program can also be an
example of the necessity of direct involvement of managers throughout the development
cycle.
3.2.2 Boeing 737 Families
Before examining the Boeing Corporation’s strategy on the 737 family, it is critical to
classify different types and levels of commonality observed across different vehicles. For the
case of commercial aircraft, commonality can be observed in different ways. In Figure 17,
different levels of commonalities between the products of the same company are shown. It
is possible to observe:
• Commonality between families (e.g. similar flight deck structure between B737NG,
B767-400ER and B777)
• Commonality across generations of families (e.g. Boeing relies heavily on
B737NG while designing on the re-engined B737MAX family)
• Commonality within the family (e.g. B737-600, B737-700, B737-800 and B737-
900ER shares the same wing as well as many other common parts)
• Commonality between different versions of the same model (e.g. B737-700ER
has an extra fuel tank, B737-700C is the convertible version in which the seats can be
removed to carry cargo instead, B737-700W is the version with winglets and B737-
700BBJ is the business jet version)
Within this context, the main intent is to emphasize the vehicle commonality from an engi-
neering perspective. On the other hand, the term “fleet commonality” is also popular among
airlines and other stakeholders implying the operational ease of switching between different
aircraft due to shared platforms. Utilizing a family of aircraft sharing common platforms
makes the operations easier for airlines thanks to the factors such as simplified crew schedul-
ing and ground operations. In the vehicle acquisition practices observed today, this is one
of the primary factors. One example is Southwest Airlines preferring Boeing B737MAX
over Airbus A320neo (New Engine Option). The chief operating officer of Southwest stated
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Figure 17: Different Levels of Commonality
that “Choice of the B737MAX guarantees to Southwest Airlines a single-fleet type well into
the next decade with all the operational benefits associated with training and schedule re-
covery and our maintenance programs.” referring to the Southwest fleet composed entirely
of Boeing aircraft and primarily of B737-700 [17]. From an engineering point of view, the
focus is on parts-based and physical architecture commonalities and specifically following
the classification of different types of commonalities observed in the commercial aircraft
industry, the primary focus on this section will be on commonality within the family using
the Boeing 737 families as an example based on its success.
The best-selling commercial airliner since its introduction in 1968, 737 is arguably one
of the most successful commercial aircraft program in the history of aviation. The Boeing
737 series is composed of four generations: the Original series, the Classic series, the Next
Generation (NG) series and the MAX series which is planned to be introduced in 2017.
MAX series will replace 737-700, 737-800 and 737-900 with MAX 7, MAX 8 and MAX 9
respectively. Boeing has followed a similar strategy in all these generations utilizing the
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Figure 18: The Seating Chart for Economy Configuration for B737NG [11]
same wing throughout the variants and fuselage plugs which enable scaling or “stretching”
between the variants. Scaling the fuselage can also be seen as a subset of module-based
product family design due to the addition of new modules to serve different market segments.
These fuselage plugs do not change the diameter of the fuselage. Figure 18 shows the
corresponding seat layout for each variant of the 737NG family to demonstrate fuselage
stretching.
Additional fuselage plugs result in an increased operating empty weight (OEW). Also,
due to additional passenger capacity, the payload is increased for a fully occupied flight.
These two factors result in an increased TOGW, which as a result increases the wing
loading when the same wing is utilized among the variants. This may compromise the
fuel efficiency especially at the cruise condition. In Figure 19, it is possible to observe
how the same fuel capacity and the same wing shapes the payload-range diagram as the
fuselage is extended. Especially, the comparison of 737-700 and 737-800 payload-range
limits exhibit how sharing too many common parts increase the payload capacity at the
expense of reduced range capability. In this particular comparison, every derivative except
737-600 utilize an additional winglet and 737-900ER extended range version has a slightly
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Figure 19: Payload and Range Diagram for B737NG Aircraft Family [11]
larger fuel tank which can still offer a relatively flexible range capability while extending
the payload capacity. At this point, it is necessary to clarify that a larger payload-range
envelope does not correspond to a higher operational efficiency, but it can clearly be an
indication of high operational flexibility.
Most of the aircraft families, including the B737NG family, also share common empen-
nage. However, the general trend of the need for a bigger wing as the TOGW increases is
not easily applicable to the empennage sizing. Empennage sizing usually involves advanced
stability, and control analysis, but in simple terms, the tail aims to counter the moments
generated by the wing. Therefore, tail size is related to the wing size as well as the “mo-
ment arm”. Moment arm in this case is the distance between the tail and the wing which
is mainly a function of the fuselage length. Raymer defines the tail volume coefficients for










Moment arms (LHT and LVT ) is approximated as the distance from the tail quarter-
chord to the wing quarter-chord. Wing span (bW), wing area (SW), vertical tail area (SVT),
horizontal tail area (SHT), and mean chord length (CW) are the other geometric properties
used to estimate the volumetric tail coefficients. For jet transport aircraft, these values are
listed at 0.09, and 1.0 for vertical tail, and horizontal tail respectively based on historical
examples. At the conceptual design phase, these numbers can provide some simplified
guidance to the stability, and control related needs of the vehicle defining the minimum
requirements.
In the case of aircraft families, B737NG family uses the same empennage structure.
However A320, B737NG’s competitor in the narrow-body market, has two different tail
designs among its members. The smallest A320 variant, A318, uses a larger tail than its
bigger derivatives. This implies that the bigger derivatives do not necessarily need bigger
tails partially due to the usage of the same wing and partially due to the advantage of having
a longer fuselage which naturally increases the moment arm. Therefore, it is concluded that
the tail should be sized according to the smallest derivative. To sum up, one can suggest
that sharing the same empennage throughout the derivatives may perhaps result in an
additional drag penalty for the bigger derivatives.
Observation 5: Family members in most successful commercial aircraft family programs
share the same empennage, wing, nose, cockpit, nose, and fuselage cross-sections (plugs).
Addition of winglets is not uncommon.
The wing design is one of the most costly elements of aircraft design. In the traditional
aircraft design, the wing is usually sized for the most demanding condition of the design
mission. For most designs, it is possible to argue that it is the landing phase. Unlike the
empennage sizing for the families, the wing is usually sized for the biggest derivative in
cases where multiple wing designs are not available, or seen as unprofitable in means of
program economics.
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There are exceptions to the common observation of sharing the same wing. In certain
aircraft families such as Embraer E-Jet family, different derivatives use different wings.
E-170 and E-175 have a smaller wing and horizontal tail than E-190 and E-195 although
they still share the same fuselage plugs [13]. For the case of a fuselage extension, which
is utilized in this thesis, several assumptions are made. Most of the modern narrow-body
aircraft feature six-abreast cabin configurations. A logical assumption would be to assume
passenger capacity for the 1-class dense configurations are increased by multiplications of
six seats at all times.
lf = lbf +
∆Seats
6 ∆lrow (3)
Starting from the baseline fuselage length lbf, and assuming six seats per row with
ΔSeats representing the number of seats difference, the new fuselage length lf can be cal-
culated using Δlrow. A linear regression based on 1-class, dense configurations of A320neo
family members indicate an estimate of 91cm(~3ft) of fuselage extension per new row of
six seats with an R2 value of 0.98. These values support the assumption of linear fuselage
extension.
Engine selection among aircraft families is also an interesting topic. All of the air-
craft manufacturers in today’s commercial aviation market outsource the engine from three
primary jet engine manufacturers: General Electric Company (GE), Rolls-Royce Holdings
(RR) and Pratt & Whitney (PW). Although different TOGWs associated with different
variants require different thrust levels from the engine. Aircraft manufacturers form part-
nerships with engine manufacturers, and utilize the same engine with different thrust rat-
ings. This is to ease the process of design, certification, and maintenance while allowing
flight crew compatibility. Aircraft engines are also designed as product families such as
CFM International’s CFM56 which have five series within its domain. B737NG is powered
by CFM56-7 which have different thrust ratings ranging from 19,500lbf of CFM56-7B18 to
27,300lbf of CFM56-7B27 used in B737-600 and B737-900 respectively.
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3.3 Comparison of Commercial and Defense Market Systems vs Per-
fect Market Characteristics
So far, a military aircraft family example (JSF) and a commercial aircraft family example
(B737NG) have been introduced. Those sections dealt mainly with the physical architec-
tures of the systems. When the primary concern is designing a vehicle platform that can
be successful in the market competition, the observations should extend beyond the design
to meet the requirements and consider the market systems. In this section, the aim is to
identify some of the key differences between these markets. The differences are observed in:
• Number of producers and buyers
In a perfect market, there are many buyers and producers and none of them are dominant.
In such a case, each buyer has many alternatives to choose from. Commercial aircraft market
can be seen as an oligopoly for the narrow-body market (e.g. Boeing, Airbus, Embraer,
Bombardier etc.), and a duopoly (Boeing, and Airbus) for the wide-body market. Defense
market systems usually have only one buyer, and only one producer which is the prime
contractor that develops the system (e.g. Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and United States
Air Force). In such a monopolistic environment, the prices are determined by a series of
negotiations.
• Product differences
In a perfect market, products are homogenous meaning they are existing, standardized
items which are the same for each producer. Also, its characteristics are stable over time.
In commercial aircraft market, products are relatively closer to each other in means of
missions they can perform. This may be observed within the products of the same company
(e.g. B737-600 can fly 108 passengers to 3050NM whereas B737-700 can fly 128 passengers
to 3365NM) or between the companies (e.g. A319 can fly 124 passengers to 3600NM).
This also indicates these products can be substitutable meaning an airliner company may
buy a particular model instead of another if the conditions are favorable. For military
acquisitions, product is a newly developed item without close substitutes. Also, the design
evolves throughout the time with periodic upgrades.
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• Competition focus
In a perfect market, competition focuses on price/quantity alone. In commercial market
systems, buyer is concerned with the performance and the price of the market equally as
well as many other factors such as buyer’s origin, fleet commonality etc.. In the defense
market systems, buyer is concerned mainly on the product performance as the price is not
the dominant consideration in selecting the producer. Prospective producers compete in
the early development phase through “design rivalry” (e.g. Boeing vs. Lockheed Martin in
JSF program)
• Technology and economies of scale
In a perfect market, no producer has an advantage in production technology, or economies
of scale. In the commercial market, Boeing, and Airbus possess equally extensive know-
how, and equivalent production rates as compared to smaller companies such as Embraer
and Bombardier. In the defense systems, production technology is dynamic, and may
differ among prime contractors and their subcontractors. Economies of scale significantly
influences the producer costs as production volumes are small.
• Market entry
In a perfect market, market is easy for new producers to enter. Commercial markets,
and military markets have similar properties in market entry aspect as new companies
rarely enter the market due to high capital investment required. Especially for the military
markets, the administrative and contractual burdens of a highly regulated industry is a
significant reason to prevent easy entry.
• Acquisition process
In a perfect market, buying the product is a simple, quick, one-step transaction between the
buyer, and the producer. This process is independent of other purchases from the same, or
other producers. In commercial aviation, this process is more complicated as “bidding”, and
“green stamps” are usually observed between different manufacturers [114]. Instant delivery
is usually not possible, as especially in the narrow-body market, buyers are facing backlogs.
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On the other hand, acquiring a military system is a multi-year, multi-step, complex process
which requires many negotiations between the buyer and the producer.
• Intelligence and uncertainty
Perfect market is characterized by perfect intelligence, and absence of uncertainty. Informa-
tion about product price, standards of quality, number of items to be purchased, delivery
schedule etc. is available to all concerned. In both commercial and military markets, un-
certainty is a dominant, and unavoidable reality. The uncertainty specific to LCA market
is elaborated in Section 3.7.
Observation 6: LCA market is an oligopoly with heterogeneous but substitutable products.
Market also has various sources of inherent uncertainty.
3.4 Large Commercial Aircraft Market
In this section, wide-body, and narrow-body markets will be differentiated. Based on the
observations from the current market structures, the primary case study of this thesis will be
on the narrow-body market since it involves more strategic interactions than the wide-body
market due to potential entrants.
3.4.1 Wide-Body Market
The wide-body aircraft, also known as twin-aisle or large aircraft, market encompasses a
wider variety of sub-segments where the most common classification is the small (180-340
seats), medium (260-450 seats) and large (>400 seats) wide-body aircraft. The duopoly
competition can be observed clearly in the wide-body aircraft market where there is no
threat of a new entrant soon. In means of strategies however, the duopolists Boeing, and
Airbus have different visions of the future. Early 2000s saw these two companies deciding
to come up with different products to serve the same market. Airbus’s strategy with 550-
seater A380 has been serving the congested hubs with less flights for the same amount of
passengers so that the problems related to airport capacity are minimized. On the other
hand, Boeing has introduced the B787 which has a capacity of 290 passengers so that
more direct flights with fewer connections are encouraged. Initially, this could mean that
64
Figure 20: The Market S-curve [199]
the duopolists are following “complementary” strategies to each other. However later on,
Airbus announced A350 which is an evolution of the A330 to compete directly with B787.
In the same year of 2005, Boeing also announced it would stretch the existing B747 to create
B747-8 Intercontinental which would compete with A380. These policies show that none of
the manufacturers are willing to cede any part of the wide-body market to its competitor
[138].
Uncertainty associated with the airline strategies to prefer less flights with more capacity
or more flights with less capacity result in two types of uncertainty from the manufacturer’s
point of view. First, the design requirements and market segmentation is subject to change
because of these policies. Second, it alters the number of aircraft required, which results in
different demand profiles. Airline strategies are usually explained by the frequency/market
share S-curve [199]. In a certain Origin-Destination (OD) pair, when the same total daily
transport capacity is distributed to more frequent flights, the market share of an airliner
can be increased thanks to more options offered to attract more customers. This, however,
usually comes at the cost of increased fuel burn per seat per mile. These are very complicated
decisions that need to be carefully made by the airline managers and are out of the scope of
this thesis. However, due to these reasons, especially in the wide-body market “mismatch”
exists between the design missions of different vehicles and these vehicles are not quite
substitutable as observed in the narrow-body market.
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Figure 21: Airbus vs. Boeing Product Line Comparison [8]
Wide-body market is a small market in means of unit numbers with very expensive
goods. Wide-body aircraft are also more expensive, complex and risky to develop. In
the B787 Dreamliner program, Boeing experienced production delays, supplier delays, cost
overruns and technical problems which increased the development cost from the initially
planned amount of $5 billion to $12 billion [23]. This huge jump in R&D costs is attributed
to the extensive use of composite materials, new wing design, new flight deck technologies
etc.. Similarly, Airbus A380 was initially thought to cost $8 billion to develop, but the final
cost rose to $12.2 billion [16].
Observation 7: Extensive R&D effort required results in massive entry costs and this
prevents smaller firms without sufficient know-how and capital resources to enter the market.
Entry cost is also a source of uncertainty as many airframe development programs tend to
take longer and cost more than the initial plans. In any scenario though, utilization of a
common platform across segments allows reduced average entry costs per design.
The existence of relatively high entry costs, and uncertain capacity/frequency demand
is not unique to the wide-body market. However, it is easier to observe these occurrences in
the wide-body market rather than the narrow-body market. This is the main reason, this
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Table 4: Boeing and Airbus Narrow-Body Comparison [85, 158]










section focused mainly on these observations. As explained, one of the significant differences
is in the similarity of the segmentation. As shown in Figure 21, the biggest difference is in
the way Boeing and Airbus attempt to satisfy the needs of the customers in the wide-body
market.
3.4.2 Narrow-Body Market
Narrow-Body, also known as single-aisle aircraft, market is defined to include LCA that
have more than 90 seats. This is not a strict definition however, as the smaller jets such
as Regional Jets (RJ) which are traditionally known to accommodate up to 90 passengers
recently have some models from Bombardier and Embraer that can seat up to 100 passengers
and more. Historically, Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 families define the market. Defining the
market is not only dominating this high concentration market, but also defining the exact
requirements for these aircraft as a norm for potential entrants, setting the standards. The
“mismatch” in the design mission capabilities of wide-body aircraft offering airlines multiple
passenger-range combinations does not exist in the narrow-body market. The products from
these two companies are easily comparable to each other.
This high substitutability between the aircraft from different manufacturers due to sim-
ilar design missions intensifies the competition between the companies and enhances it both
in means of price discounts and increased technical benefits despite the duopoly. Also, the
competition is not necessarily between two different companies. The empirical studies in-
dicate that lowering the prices of a certain model attracts customers that would initially
go for another model of the same company [103]. This may be observed within the same
market and also very rarely, this can be observed across the segments. This cross-price
elasticity phenomenon will be elaborated in Section 4.1.2.
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Table 5: Projected Narrow-body Production Rates for 2018 [3]








An interesting observation from the narrow-body market is the observation of backlog.
Backlog is a natural outcome of capacity constraints, and significant growth of narrow-
body market, especially in regions like Asia Pacific. The high amounts of backlog observed
is a hot topic for debate. Some experts argue that the current production rates of Boeing
and Airbus which are about 42 aircraft per month doesn’t balance supply and demand as
based on the forecasts, the demand is 30 aircraft each per month from these manufacturers
[3]. This is based on the projected forecasts of narrow-body production rates as shown in
Table 5. Capacity constraints haunting the narrow-body market may propose advantages
to the entrants as fast-growing airlines will prefer to expand their fleets earlier and may
go for readily available aircraft. In this framework, backlog will not be modeled due to
its questionable impact although the poor management of capacity can lead to reduced
program value as it may cause production surplus planes called “white tails” or insufficient
supply to the customers.
In addition to these observations, it is also interesting to recognize the need for vehicle-
infrastructure compatibility for the design of future vehicles [108]. Advisory Circular
150/5300-13 of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) categorizes aircraft into different
classes [61]. These classes impose geometric constraints on the dimensions of the vehicles
to ensure safe ground operations. All of the aircraft within the narrow-body families con-
sidered here (B737NG, B737MAX, A320, A320neo) fall within the Airplane Design Group
(ADG) Category 3. These categories are defined by the following:
There are certain consequences of not matching the current ground operation standards
of the fleets of families that are to be replaced. One direct result is a compromised ground
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Table 6: FAA Airplane Design Groups for Airport Design [61]
Airplane wingspan Tail Height
Group I < 49’ (15m) < 20’ (6.1m)
Group II 49’ (15m) - <79’ (24m) 20’ (6.1m) - <30’ (9.1m)
Group III 79’ (24m) - <118’ (36m) 30’ (9.1m) - <45’ (13.7m)
Group IV 118’ (36m) - <171’ (52m) 45’ (13.7m) - <60’ (18.3m)
Group V 171’ (52m) - <214’ (65m) 60’ (18.3m) - <66’ (20.1m)
Group VI 214’ (65m) - <262’ (80m) 66’ (20.1m) - <80’ (24.4m)
utilization, which may result in access to fewer airports both in US, and around the world.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 14 lists similar geometric con-
straints including the wingspan, and the outer main gear wheel span [34]. In this thesis,
all of the future vehicles are forced to have wingspans lower than 118ft, and a tail height
of 45ft, thus falling within the ADG III. This will ensure that the new vehicles can directly
replace the existing fleets without requiring further infrastructure arrangements. These ge-
ometric constraints are easier to model, and implement unlike some other complex drivers.
An example to those complex elements could be the airlines’ preference towards similar
cockpits, which airlines prefer for crew scheduling purposes.
Specifying the common platform modules to the wing, and the empennage ensures all
family members will be within the same ADG per FAA’s classifications. For the scope of
this thesis, it is very difficult to estimate how an increased ADG would affect the market
performance of the family member. However, the justification for this constraint is that
as long as all family members are in the same group, competitiveness of the products
should not be affected. In fact, since the common platform is fixed at a common wing, and
empennage, the constraints imposed ensure the family members stay in the same group.
However, the tail height is an indirect constraint governed by Equation 1 and 2 to ensure
sufficient stability, and control power.
3.5 Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope
Klepper summarizes the LCA industry characteristics in three main elements[120]:

























• Dynamic economies of scale: Includes LBD
• Economies of scope: Includes family cross-effects
Economies of scale are the set of factors that result in reduced average unit cost as the
production volume increases whereas economies of scope, as often related to the economies
of scale, are the set of factors that make it cheaper to produce a variety of products together
instead of producing each one of them on its own independently [99]. The fundamental
contribution to the economies of scale in aircraft industry comes from the learning effect
which is usually modeled with a learning curve[169]. Each time the cumulative production
quantity doubles, the production time and cost will be a certain percentage of its value
before the doubling occurs [35]. A typical power-function for the learning curve is [136]:
γ = ax−b (4)
where
γ is the number of direct labor hours required to produce the xth unit
a is the number of direct labor hours required to produce the first unit
x is the cumulative number of units produced
b is the parameter measuring the rate labor hours are reduced as cumulative
output increases
Benkard indicates that the smooth learning curves used in analyzing LCA industry lack in
explaining the complexity of the actual dynamics and suggests the presence of “Learning
and Forgetting” and the stochastic evolution of learning [42]. In this thesis, in which one
of the primary aims is to assess the commonality benefits, this is an element that can’t
be disregarded and will be incorporated. Apart from these production benefits, static
economies of scale are fairly straight-forward: the total non-recurring cost in the form of
initial investment is divided by the number of total units produced. In this case, the initial
investment is assumed to be independent of the total production volume.
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Aircraft families offer huge commonality benefits in both economies of scale and scope.
Shared parts throughout the entire family means a single type of part can be used across
a greater market share. This brings learning curve effects at a part level, if not the vehicle
level. Unique advantages for commonality also come in economies of scope. Baldwin and
Krugman explain the difficulties faced by A300 not only by the late entry which results in
a hard progress on the learning curve, but also lack of a complete product line extending
to A320 family, and A330/A340s [39].
3.6 Market Entry
Firms consistently have to answer three main questions with regards to market entry [91]:
• What market to enter?: Entry location
• How to enter?: Mode of entry
• When to enter?: Timing of entry
In the light of these questions, the new entrants to the aircraft market face a number of
challenges which may result in quitting the program, reconsidering the design or discovering
successful strategies to make profits in a competitive environment. Entry usually refers to
the entry of a new company. However, it may also mean the introduction of a new vehicle by
a company which is already in the market. Following the terminology of market entry, there
are two incumbent firms: Boeing, and Airbus. Identifying the entrants is not a straight-
forward task as they are not physically present in the market. Based on the available data,
today’s potential entrants include firms from four different countries. Russian, Chinese
aircraft manufacturers have not built a competitive large commercial aircraft yet. However,
Bombardier of Canada and Embraer of Brazil have manufactured regional jets with success.
The brief summary of the entrants as of 2011 is as follows [94]:
• Bombardier CSeries (Canada): CS100 targets B737-600/B-737-700 (A318/A319)
segment whereas CS300 seats between 125-145 passengers to compete with B737-700
(A319) class.
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Figure 23: The Future of the Narrow-body Market [19]
• Embraer (Brazil): E-190 and E-195 currently compete with the B737-600 (A318)
segment.
• COMAC C919 (China): C919 is in the same segment as B737-800 (A320). Ac-
cording to Boeing’s forecasts, China will take delivery of approximately 16% of the
world’s total airplane deliveries until 2032 [18].
• UAC/Irkut MS-21 (Russia): MS-21-200, MS-21-300 and MS-21-400 target B737-
700, B737-800 and B737-900ER (A319, A320 and A321) segments respectively. First
delivery is expected to be between 2017 and 2020.
Considering these two companies who have proven themselves in the industry with
regional jets (RJs) and other two who are supported by their governments, Airbus and
Boeing duopoly is under a challenge. John Leahy, COO-Customers of Airbus, has stated:
“Airbus was not going to make the same mistake with Bombardier that Boeing did with
Airbus–that is, not to take the threat seriously.“ [2]. This implies that the incumbents are
aware of the threat, and the competitive pressure from the potential entrants.
The next question perhaps is: “Is the narrow-body market large enough to sustain all
these manufacturers?” For this purpose, several different forecasts are examined. Boeing
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Figure 24: Timeline of Introduction of B737NG Family vs A320 Family [11]
projects delivery of 25680 narrow-body aircraft over next 20 years as Airbus forecast indi-
cates 22070 deliveries [158, 85]. High number of units and relative ease of entry makes it
a clear opportunity for entrants to recover sunk costs in the narrow-body market. Also,
the narrow-body demand is higher than the current percentage of narrow-body aircraft in
service.
Observation 8: LCA demand is volatile. At the same time, aircraft are expensive, and
durable goods; but the market is small in means of number of units.
The brief company outlook presented represents “the mode of entry”. The question
of “When to enter?” is another important issue. For a given vehicle with fixed level of
technology, it is intuitive to think that a firm will try to enter the market as soon as
possible to prevent the introduction of an out-dated product. But then, the next question
is “Which derivative should be the first one to introduce?”. Even when all derivatives are
kept in mind when designing the product platform, manufacturers try not to delay the
introduction of their products. A particular example to this is possibly the introduction of
B737NG family to compete with A320 family as shown in Figure 24 [11]:
Observation 9: Simultaneous introduction of multiple derivatives at the same year may
technically not be possible as manufacturers usually finalize a baseline design and continue




The production of a commercial aircraft can only begin after years of extensive R&D which
usually averages about 5 to 6 years[119]. For example, the first Boeing 737-200 was in-
troduced to service in 1968, and was flying scheduled routes until 2008. Since commercial
aircraft stay in the market for such long durations, the designer must consider the entire
lifespan of both the vehicle and the program. For the scope of this framework, the uncer-
tainty related to the program lifecycle is the main focus as the manufacturer must ensure
that there is always a market of reasonable size so that at least the development costs or
other sunk costs for the program are covered.
From the airliner point of view, the operational costs come from different sources. Some
of the primary elements of costs are fuel, maintenance costs, crew salaries and benefits,
landing fees, depreciation and amortization. Some of these cost items are highly relevant to
the technical characteristics of the aircraft. Therefore, realizing the needs of airlines as well
as the related uncertainty and projecting them to the conceptual design phase is critical to
ensure robustness.
3.7.1 Systemic Market Risk
Exogenous risk for commercial aircraft programs comes from various sources. These two
elements are considered:
• Overall market demand
• Fuel Prices
The demand for commercial aircraft especially in the narrow-body market is a source of
uncertainty. The number of aircraft deliveries per year is correlated to various factors
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, population growth and demand for air
transportation in general which is hard to estimate due to its dependence on many exogenous
elements such as cultural factors. Decision-makers constantly try to have the most accurate
predictions by monitoring the changes so the market size can be estimated to follow more
profitable strategies. Due to the complexity of this estimation, manufacturers usually come
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up with forecasts that are inconsistent with each other [85, 158]. As explained in Section 3.7,
demand volatility is not only attributable to the growth of the vulnerable airline industry
but also the trends in air travel in general. Different airlines have different views on the
issue of smaller airplanes with higher frequencies or larger airplanes with less frequencies
(usually using main hubs). As an example, Boeing believes the hubs will be more and more
congested to become too expensive to operate within whereas Airbus forecasts, based on an
analysis of 20-year, that the airlines will need larger aircraft to effectively utilize major hubs
[98]. Boeing believes travelers will prefer non-stop flights between smaller hubs. If Airbus’s
predictions hold, especially for the wide-body market, A380 will be more successful than
the smaller B787. Due to such cases, the interest should not only be in the growth of the
market, but also the demand shift between different vehicles.
Future delivery forecasts are usually continuous. Although the possibility of a new
market entrant can significantly change the number of aircraft delivered for an incumbent
firm, this section deals with how the overall demand, that is the number of total deliveries
by all companies combined, changes. To capture the uncertainty of deliveries, a mean
reverting process in the guidelines of Blanco is commonly seen in literature. Their model
can be shown as [149, 46]:
Xt+1 −Xt = κ(µ−Xt) + σεt+1 (5)
In this model, the expected change in demand (Xt+1-Xt) is a function of:
κ is the speed of adjustment coefficient
μ is the long run mean value of annual percent change in deliveries
σv is the demand volatility
ε is the value of random, independent shock
In the absence of “game-changing scenarios, these models tend to work reasonably well
so, this is an underlying assumption for using such simplified approaches. Fuel prices also
tend to affect the airliner’s choice of aircraft. Fuel price forecasts are important from the
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Figure 25: Fuel Price Forecast including Low, Expected, and High Scenarios [26]
manufacturer point of view as airlines prefer more fuel-efficient aircraft as the fuel prices are
higher. In those circumstances, the acquisition cost of the aircraft may be less important.
As aviation relies on fossil fuels and the sources are getting depleted, it is natural to expect a
continuous rise on the jet fuel prices. Three different scenarios from US Energy Information
Administration are shown in Figure 25.
Changes in fuel prices are addressed in many studies that try to balance engineering,
and marketing considerations. It is an important element of airliner’s perception of the
attractiveness of a design therefore important for manufacturers. Manufacturers often face
tradeoffs between the fuel efficiency, and the R&D, and production cost of vehicles. Even in
studies without the competitive analysis, these studies are critical in minimizing the LCC
of a product, and therefore increasing its attractiveness to customers.
3.7.2 Firm-specific Idiosyncratic Shock
Shock refers to the realization of different states of the world [122]. Firm-specific shocks, also
known as idiosyncratic shocks are independent of the market, and specific to firm’s internal
structure, and dynamics [76]. It is possible to identify three components of idiosyncratic
shocks:
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• Uncertainty within customer perception of the product: One possible rea-
son for an idiosyncratic shock can be a quality control issue that results in defected
products. Although not very likely, accidents, or regulatory changes can also affect
the market performance of a vehicle, and can occur at any time period during the
program’s lifecycle.
• Uncertainty within the entry (R&D, and facility) cost: Recalling the Obser-
vation 7, another possible source of firm-specific shock is the entry cost. Although
every R&D program is cursed with certain amounts of uncertainty, it is possible to ex-
pect firms with no previous aircraft production experience to expect higher expected
values and an increased deviation in the distribution. These factors are recognized as
firm-specific elements within this framework.
• Uncertainty within the scrap value: The third source of a firm-specific element
of uncertainty is the usage of scrap values. Previously, two aircraft in the same dis-
continued narrow-body sub-segment were given as examples: B737-600, and A318.
Although, not many data is available about these types of inside information about
firm decisions, it is possible that these products are discontinued in the next gener-
ations because of low order numbers. This implies that even though the R&D effort
is put in and the firm has the capability to produce these vehicles at no cost, it is
economically more profitable to stop production, and receive a scrap value. From the
simulation perspective, these values would enable the decision-makers to identify seg-
ments that are no longer seen profitable. Without such a definition, firms would keep
offering products in those segments as they have nothing to gain by stopping the pro-
duction. Considering the actual practices, it is intuitive that aircraft manufacturers
will recover some of the production tools, and facility resources after the production
is halted.
3.8 Formal Problem Formulation
In this research effort, the main problem arises from the need for incorporating quantitative
approach with a qualitative philosophy. The fundamental philosophy is motivated by the
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observations from the industry: the success of an aerospace program does not solely depend
on the quality of the design, but also the management of the program throughout its entire
lifecycle. When this problem is extended to include the competition between multiple
firms, systemic market risks, and idiosyncratic shocks, it can become complicated quickly
for anyone who attempts to quantify these elements. As shown in the next chapter, the
existing research efforts were usually insufficient to cover certain fundamental elements of
the LCA market.
Based on the literature review, and observations from the industry, a large-scale aerospace
program consists of three types of decisions: design decisions, financial decisions, and eco-
nomic decisions. When the problem of maximizing the expected program value by making
design changes at the conceptual design phase is considered, designers need better decision-
making tools. This need is caused by two main requirements:
1. Early in the design phase, little information is available about the future of the firm
itself, the market, and the competition
2. The product platform to be designed is very likely to stay in the competitive market
for at least two decades
From the designer perspective, when consecutive effects of technical design decisions are
considered within the marketing perspective, the influences are numerous. These technical
decisions may influence the customer’s purchasing behaviors, and firm’s growth opportuni-
ties, as well as strategic benefits to the nation. Since the consequences are widely spread, a
variety of different approaches are encountered in literature. For any of these examples, the
generalized form of a mathematical notation is given by Papalambros [161]. The expanded
form to account for product families is as follows:
Π(x), x = [xd, xb] , xd = [xc, xu] , xb = [xe, xf ]
where Π is the profit (value in this thesis case, however the original notation is used), x
is the set of product decisions that encompasses engineering design decisions xd, and business
decisions xb. Engineering design decisions xd includes common design attributes xc that are
shared throughout the family, and unique design attributes xu that are derivative specific.
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Figure 26: Controllable Elements for Achieving Program Value
Business decisions xb is composed of economic decisions xe, such as product pricing, and
output quantity decisions, and financial decisions xf such as investment timing and value
considerations.
Research Question 1.a: What are the main types of actions controllable by the aircraft
manufacturers before and after entering the market?
Reconsidering the Research Question 1.a, it is now possible to answer the question
based on both the observations, and the literature review. The specific area to answer this
question to be found in the literature review was the means of strategic flexibility used by
top-level decision makers in the industry. Resource flexibility, and coordination flexibility,
explained in Section 2.9, are identified as keys to market success. Based on the assumption
of fixed variants, the design specifications reduce to common design attributes, which are
the product platform specifications. Once the platform is fixed, and the market is entered,
managers can still decide on the strategic control variables (price, or quantity), and to
enter/exit certain segments. In simple terms, the program value is a function of the firm’s
design decisions, economic decisions, and financial decisions.
Underlying assumption is that the design decisions are fixed once the product platform
is utilized in the market. However, the managers can still control the program as suggested
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in Observation 4. Among these, economic decisions can only be made once at least one of
the family members is in the market. On the other hand, financial decisions, decisions that
involve market entry/exit decisions, are made at every stage throughout the lifecycle, both
before, and after the market entry.
As previously suggested, the main focus of this thesis is on the elements of conceptual
design which is shown in bold. A market-focused designer should not only work on the
elements of technical feasibility, but also the economical viability of a commercial program.
Considering the certain control variables defined to answer Research Question 1.2, economic
decisions, and financial decisions are made out of the control of the designer. In certain
conditions, it may be possible to argue that there is an optimal combination of x* , composed
of xd*, xe*, and xf*, that results in Π* . At this point, considering the tools at designer’s
disposal, let’s assume that the economic, and financial decisions will automatically react
optimally to any design changes made by the designer to maximize the program value. This
would allow the designer to see how design changes would result in an environment where
there are obvious interactions between different decisions made even within a single firm.
This is not a straightforward task as uncertainty, and competition affects decisions at all
levels of the commercial program. The observations help answer the Research Question 1.b.
Research Question 1.b: What are some of the key features of the Large Civil Aircraft
(LCA) market?
LCA market has the following main sources of uncertainty:
• Systemic Market Risk
– Overall Market Demand
– Jet Fuel Prices
• Firm-specific Idiosyncratic Shock
– Uncertainty within customer perception of the product
– Uncertainty within the entry (R&D, and facility) cost
– Uncertainty within the scrap value (for exiting the market)
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Figure 27: The Interaction of Decision Makers in a Competitive Market Environment
• Competitive Reactions
Here, possible competitive reactions are also listed as a source of uncertainty. It is intuitive
to think so, as a given firm has no control over the actions of the competitors, and com-
petitive reactions can affect the outcome of the objective of a firm, the program value in
this case. However, in a game-theoretic sense, the competitive reactions are not completely
random under certain assumptions. Those assumptions are listed as the motivations of the
firms in this section.
In fact, in a dynamic, and oligopolistic market environment as shown in Figure 27.
All decisions are interconnected, both within a firm, and between firms via the market
environment. Since most of these decisions are observable and firms are non-cooperatively
focusing on their own benefits, if a firm changes a decision, rational decision-makers are
expected to react.
Key elements of LCA market are identified with the observations, and literature review.
To summarize the key characteristics of large commercial aircraft industry, the following
observations are identified:
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Observation 1: Aircraft production is the first published case of Learning by Doing
(LBD) also known as the learning curve. Economies of scale are enormous relative to small
market demand. Recurring costs are reduced through utilization of similar parts across
different vehicles.
Observation 2: Static models fail to represent some of the observations in the LCA
industry.
Observation 3: Creating a common platform to satisfy a diverse set of customer
requirements may result in reduced program value.
Observation 4: Managers of aircraft family programs can still actively be involved
and make value-adding decisions after the design is fixed. For different programs, there are
different means to reach that goal.
Observation 5: Family members in most successful commercial aircraft family pro-
grams share the same empennage, wing, nose, cockpit, nose, and fuselage cross-sections
(plugs). Addition of winglets is not uncommon.
Observation 6: LCA market is an oligopoly with heterogeneous but substitutable prod-
ucts. Market also has various sources of inherent uncertainty.
Observation 7: Extensive R&D effort required results in massive entry costs and this
prevents smaller firms without sufficient know-how and capital resources to enter the market.
Entry cost is also a source of uncertainty as many airframe development programs tend to
take longer and cost more than the initial plans. In any scenario though, utilization of a
common platform across segments allows reduced average entry costs per design.
Observation 8: LCA demand is volatile. At the same time, aircraft are expensive, and
durable goods; but the market is small in means of number of units.
Observation 9: Simultaneous introduction of multiple derivatives at the same year may
technically not be possible as manufacturers usually finalize a baseline design and continue
to work on the derivatives. In any case, using a common platform greatly reduces the time
to market.
These observations impose certain requirements to any researcher that aims to model
the LCA industry. Based on each observation, the following requirements are defined:
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1. The ability to model economies of scale in a dynamic environment, and expand this
ability to account for shared commonality between the family members.
2. The need for a dynamic model. In this context, the word “dynamic” has two meanings:
The time dependence of decisions, and the strategic interactions between the firms.
3. Commonality may not always be beneficial for increasing the program value. There-
fore, the marketing, engineering, and manufacturing aspects of the problem should be
analyzed concurrently in a dynamic, competitive environment.
4. As defined in Chapter 2, increased program value through flexibility comes from two
components: resource flexibility, and coordination flexibility. Coordination flexibility
involves the actions of program managers after the vehicle platform is fixed, and is
seen to be an important factor for successful aerospace programs. This type of a
strategy space should be included in the model.
5. Observing the practices of existing conventional tube&wing aircraft manufacturers
help reduce the design space by providing a priori knowledge.
6. LCA market features many buyers, and few heterogeneous producers with system-
wide, and firm-specific sources of uncertainty. The design methodology needs the
ability to model, and simulate the competitive interactions, and rational handling of
uncertainty.
7. Entry cost should be modeled as an uncertain consequence of the decision to enter
the market. A framework should also account for potential programs that seem to be
profitable in the beginning, but prematurely end in a loss due to higher entry costs
than anticipated, and/or unfavorable market outcomes.
8. As suggested in Observation 6, one of the main sources of uncertainty in the market
is the volatility of demand. This happens at the overall market demand level, and
product-specific level as firm-specific shocks may alter the customer value perception
of vehicles.
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Figure 28: Design, Business, and Financial Decisions throughout a Program Lifecycle
9. Firms should come up with a strategic plan to introduce family members to the market
in a sequential manner if entry is found to be viable.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to presenting the literature review conducted to identify a model
that can simultaneously capture these industry dynamics. Therefore, it is possible to say
that the observations define the requirements of a model to be found, but the model is not
selected yet. This is the motivation for the next chapter. Finally before readdressing the
primary research question, and listing the necessary assumptions in an attempt to find an
answer, Research Question 1.3 can be rechecked.
Research Question 1.c: How can we define the value from the aircraft manufacturer point
of view? Once it is defined, what are the enablers to quantify it?
Research Question 1.c is partially answered in Section 2.7, and in fact the second part
of this question resonates with the secondary research question. The way to quantify the
value is only possible via a comprehensive, and transparent model that can represent the
industry-specific dynamics.
Research Question 1: For a given oligopolistic market system with inherent uncertainty,
how can an aircraft manufacturer estimate the expected family program value? How can we
use this valuation technique to assess program risk of a new design?
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Modeling and simulating a competition to identify valuable designs is a difficult task.
Any research attempt addressing this area needs clear assumptions. First, assumptions
related to firm’s behavior is explained. Aircraft manufacturers as players have the following
characteristics:
• Firms (both incumbents, and entrants) have similar expectations of ex-
ogenous uncertainty: Although firms may be subject to different shocks, they have
similar expectations of market-wide uncertainty such as demand fluctuations. No firm
has the perfect information, or complete confidence about the future. It is assumed
that they all observe similar forecasts.
• Firms do not enter the market if an economic return is not anticipated:
This assumption is critical to limit the number of firms to a finite value, as market
can only sustain a certain amount of players. This assumption is also easy to justify
from a realistic perspective as firm theory suggests that the firms exist to generate
value.
• Firms are value-maximizers: Firms will follow the policies that result in a maxi-
mized expected value metric. Value metric in this case is the profit.
• Firms act rationally: Firms behave according to rational expectations.
• Firms play strategically with long-term goals: Instead of myopic, short-term
profits, the firms focus on the overall goals for the entire program lifecycle.
It is possible to argue that these assumptions do not differ significantly from the actual
motivations of existing firms, though one critical aspect about these assumptions is the
reality of the incumbent firms, to possibly deter new entrants at all costs. In this thesis
environment, incumbent firms will do anything to maximize their program values. Most of
the time, it is logical to expect these firms to try to prevent the new entry at the expense
of short-term benefits.
Once the motivations of the firms, which are players(or agents), are defined, the second
step is to define the structure of the market.
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In this framework, firms compete in prices (Bertrand competition), instead of quantity
and the price is chosen as a control variable. The literature is divided between whether the
aircraft manufacturers compete in price, or quantities, therefore any preference is acceptable.
Also, choosing price as a control variable will allow an easier interpretation of the values and
is more intuitive. One drawback of such an approach though is that the direct mathematical
implementation of the capacity constraints is no longer possible. Therefore, production
capacity is assumed to be fixed and sufficient throughout the program lifecycle. In this
framework, the simulation of backlogs is not included, and all the deliveries are assumed to
be immediate. If there is a demand for a certain number of vehicles, then the delivery is
made within the same year as the demand. Also, as shown in Equation 12 of Chapter 4, the
revenue for the production is collected in the same time period with the demand, and the
production. This assumption can be justified by the fact that many aircraft manufacturers
will not be likely to produce “white-tails” without a guaranteed, fast payment.
Several authors such as Irwin and Pavcnik have analyzed the interactions between
narrow-body, and wide-body markets [103]. Some of these results are shown in Table
7. Although significantly getting weaker within each time period analyzed, there is some
price elasticity relation between these two markets. Within this work, wide-body aircraft
are considered to be outside-goods, and any sort of relationship is neglected. A similar
assumption is also valid for the Regional Jet (RJ) market.
Airlines usually prefer similar cockpits, and therefore same families, to ease the crew
scheduling. This is hard to model due to lack of data to help understand how favorable
the conditions become for airlines to make a certain aircraft more attractive than its com-
petitors. In this thesis, this aspect, although recognized to be significant in the real life
acquisition practices, is ignored. Similarly, long-term good relationships between airlines
and manufacturers may result in more likelihood of continuing business together, this is
also ignored in the case study.
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CHAPTER IV
LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK DEFINITION
This chapter presents the findings of a more specific literature review, and proposes a
framework that can be used to answer the research questions, and test hypothesis.
4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 Market Share Attraction Models
Purely theoretical approaches are destined to reach certain limitations due to inability to
come up with realistic representations of the industry in practice. At that point, empirical
models can bridge the gap between the theory and practice by providing meaningful con-
clusions from the real-life data. That being said, high quality, reliable data is required to
suggest and calibrate an acceptable model.
Several sources have tried to model the LCA market before. Recognizing its strategic
importance, US International Trade Commission and National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA) have attempted this to assess the global competitiveness of US aircraft
[32][201]. Market share is usually regarded as a very useful indicator of the competitiveness
of a product or the producer. If a market entry is considered, these studies can help measure
the economic impact of a product even in the early design phases. According to Owen and
Naert, there are three types of market share models [159, 153]:
Sit = αi +
K∑
k=1
βkXkit + eit (6)














t is the time period ti is the producer i, i=1,2,..., I
K is the total number of predictor variables
Sit is the market share of producer i
αi is the constant term of producer i
βk is the coefficient for the kth predictor variable
Xkit is the kth predictor variable for producer i in period t
eit is the error term for producer i in period t
The simplest model is the linear model in Equation 6. The NASA model uses the multi-
plicative model for the market share estimation which is represented in Equation 7. The
problem with the linear and multiplicative models is that these types of models do not
guarantee the two fundamental aspects of the market share concept. First, the range of any
market share is limited to the range [0,1]. Second, the sum of the market shares of all pro-
ducers must be equal to 1. The third type represented in Equation 8 guarantees the logical
consistency. A modified version of this type has been applied to the commercial aircraft
market[81]. The high R2value attributed to their model is enabled by the incorporation of
a general auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) framework that is also used in several other
market share studies [60, 159]. The benefit of ADL is the consideration of auto-correlation
by implementing the lag effects of the predictor variables on the resulting market share.






















St is the geometric mean of Sit ∀i
α is the arithmetic mean of αi ∀i
et is the geometric mean of ei ∀i
λ is the coefficient for the time trend
T is the index for time
Although this type of model is hard to calibrate and compute in some occasions, it satisfies
the logical consistency when there are two producers such as an American and European
duopolists and reaches very high R squared (R2) values. Also known as coefficient of deter-
mination, these values indicate how well data fit a statistical model. The model developed
by Fernandez reach values in the range of 58-75% [81]. The previous models reached values
in the range of 13-61% and the NASA model has reached 47%.
The need for using such an empirical model comes from two main reasons. First, the
factors that influence the airline’s aircraft decisions should be identified. Second, the impact
of these factors on the final decision should be quantified. The authors have identified the
following factors to be statistically significant in the analysis:
• The market region:
– The United States
– Europe
– Asia-Pacific
– Rest of the World (mainly South America, Africa and the Middle East)






– Dollar’s value vs. Euro ($-€)
The demand models such as these have other benefits. One significant contribution of this
model is the indirect capability of converting a potential multi-objective decision making
problem into a single-objective one. Such example is the MDO of an airliner. Manufacturers
constantly conduct tradeoff analysis between many design objectives. The acquisition cost
vs fuel efficiency is an important one as these two objectives lead to significantly different
designs as shown in Figure 9 [109]. In addition to the list, it is also possible to argue the
maintenance cost to be an important factor for the LCC from the airlines point of view. A
higher aspect ratio wing that minimizes the fuel burn is also more expensive to build and
may lead to higher unit prices. When such a market share model is used, market share as a
single metric becomes a representation of all these tradeoffs that may help in finding “sweet
spots”. This is a critical enabler to value-driven aircraft family design.
4.1.1.1 Simplified Demand Functions
Using a complex empirical market share model, such as the one described in Equation 9, is
often impractical to use for theoretical derivations, and numerical simulations. When the
simulation of a multi-firm, multi-product market is considered, the problem may quickly
become a hard-to-handle computational burden. For the static case of two two-product
firms A, and B, profit function for firm A can be defined as:
ΠApA1 ,pA2 = p
A
1 ∗ qA1 (pA1 , pA2 , pB1 , pB2 ) + pA2 ∗ qA2 (pA1 , pA2 , pB1 , pB2 )− CA(qA1 , qA2 ) (10)
where the strategic control variable of the competition is price p with the assumption of
a Bertrand competition. Quantity, q, is a function of prices, and can simply be written as
qA1 = M ∗ SA1 (pA1 , pA2 , pB1 , pB2 )
so that the quantity output of firmA in segment 1 , q1A, is a function of the total market
demand for both segments 1 , and 2 , M , and the market share of firm A in segment 1 ,
S1A, which is a function of the price decisions of both firms, in both segments, such that
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p1A is the pricing decision of firm A in segment 1 . Since the quantities in this case are
functions of all the pricing decisions by all firms, and in all segments, such an approach
allows the demand shift between segments which is explained by cross-price elasticity in
the next section. However, for the application in this thesis, the price competition may not
be the most advantageous selection. First, cost, C is always a function of the quantities,
not the price so it is more straightforward to calculate the total cost when the quantity
is directly the strategic control variable. The real burden of a price constraint is mainly
in the simulation of capacity constraints. When quantity is a function of the price, as in
Equation 9 and 10, the numerical simulation requires an additional step to check if the
quantity output is within the capacity allowances.
Literature on the way competition occurs in the LCA industry is divided, and there is
no clear, widely accepted standard of the way the competition occurs [114][103]. In fact,
Irwin and Pavcnik have come up with very similar markup margins when they modeled the
competition in both ways. Equation 10 can be rewritten in the Cournot competition form:
ΠAqA1 ,qA2 = q
A
1 ∗ pA1 (qA1 , qA2 , qB1 , qB2 ) + qA2 ∗ pA2 (qA1 , qA2 , qB1 , qB2 )− CA(qA1 , qA2 ) (11)
with the capacity constraints:
qA1 + qA2 ≤ QAmax
where QmaxA is the production capacity of the firm A with the assumption that the
production of the product for segment 1 , and segment 2 are equally difficult, imposing a
substitable upper bound to both production quantities.
Examples given in Equation 9 and 10 are for single-period, myopic, and deterministic
profit maximization problems. In order to expand this example to a multi-period, long-run,
and stochastic profit maximization problem, first a profit function is defined for a specific
time epoch, firm, and segment:
πijt(i, st, qijt,Mjt) = pijt(i, st, qjt,Mjt) ∗ qijt − cijt(i, st, qijt) (12)
where
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πijt is the profit of firm i in segment j at time t
pijt is the price of the vehicle designed for segment j by firm i at time t
qijt is the quantity produced for segment j by firm i at time t
cijt is the cost of the vehicle designed for segment j by firm i at time t
j is the segment
i is the firm
t is the decision epoch
s is the industry structure that includes the states of all the firms
Mjt is the overall demand for the market segment j at time t
In this form, the state of the industry, s, is composed of the market presence of the other
competitors, and their production quantity decisions, as well as their designs. To obtain
the price function pijt, a simple utility function should be obtained. Utility functions of
linear forms are faster to use in iterative computations, compared to models of Equation
7 and Equation 8. There are multiple ways of creating market share information from
utility functions such as multinomial logit models. Those types of models can also enable
simulation of oligopoly cases, instead of duopolies.
4.1.2 Product Substitutability and Cross Price Elasticity
As mentioned in Chapter 3, especially in the narrow-body market, the design missions for
the variants within a family are relatively close compared to the wide-body market therefore
implying a potential “substitutability” between the products. In such circumstances, an
airliner may acquire other aircraft than the “preferred” models. In fact, the price sensitivity
mentioned with the model described in Section 4.1.1 can be considered as the own-price
elasticity of demand given the practices of the other manufacturers. Generalized price












if j 6= k, k /∈ g, j ∈ g
where:
ηj,k is the price elasticity of demand between products j,k
pk is the price of the product k
sk is the demand for the product k
g is the market segment g
The first type is also known as the own-price elasticity of demand. It is used to measure
how a price of a product changes when its own price is increased. In the second type,
two different products that are in the same market segment are considered. This is also
called cross-price elasticity within the same segment Finally, in the third type, two different
products in two different markets are considered which is also called the cross-price elasticity
across segments. Irwin has collected data from various narrow-body and wide-body aircraft
transactions from 1969 to 1998 to come up with the numbers presented in Table 7 [103].
A positive cross-price elasticity indicates substitutability between vehicles. Considering the
fact that authors conducted this study by grouping the market into two groups, a very low
value between wide and narrow body segments suggests that these two goods are practically
independent. An airliner looking for a wide-body addition to their fleet will not be likely to
go for an attractive narrow-body aircraft pricing. However, the significant values of cross-
price elasticity within the segments suggest that a competition is fierce within the products
of the same segment as they are substituble. Another interesting conclusion from this data
is the significant increase in the magnitude of the own-price elasticity throughout the years
suggesting the competition has become stronger.
It is a known fact that products in the product families of today do not only compete with
individual or family products of the competitors but also with other products that belong
to the same company and sometimes the same family. With that observation in mind,
the substitubality between vehicles, especially in the same segment creates new market
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Table 7: Price Elasticities within Different Periods [103]
Period Own Price Cross-price within same segment Cross-price across segments
1969-1973 -2.901 2.570 0.502
1974-1978 -3.750 1.604 0.098
1979-1983 -4.079 1.858 0.101
1984-1988 -4.822 1.789 0.047
1989-1993 -6.410 2.007 0.071
1994-1998 -7.813 1.436 0.047
opportunities. Recalling the concepts of ideas from Figure 6, COMAC’s strategy with
COMAC C919 in the narrow-body segment may be depending on shifting some of the
demand from the other subsegments by offering a highly competitive product in just a
single subsegment. Since it is planned to compete with B737MAX8 and A320neo which
is a very popular subsegment, this strategy of introducing a single product for competing
against a family of products needs extra attention. It is an intermediate size aircraft that
is capable of “stealing” demand from both the larger and the smaller subsegments.
4.1.3 Family-specific Cost Benefits and Modeling
The methods of quantification of the economocal impact of a program is essential to the
cause of this research and proper ways to assess the magnitude of cost of different vehicles
and strategies is critical. The major elements of cost in an aircraft program lifecycle are
the initial non-recurring investment (R&D cost) and the recurring costs (production cost).
Using a common platform among different aircraft have different benefits that shape the
cost structure in these two elements. Fujita et al., in an attempt to quantify the cost
benefits, divides the cost into three elements: design and development cost, facility cost, and
production cost [89]. Similar to the development cost, facility cost is also a non-recurring,
one-time cost element. Unlike the development cost however, in their cost model, facility
cost is a function of the aircraft dimensions whereas the development cost is a function of
the weight. There are several problems with cost modeling due to lack of data revealed
by the manufacturers. Based on the literature review, several findings, as candidates of
realistically modeling an aircraft family design, are presented here.
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Figure 29: Cost Components and Dependence Breakdown
4.1.3.1 Research and Development Cost
R&D cost, occasionally known as the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
(RDT&E) cost, includes all the technology research, design engineering, prototype fab-
rication, flight and ground testing, and evaluations for operational suitability [169]. It is
usually a fair assumption to consider R&D effort to be independent of the number of units
to be produced. RAND DAPCA IV cost model is the most widely accepted publicly avail-
able model for estimating the R&D cost [97]. Such an empirical model is needed to have a
starting point for assessing the viability of a business, but there are some drawbacks related
to it. First, the model is mainly dependent on the empty weight of the design which may not
represent some of the practices conducted in the industry today, such as additions of new
technologies. For example, a revolutionary material technology may be costly, but reduce
the empty weight of the airplane to result in fuel savings. Second, the result is a determin-
istic value, which in reality is haunted by different sources of uncertainty. Third, the model
doesn’t account for the reduced R&D cost resulting from the development of a derivative
from a baseline. The last factor in particular leads to the need for various assumptions
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to be made to account for. Weight based analysis are common for assessing the common-
ality benefits at the R&D level [133, 90, 104]. These approaches resemble the traditional
commonality index based approach used by product family design community. There are
various types of commonality indices in literature [191]. In simple terms, a commonality
index is “a metric to assess the degree of commonality within a family”. The weight based
example is presented here on the guidelines of Perez et al. [104]:
CIj = Wcommon/(Wcommon +Wexclusive)
C∗jk = fkCjk 1CIj
where
Wcommon is the weight of common modules
Wexclusive is the weight of exclusive(unique) modules
CIj is the commonality index for the part j
Cjk is the value of the kth cost contributor for a baseline
C*jk is the value of the kth cost contributor for a derivative
fk is the commonality cost reduction factor
In the absence of detailed derivative cost data, many authors have come up with ap-
proximations to how much the commonality benefits the cost elements. Intuitively, com-
monality’s main strength is in reduced engineering hours and tooling cost as they are shared
among common derivatives in particular. With a similar reasoning, the material require-
ment would not get greatly affected although some efficiency improvement can be excepted
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through reduced wastage. Fujita expands the module based R&D cost estimation with a
weight-based approach, and intuitive coefficients [88]. Specific application they propose to
model the “stretched fuselage” benefits requires an explicit representation of such modules


















0 for same design
whereCDi, the design, and development cost for product i, is composed of the individual
development costs form number of modules, CDj i. The coefficients used, αDj , βDj , γDj , are
in the form of [currency/weight], and [yen/kg], in the original example. Weight differences
between modules, Wji-Wj1, are used to estimate the development cost of the derivative
module of similar designs. The analogy from this weight-based methodology will be assumed
for the work in this thesis. Section 5.3 details the approach used in this methodology.
4.1.3.2 Production Cost
Production cost is the umbrella term for all the recurring costs in an aircraft program. In
its simplified form, it consists of two fundamental elements: material cost and labor cost.
From the production of a product family point of view, the actual benefits are not in the
material cost reductions, but the labor cost. This is mainly due to the learning curve effect,
which was explained in Section 3.5. To estimate, and signify the learning curve effects
in product families, here a module based labor cost breakdown is shown here. Recalling
Equation 4, the module based labor requirement for a family is defined in a similar fashion
to the works of Fujita, and Jansen [88, 104]. Also, the relationship between weight, and the
cost is linearized similarly to the work of Markish et al. [134]. This is not the case observed
in the RAND DAPCA IV model, which proposes power relationship between the OEW and
the costs [97]. However, it is an acceptable assumption to choose a baseline vehicle, and
linearize the cost equation around that specific design.
CiP (`i) = cim + cip(`i)
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where the production cost of for the `-th unit of the product i, CiP(`i) is composed of






where the material cost, cmi, is a function of the weight of the module j of product i,






where the family-wide production labor cost reduction coefficient for the product i, and










where Kj, RjI,i are coefficients for module slots, and learning coefficient from similar
designs respectively.
Quantification of cost benefits of commonality is paramount to any product family design
effort that aims to maximize the program value. However, just as in case of market demand
modeling, such supporting cost models are usually empirical. Since companies do not reveal
their firm-specific data, such models are very hard to calibrate.
4.1.4 Market-Oriented Product Design
One of the realities of today’s market-oriented design is the marketing executives’ constant
desire to explore and utilize new market gaps and opportunities which usually conflicts
with the constraints imposed on the design engineers. To address this problem, there
have been various attempts with one common perspective. If the design decisions have
market consequences, the connections between the revenue, cost and corresponding design
characteristics should be quantified. Also, it is known that the commonality as a tool in
the design of product families is related to all three of these elements. First, the existing
literature on the individual product design for market systems is reviewed. In Section 4.1.5,
the limited literature on the product family design for competitive markets is presented.
The main motivation for any of these studies is the understanding that the engineering
decisions will affect economic decisions through the product lifecycle whether it is a single
product or a multi-product line. In an attempt to avoid documenting the vast variety of
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market-oriented product designs that do not consider family positioning, this section only
generalizes those approaches. It is possible to group product design problems that take
competitiveness into account in two groups:
• Short-run Price Equilibrium: Design attributes of all the competitor products are
fixed in the beginning and only the prices will be adjusted to reach the equilibrium.
Short-run equilibrium can also be in quantities instead of prices.
• Long-run Design Equilibrium: Competition is sufficiently long-term that the com-
petitors have enough time to both readjust the design attributes as well as the prices.
In simple terms, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for a short-run Nash competition, new prod-








where Πk is the net profit of all new products Jk from producer k, and Πk’ is the
net profit sum of the products of competitor k’. In this example, xj is the vector of design
variables of product j, and pj is the price of the same product. pj’ is the price of competitor’s








where, for product j, pj and cj are the price and cost of the corresponding product re-
spectively. sj denotes the market share of product j, which is a function of design attributes
zj, price pj, competitor design attributes zj’, and competitor’s price pj’. Multiplication of
the market share with the overall market demand Q gives the market demand for the prod-
uct j: qj. Cost cj is a function of design attributes as well as the quantity. Similarly, design
attributes zj is a function of design variables xj.
qj = Qsj , sj = fs(pj , zj , pj′ , zj′), zj = fz(xj), cj = fc(xj , qj)
Although this example approach is static and simplified, it provides a logical baseline
to build on for the design-for-market approaches, especially for Class III models. For most
engineering applications though, these profit considerations should be evaluated subject to
engineering constraints. Another possible way of classifying the existing market-oriented
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product design literature is based on how the competitor reactions are modeled [180]:
• Class I: Perspective of a single firm is considered where there are no other deci-
sion makers, or competitive reactions. This approach is the most simple and popular
technique, and in certain cases, it can be compared to a monopolistic approach. Con-
sumers have two options: purchase the product from the single firm, or not purchase
at all. In fact, the single firm competes against an outside good in Class I litera-
ture. Models that doesn’t account for competitor reactions tend to overestimate the
profitability of firms [179].
• Class II: Competitor designs are not fixed, but they may react by adjusting the price,
or the quantity. These problems are usually solved by game-theoretic approaches [87].
These problems result in solutions in the form of equilibriums, which usually leads to
the concept called Nash Equilibrium (NE). At the NE, no firm can make a decision
to change price, or quantity without decreasing firm’s payoff. Design can still be
optimized for the static attributes. Short-term firm policies can usually be explained
by Class II models.
• Class III: Firms can change both the prices, or quantities, and the design as a
reaction to a new product entry. In such conditions, NE is located by solving the
price, or quantity and design simultaneously. In certain cases, Class III problems can
be formulated as an extension of the short-run price equilibriums [59]. These types of
problems are the most difficult examples, and different methods have been proposed
to find the equilibria [180, 144].
For decision-makers, all these three classes are in fact, single-stage equilibria where any pro-
ducer is forced to make all decisions simultaneously. When IO applications are considered,
these single-stage approaches are very simplified concepts. For IO purposes, the alternative
is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) where manufacturers can make a design decision,
but most of the time the decisions are made on prices, or quantities [192].
Decision-Based Design (DBD) is another framework that focuses on designing the most
valuable product [95]. Focus of that framework is to identify the design alternatives that
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can maximize the value of the product. Within that context, profit is a bottom-line mea-
surement of value [112]. Optimization techniques include analytical target cascading, and
collaborative optimization [143][170]. Despite considerable amount of research being fo-
cused on product design under competition, the studies on competitive product family
design problems are limited. Next section surveys the existing literature.
4.1.4.1 Value-Driven Aircraft Design
The trend in engineering design of vehicles for market systems is shifting from cost control
to value creation and existing mechanisms are populated by costing approaches rather than
value approaches [106]. The same VDD approach for commercial aircraft is explained in
Section 2.7. There are other notable works in the domains of VDD aircraft design.
Peoples realizes that a stochastic value-based optimization can result in a 2.3% higher
program value than the traditional weight-minimizing solutions for a case study on a
Blended Wing-Body (BWB) [162]. The realization of the importance of managing long-term
cash flows over focusing solely on the development costs have enabled the idea of combining
elements of vehicle performance and managerial flexibility with uncertainty. Markish uses
DP enhanced with cost, and revenue tools to account for future uncertainty in an aircraft
program [132]. However his approach assumes no competitive reactions.
4.1.4.2 Market-Oriented Product Family Design
More and more product family design problems have started incorporating customer-driven
approaches rather than pure performance and cost-driven engineering approaches. Kumar et
al. utilize demand modeling for product line positioning as they investigate different market
niches [124, 125]. They clarify the need for simultaneous consideration of performance,
cost, and marketing decisions in product family design literature. Lou shows that such
concurrent approaches combining the elements of engineering, and marketing results in
more profitable product families than alternate approaches [131]. Michalek et al. find that
the correct number of products may not be equal to the number of market segments for
maximizing firm-level profits as they differentiate between homogeneous and heterogeneous
market systems [143]. They conduct their experiments using a Bayesian account of consumer
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preference heterogeneity.
Market focus is not always easy to assess on its own. Cost and customer perceptions
become important elements of such studies. Jiao et al. point the importance of cost
modeling across products as economies of scale and scope affect family products in different
ways [107].
Li and Azarm presents an approach that solves a product line selection problem using
GA [128, 129]. NPV of total profits and the market share are their main goals. The
competition in their approach is known and fixed as they do not consider the potential
competitive reactions. The work of Heese and Swaminathan solves a problem in which
the manufacturer sets the price and quality levels of two products offered in two market
segments in a setting that doesn’t include competitor reactions [96]. Farrell et al. consider
a problem that a manufacturer tries to find the optimal product platform in a cost-focused
approach [80]. Ramdas et al. attempt to find the optimal choice of adding a new product
to an existing product family with revenue and LCC implications [168].
4.1.5 Competitive and Flexible Product Family Design
Although all market-driven approaches, whether a single product or a product line, passively
or actively incorporate competitive reactions, in this section the main focus is the product
family design literature in which the competitors react often by rival product families.
Limited literature on the design of flexible family design approaches will also be presented.
Li and Azarm present some of the key papers in the area that is specific to aircraft
design [128, 129]. However, their approach is enabled by several assumptions. First of
all, in their case, there is no product by the company in the market before the launching
of a product line. Second of their assumptions is that the customers definitely choose a
product with the highest utility, as they use a first choice utility model. Third assumption,
which accompanies the second, is that the customers’ preferences remain unchanged during
a product’s lifecycle. The methodology proposed here builds loosely on similar assumptions.
The methodology proposed by Li and Azarm has some other assumptions that simplify
the problem but ignore some of the key elements of the way competition occurs. In their
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approach, market competition is present and static as there is no reaction from the compe-
tition after the launching of the new product line. Instead of this assumption, this thesis
proposes a methodology that can take this into account, and identify a market equilibrium
in the presence of competition. They also assume that all variants in a product line are
launched into the market at the same time, which was rejected by the Observation 9 as
shown in Figure 24. As previously explained, most of the time, even though the manu-
facturers have all the products in mind when the platform is being designed, models are
introduced at different time intervals. This problem also requires strategic decision making
at the managerial level. Another assumption they make is that all the variants in a product
line have a lifecycle of the same duration. This framework limits the simulation duration
into a finite amount of years, which in the end no product by any firm is present in the
market. Since it is possible that some products will be introduced later than the others,
and a finite duration is defined as an outside parameter to the simulation, some products
will stay in the market for longer. Entrants will have less time in the market because of late
entry. It is possible to argue that their approach, which doesn’t take competitive reactions
into account, may result in sub-optimal designs.
Suh proposes a formal methodology for “Flexible Product Platform Design” in following
steps [188, 189]:
1. Identify markets, variants, and uncertainties
2. Determine uncertainty related key attributes and design variables
3. Optimize product family and platform bandwidth
4. Identify critical platform elements
5. Create flexible design alternatives
6. Determine costs of design alternatives
7. Uncertainty analysis
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Figure 30: Implementing Product Platform to Different Segments [66]
Suh’s steps are important to the understanding of flexibility among product families,
that is to enter the market, or not, even though the common platform is established. This
thesis follows a similar approach with the addition of competition to his approach.
Sichani comes up with a pure competitive analysis of product families [112]. The
methodology developed is initially applied to a single product with the focus on maxi-
mizing the profitability under competition. Then, the author expands the application into
product families. The way the uncertainty is handled is through different case studies in
which different parameters lead to different deterministic results.
Another notable work is that of Kalligeros et al. in which the authors use real options to
valuate flexibility [111]. They use a two-step methodology for valuing this flexibility enabled
by various standardization strategies for future developments in a program of projects.
4.1.6 Ericson Pakes Class Industrial Organization Models
Ericson and Pakes (EP) presents a general, dynamic, and strategic oligopoly model [76].
The model is based on a framework in which the firms can decide on many policies such as
market entry/exit, and R&D investment, as well as other strategic control variables as real
options. The framework, which is a dynamic, stochastic game with a discrete state/action
space, works with a set of input primitives that describes the structure of the industry.
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The output is a set of policies, and resulting profits for all the incumbents, and potential
entrants at each time period.
Essentially, the EP framework gives up on analytical considerations for the sake of
numerical simulations. However, since firm heterogeneity is considered with both firm
and industry specific variability, the advantages of these numerical simulations is that the
industry payoffs can be quite different in each simulation even for similar firms.
Doraszelski et al., about the capabilities of EP models, states that “The firm specific
uncertainty is needed to account for the fact that we often see both simultaneous entry
and exit and rank reversals in the fortunes of firms within a market (no matter how we
define“fortunes”). The market (and/or) industry specific uncertainty is needed to rationalize
the fact that often the firms competing in a given market (or industry) are subject to changes
in costs or demand conditions which cause their profits to be positively correlated.” [71]. This
nature of the EP models makes it a highly suitable candidate for the application in this
thesis.
According to Adamodar, multi-stage investment models should be preferred over one-
time investment models in these cases [65]:
1. Projects that have significant barriers to entry from competitors entering the market.
2. Projects that have significant uncertainty about the size of the market and the eventual
success of the project
3. Projects where there is a substantial investment needed in infrastructure, such as high
R&D costs
LCA market is a good candidate that matches these criteria due to the observations listed in
Chapter 3. From the market entry/exit perspective, EP model is a very valuable tool since
it is powered by dynamics such as an entrepreneur exploring a perceived profit opportunity,
or an existing enterprise that only perceives a future loss and eventually decides to exit the
market completely.
EP framework relies heavily on empirical estimation models, but with the proper struc-
tural estimations, it can be used to model & simulate a large variety of industries to obtain
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Table 9: Applications of EP’s Framework [71]
Application Area Example Paper
Advertising Doraszelski and Markovich(2006)
Capacity Accumulation Besanko and Doraszelski (2004)
Collusion Fershtman and Pakes(2000, 2005)
Competitive Convergence Langohr(2003)
Consumer Learning Ching(2003)
Firm Size and Growth Laincz and Rodrigues(2004)
Learning-by-doing Benkard(2004)
Mergers Berry and Pakes(1993)
Network Effects Jenkins et al.(2004)
Productivity Growth Laincz(2005)
R&D Gowrisankaran and Town(1997)
Technology Adoption Schivardi and Schneider(2005)
International Trade Erdem and Tybout(2003)
Finance Goettler, Parlour and Rajan(2005)
an equilibrium. The theory of MPE is defined in several sources [69][192, 137]. Among the
applications of EP framework, it is also not uncommon to see MCS implementations [150].
4.2 The Framework
4.2.1 Research Gap
Product family and platform design requires detailed consideration of the market dynam-
ics. The common performance considerations for family design must be coupled with the
consumer preferences, market uncertainty, and competitor reactions in a dynamic environ-
ment. Despite all research effects directed towards designing product families for different
purposes, two elements have not attracted sufficient interest [182]:
• Integration of Management and Engineering Aspects
• Consideration of Dynamic Issues
In the product family literature, which received significant contributions in the last two
decades, there is a visible need for more studies to consider the effect of market demand,
and the product design. Some of that literature is already presented with examples [128,
129, 90, 88, 124, 125, 142, 143].
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The second hot topic in product family literature is the consideration of dynamic issues.
The word “dynamic” has been used for two different meanings in this proposal document.
One definition implies the time dependency, whereas the other definition is used for entities
that react to each other. Zacharias et al. have identified the system uncertainties as dynamic
elements that should actively influence the design decisions [203]. Shiau et al. have worked
on the competitor reactions in a market environment [180, 179]. Michalek et al. have
performed the critical step of expanding these considerations to a product line level from
a single product design [142]. There are also other types of research addressing dynamic
issues such as the work of Fixson in which the authors focus on supply chain related issues
[84].
Product family optimization problems can become complex very fast, especially when
the uncertainty, competitor reactions, and marketing-engineering-manufacturing considera-
tions are integrated. In the field of product family design, there have been some attempts at
identifying the global optimality [116, 117]. These attempts at improving the design space
exploration are essential for such complex problems.
Initially, commonality has been identified as an important tool in increasing the program
values. Then, the observation of the industry has shown the existence of certain elements
that should be incorporated into any design method in question. These are uncertainty
(both market-wide and idiosyncratic), competitor reactions (both in derivatives and pric-
ing/quantity), dynamic elements, market entry/exit, and flexible managerial decisions. A
framework is needed to address all these issues simultaneously while addressing some of the
overall needs of the product family literature. The hypothesis is formed as a response to
the primary research question. So far in the literature, a framework to address such crit-
ical elements simultaneously has not been identified and stand-alone approaches of game
theory and real options fail to do so. Following the conclusion to the secondary research
question, a hypothesis is created to answer the primary research question. The literature
review summarized in previous sections indicate that EP class IO models are well suited
considering the market observations due to their capability to model dynamic industries















































































































































































































for the aircraft industry [42, 43].
Research Question 1: For a given oligopolistic market system with inherent uncertainty,
how can an aircraft manufacturer estimate the expected family program value? How can we
use this valuation technique to assess program risk of a new design?
To conclude the literature review, an overarching hypothesis is formed. EP models are
found to be applicable to the specific problem in this thesis.
Hypothesis: Considering the dynamic, stochastic, competitive, and flexible nature of air-
craft family programs, combining an Ericson Pakes class Industrial Organization model of
dynamic oligopoly with Monte Carlo Simulations enables the designer to make risk-informed,
value-driven platform design decisions in the conceptual design phase.
4.2.2 Framework
4.2.2.1 Major Assumptions
Modeling and simulating a competition to identify valuable designs is a difficult task. Any
research attempt addressing this area needs clear assumptions. First, assumptions related
to firm’s behavior is explained. Aircraft manufacturers as players have the following char-
acteristics:
• Firms play strategically with long-term goals: Instead of myopic, short-term
profits, the firms focus on the overall goals for the entire program lifecycle.
• Firms (both incumbents, and entrants) have similar expectations of uncer-
tainty: Although firms may be subject to different idiosyncratic shocks, they have
similar expectations of market-wide uncertainty such as demand fluctuations, and fuel
prices. No firm has the perfect information, or complete confidence about the future.
They all observe the same forecast, with the same confidence interval.
• Firms do not enter the market if an economic return is not anticipated:
This assumption is critical to limit the number of firms to a finite value, as market
can only sustain a certain amount of players. This assumption is also easy to justify
from a realistic perspective as firm theory suggests that the firms exist to generate
value.
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• Firms are value-maximizers: Firms will follow the policies that result in a maxi-
mized value metric. Value metric in this case is the NPV.
• Firms act rationally: Firms behave according to rational expectations.
It is possible to argue that these assumptions do not differ significantly from the actual
motivations of existing firms, though one critical aspect about these assumptions is the
reality of the incumbent firms, to possibly deter new entrants at all costs. In this thesis
environment, incumbent firms will do anything to maximize their program values. Most of
the time, it is logical to expect these firms to try to prevent the new entry at the expense
of short-term benefits.
Once the motivations of the firms, which are players(or agents), are defined, the second
step is to define the structure of the market. In this framework, firms compete in prices
(Bertrand competition), instead of quantity and the price is chosen as the control variable.
The literature is divided between whether the aircraft manufacturers compete in price, or
quantities, therefore any preference is acceptable. Also, choosing price as a control variable
will allow an easier interpretation of the values and is more intuitive. One drawback of
such an approach though is that the direct mathematical implementation of the capacity
constraints is no longer possible. In this system, the framework doesn’t allow the simu-
lation of backlogs, and all the deliveries are immediate. If a certain amount of vehicles
are demanded, and the amount is within the production limitations of the firm, then the
delivery is made within the same year as the demand. Also, the revenue for the production
is collected in the same time period with the demand, and the production. This assumption
can be justified by the fact that many aircraft manufacturers will not be likely to produce
“white-tails” without a guaranteed, fast payment.
Several authors such as Irwin and Pavcnik have analyzed the interactions between
narrow-body, and wide-body markets [103]. Some of these results are shown in Table
7. Although significantly getting weaker within each time period analyzed, there is some
price elasticity relation between these two markets. Within this work, wide-body aircraft
are considered to be outside-goods, and any sort of relationship is neglected. A similar
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assumption is also valid for the Regional Jet (RJ) market.
Airlines usually prefer similar cockpits, and therefore same families, to ease the crew
scheduling. This is hard to model due to lack of data to help understand how favorable
the conditions become for airlines to make a certain aircraft more attractive than its com-
petitors. In this thesis, this aspect, although recognized to be significant in the real life
acquisition practices, is ignored. Similarly, long-term good relationships between airlines
and manufacturers may result in more likelihood of continuing business together, this is
also ignored in the case study.
Production capacity is fixed throughout the program lifecycle. Although the maximum
number of units the firms can produce in a single year is hardwired into the model in
the beginning, and can always be altered, firms don’t have the option to spend additional
resources, and expand the production capacity based on the expectation in an increase in
the anticipated net program value. This type of problems is another area of literature called
the capacity expansion, management problems.
When both supply and demand sides of such a complicated field is analyzed, some
simplifications are essential. For example, Airbus sells airplanes in US Dollars but apart
from some of the outsourced parts and materials most of the cost is incurred in Euros.
On the other hand Boeing operates almost completely on US Dollars. Such a difference
could mean Airbus could receive shock from the fluctuations in the exchange rates between
Euro and USD. Delivery lead time can also be an important element for airlines looking
to expand their fleets quickly. Such factors, even though important, are hard to model. In
addition, from a conceptual designer perspective, the focus is on the controllable elements.
4.2.2.2 Scope
Before proceeding with the explanation of a methodology, the scope of this framework needs
to be specified. For this purpose, the main benefits of commonality to be considered are
shown on a commonality advantage chart in Figure 31 [54]. This framework is intended to
directly handle elements in bold boxes and is not capable of modeling the elements in dashed
boxes. Elements in regular boxes, such as deploying new technologies, are not considered
112
Figure 31: Main Benefits of Commonality [54]
by default, however they can be assessed with appropriate scenarios. The first part of
this chapter was dedicated to demonstrate some marketing, and manufacturing specifics of
common platform designs.
Second, the intent is to demonstrate the whole map of possible risks in a technology
program. In Figure 32, there are four main types of risks: financial risks, strategic risks,
operational risks, and hazard risks [31]. The focus in this framework is solely on addressing
and minimizing the strategic risks. Both exogenous and endogenous factors are separately
considered in the methodology. Among the elements of strategic risks:
• Competition (See Section 2.8)
• Customer Demand (See Section 4.1.1)
• Industry Changes (See Section 3.7.1)
• M&A Integration (See Section 3.1, not modeled)
• R&D (See Section 4.1.3 and Section 2.11.1)
have all been considered in this thesis proposal.
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Figure 32: Risk Management Map [31]
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As previously described, the competitive strength consists of three elements: differen-
tiation, cost, and agility. In fact, these are the main elements of product family design,
any designer must perform tradeoff studies on. Based on the presented observations, it is
possible to argue that the most critical tradeoff in a family design effort is between the
Observations 1,7,9 versus Observation 3. In the problem formulation, this tradeoff is par-
ticularly addressed. In this work, development of a new platform is not allowed (maximum
one per firm), thus the strategy space is limited.
4.2.2.3 Methodology
To test the hypothesis and answer the primary research question, a competitive product
family design methodology is introduced within this thesis framework. In the main stage,
shown as Stage 5 in Figure 33, a multi-product, multi-firm dynamic market environment
is simulated in which the players are the incumbent or new entrant aircraft manufactur-
ers. The main motivation of these players is to maximize the family program value by
making strategic and rational marketing decisions under uncertainty and competition. The
stochastic game in that stage is modeled as a competitive Markov Decision Process (MDP)
in which the players act non-cooperatively with the sole purpose of maximizing their own
expected rewards. The players within the environment have the perfect information of each
other’s designs and prices. They also have the same knowledge about the uncertainty for
an infinite time horizon. At each node, a rational decision is made after assessing the state
of the market, actions of the competitors, future uncertainty, and some shock associated
with internal and external firm dynamics. Cross elasticity of demand is also incorporated
to the model in order to demonstrate strategies for smaller firms to possibly capture some
of the demand from the other sub-segments the firm is not operating in. The second stage
includes generating a family of candidate vehicles based on different scenarios.
Within this work, the LCA market is divided into narrow-body (single-aisle), and wide-
body (twin-aisle) aircraft market segments. Classes of different aircraft sizes within each of
these segments are further divided into sub-segments. Around the fore-mentioned first stage
is a sizing and synthesis tool that is responsible for evaluating the common design variables
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among the family members, estimating performance and cost responses for different sce-
narios. This second stage considers the first stage as a black box and only considers the
common design variables as an input and the resulting program value as an output. For the
scope of this thesis, the design decisions will be limited to the technology selection problem.
For an infinite time-horizon game, the state transition matrices of the industry evolution
can be obtained from the first stage analysis. Then, Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) are
conducted to obtain trends of Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) that can help create distribu-
tions of Net Present Value (NPV). In this case, MCS will provide useful insights to assess
the risk. Since the firms actively react to different stochastic elements, same scenario can
result in different market outcomes if the simulation is run multiple times.
Formally, the methodology proposed here is composed of:
1. Create the Market Environment
(a) Market Segmentation
(b) Market Uncertainty-Evolution of Demand
(c) Demand Model
2. Identify Players and Firm-specific Dynamics
(a) Incumbents (with observable designs)
(b) Entrants (with changing designs)
3. Identify Common Platforms
(a) Identify Critical Design Variables
(b) Generate Candidate Family Platform Designs




(b) Monte Carlo Simulations
(c) Obtain Distributions of Program Value
5. Platform Optimization
(a) Pick value-maximizing platform design
i. One-step solution for one entrant
ii. Sequential Nash Equilibrium Solution for two or more entrants
In Figure 33, a novel product family design methodology is demonstrated. Those com-
ponents are found in different individually or combined in different studies.
1. Create the Market Environment: Any market-oriented study will include some
type of a model for the market characteristics.
2. Identify Players and Firm-specific Dynamics: Any competitive assessment will
include some sort of a competitor study.
3. Identify Common Platforms: Even though this step focuses on the technical
aspects of product families, the screening, generating candidate designs, and technical
evaluation are paramount components of any design effort both for individual products
and product families.
4. Market Simulations: Particularly in this step, the research effort in this thesis
differentiates itself from the status quo. Thanks to the advancements in the microe-
conomic models, and an identified need for more comprehensive models, IO and MCS
was introduced to a product family design problem.
5. Platform Optimization: There are many different optimization algorithms for
product design and also a specific set of these focus on product families.
4.2.2.4 The Options of Players
Within the market environment created, there are three types of players. Those are firms











































































































































































































































































































































































































offers products across the whole market. They all have different options based on their
position.
Player Type 1: At each decision epoch, an entrant, a firm with no products in the
market, can:
• Observe the market uncertainty, competitors’ designs, and competitors’ state
• Enter any segment and decide on the production quantity (only one segment can be
entered in any year)
V e(s,M) = maxXei ∈{0,1,2,3} −
3∑
k=1




V (ie, s′,M ′)P (ie, s′,M ′ | i, s, q,M,X,Xe) (13)
An important assumption for the entrants in this framework is that they always consider
entering at the present time, and do not take the option value of delaying entry into account.
Player Type 2: At each decision epoch, an incumbent firm that hasn’t maximized its
market coverage can:
• Observe the market uncertainty, competitors’ designs, and competitors’ state
• Enter a segment, that the firm is not present in, and decide on the quantity to be
produced for that segment (only one segment can be entered in any year)
• Decide on the production quantity for a segment the firm is already present in.
• Exit a segment, that the company is not making profit
Player Type 3: At each decision epoch, an incumbent firm that offers products for all the
available segments can:
• Observe the market uncertainty, competitors’ designs, and competitors’ state.
• Decide on the production quantity for a segment the firm is already present in.
• Exit a segment, that the company is not making profit
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V (i, s,M) = maxXei ,Xj ,qj∀j∈Ji −
3∑
k=1
1 {Xei = k}xek +
∑
j∈Ji




V (i′, s′,M ′)P (i′, s′,M ′ | i, s, q,M,X,Xe) (14)
Equations 13 and 14 are from Benkard’s work where he creates an EP model applicable
to his research [43][76]. i refers to the firm identity so that i is finitely bounded above.
Ji is the set of products owned, or offered by firm i. Xie is the entry decision, whereas
the Xj is the exit decision. i’, s’, M’ are the state variables one period into the future
whereas the P is the probability distribution generating the transition probabilities. qjt is
the production choice for product j at time t. πj is the per-period profit function as defined
in Section 4.1. Φjt is the random scrap value for exiting j at t.
Discount factors, β , can be chosen according to different criteria. US government indi-
cates a 7% rate that corresponds to a 14 year time horizon [62]. This simulation will be set
for 20 years, indicating a closer number to the industry averages.
The value formulation in this thesis is conceptually similar as entry and exit decisions
include different aircraft designs . However in the later steps, approach of Aguirregabiria
and Mira is followed to use randomly drawn, privately known shocks[28]. In addition, as a
part of the subgame, prices are used instead of quantities.
4.2.2.5 The Platform Design
Each firm enters the dynamic market with a fixed platform design. Wing design is simpli-
fied to five design variables such as span, area, taper ratio, thickness-to-chord ratio, and
leading edge sweep angle. At the dynamic game level, firms are not allowed to change the
platform design. They are only allowed to modify other components to meet the customer
requirements if they decide to enter a certain segment.
This second level of the optimization takes the dynamic game simulation as a blackbox
for which product platform properties are inputs and the outputs are financial outcomes
. In the scenario of a finite number of incumbent firms, and an entrant; the entrant is
able to observe the existing designs and create a new design that will yield the most value.
Initially, such a study will be performed only for a case of two incumbent firms, and an
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entrant. Entrant will be the focal company, for which the framework will be used both for
determining the design, economical, and financial decisions.
The following common design variables are directly considered in this research:
• Continuous Variables
– Wing Area (Sw) [ft2]
– Wing Aspect Ratio (AR), therefore the wingspan (bw) [ft]
– Wing Taper Ratio (TR, λ)
– Wing Leading Edge Sweep (ΛLE) [deg]
– Wing thickness-to-chord ratio (toc)
• Discrete Variables
– Technology Packages (T)
4.2.2.6 Simulation Environment
To better describe the simulation environment, following types of cases are defined:
• Case I - Multiple Incumbent Firms
– Case IA - Multiple Incumbent Firms with Full Product Lines (Fixed
Designs): In this scenario, incumbents have their platform designs fixed and
have entered the market in all segments. The framework will only enable deter-
mination of optimal policies in a MPE, therefore the program values. Still, MCS
can be implemented to see different outcomes. Depending on the simulation
parameters, some of the segments may be prematurely exited.
– Case IB - Multiple Incumbent Firms with Partial Market Presence
(Fixed Designs): In this scenario, incumbents have their platform designs
fixed, but keep the options of entering new segments using the baseline vehicle.
The framework will enable to identify optimal entry/exit decisions in this case.










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 34: Case IIA featuring One Entrant and at least One Incumbent
– Case IIA - Multiple Incumbent Firms with a Single Entrant (En-
trant Design not Fixed): In this scenario, the main aim is to identify value-
maximizing platform design variables for the entrant. The incumbents are al-
ready present in the market, therefore their designs are fixed. This section will
build on this example.
– Case IIB - Multiple Incumbent Firms with Multiple Entrants (Entrant
Designs not Fixed): This is a similar scenario to Case IIA, however it is more
complex, as competitive reactions are now not only in means of entry/exit, and
strategic control variables, but also designs. A Nash Equilibrium solution is
proposed for such cases.
In this thesis, the primary example will be based on Case IIA representing the narrow-
body market. In this case there is one Player Type 1, and at least one Player Type 2, or
Player Type 3. Referring to the methodology flowchart given in Figure 33, this environment
describes the stages 4 and 5, Market Simulations and Platform Optimization respectively.
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The assumption at this stage is that the necessary information about the industry dynamics,
market uncertainty, and firm-specific information is already collected. Also, special to this
Case IIA, entrant can observe the designs of the incumbents, which is a realistic assumption
for a firm considering market entry. In Figure 35, the obtained data is shown in italic, inputs
and outputs of consideration are shown in bold, intermediate values are shown in normal
fonts. IO model handles a given entrant firm’s design, as well as incumbent firm’s design
in a similar fashion. After several iterations, the equilibrium is reached. Using the optimal
policies of the entrant, maximized program value is obtained.
Figure 35 shows an expanded structure of the IO model. First, using a sizing & synthesis
tool, performance data for the candidate vehicles are created based on the previously defined
mission requirements. Also based on the design and weight data, dynamic cost equations
are created. The purpose of this set of equations is to support decision-making of agents
within the model. Actions of the competitors are a variable input within this perspective,
but this is due to the iterative nature of the process shown in Figure 34. Firm-specific
factors have deterministic and stochastic elements as shown in the Internal Firm Dynamics
box.
IO model for the Case IIB, has only one variable input, the design of Entrant A, as
the simulation parameters, as well as incumbent designs are fixed as shown in Figure 36.
In Figure 37, the next step of the methodology is presented.
As explained in Section 4.2, the optimization problem could be formulated such as:
minSw,bw,ΛLE ,λ,toc,T −E[NPV ]
subject to bw < Bw, Vapp,A3 < VAAC , VV T,A1 > VV T,min, VHT,A1 > VHT,min
where E[NPV ] = f(Sw, bw,ΛLE , λ, toc, T )
The Case-IIB is a problem of additional complexity. Two firms that are able to make
design changes make problem more complicated than the problem in Case-IIA. For that
case, the suggestion is using a Nash Equilibrium concept to find a set of solutions for both
firms A and B so that they can’t change their designs without losing a portion of the value.




































Figure 36: Top-level Inputs and Outputs of the IO Model
Entrant A’s Platform Design
(Common Design Attributes)
Design Variables to be Optimized:
• Continuous:
• Wing Area (Sw)
• Wing Span (bw)
• Leading Edge Sweep Angle (LE)
• Taper Ratio ()
• Thickness-to-chord Ratio (toc)
• Discrete:
• Technology Packages (T)
Industrial Organization Model
Entrant A’s Distribution for 
Program Value
Monte Carlo Simulations
Entrant A’s Expected 
Program Value




• VVT,A1>VVT,min , VHT,A1>VHT,min






w,B,Λ∗LE,B, λ∗B, toc∗B, TB
]
so that at the equilibrium,
∂E[NPV ]A
∂xA
= 0, ∂E[NPV ]B∂xB = 0
These calculations are however, expected to be computationally much more expensive.
They also assume that the firms have complete information about each others’ design prac-
tices which is an unrealistic assumption.
4.2.3 Classification of Methodology
The methodology proposed here focuses on the interaction of front-end issues and the core
design activities amongst the domains of the product family design literature. This method
is a Class II family design optimization, which means that the platform design is variable
while the variants are fixed. Variants are fixed because as justified in Chapter 3, different
sub-segments are defined according to the seat capacity, and maximum range. Pre-defined
seat capacities limit the possible changes that can be implemented on the variants. Com-
monality is also restricted as the possible common platform is simplified to certain wing
specifications. Referring to Figure 4, within the classification of Fujita, this method falls
into Group 3, which is a sub-group of Class II [89]. However, this technique differs from
existing product family design literature in the sense that the commonality is enabled for
the designers to use, but development of derivatives is not forced. In certain case studies, it
may be possible to identify scenarios, that an entrant may only serve a certain sub-segment.
Therefore, within this framework environment, the resultant program may not be a family
program, as it may consist of a single design, or no market entry at all.
Based on Simpson’s classification, this formulation addresses a scale-based family design
problem, in which the platform is specified a priori, with a single objective, taking into
account the manufacturing cost, market demand, and the uncertainty [181]. This is done
in two stages as first a platform is defined, and then the family members are introduced if
market conditions are favorable. The motivation of the firms is the market pull, as they react
to profitable market opportunities. The fundamental assumption to attack these market
segments is the implementation of horizontal leveraging strategies, meaning the common
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Table 12: Product Family Design Methodology Classification
Commonality Restricted Generalized
Platform Selection Fixed Variable
Variant Design Fixed Variable
Module-based or Scale-based Module-based Scale-based
Platform Specified A priori A posteriori
Single-objective or Multi-objective Single-objective Multi-objective
Supporting Models Cost model Market Demand Model
Number of Stages in Optimization Single-stage Two-stage Multi-stage
Design Motivation Market Pull Technology Push
Leveraging Strategy Vertical Leveraging Horizontal Leveraging Beachhead Approach
Value Metric Net Present Value Payback Period Market Share
Table 13: Competition Properties Down-selection
Number of Competitors Monopoly Duopoly Oligopoly
Strategic Interaction Decision Theory Game Theory
Competitor Reactions Design Reactions Price Reactions
Strategic Decision Variable Price Quantity
Time Dependency Static Dynamic
Game Duration Finite-horizon Infinite-horizon
Decision Epochs Discrete-time Continous-time
Uncertainty Deterministic Stochastic
Types of Uncertainty Endogenous Exogenous
Number of Products Firms can Offer Single-product Firms Multi-product Firms
Market Entry/Exit Entry is Permitted Exit is Permitted
State Space Continuous Discrete
Action Space Continuous Discrete
platform is used within all segments. Table 13 shows the competition properties down-
selection. The choice of using discrete action, and state spaces along with a discrete-time




In Chapter 4, the formal decomposition of the proposed methodology to test the hypothesis
is shown. In order to fully realize the methodology presented in Figure 33, certain parametric
models are needed. Creation of these models will enable us to complete the first and third
step of the presented methodology. Specifically, this chapter deals with the underlined
elements:
1. Create the Market Environment
(a) Market Segmentation
(b) Market Uncertainty-Evolution of Demand
(c) Demand Model
2. Identify Players and Firm-specific Dynamics
(a) Incumbents (with observable designs)
(b) Entrants (with changing designs)
3. Identify Common Platforms
(a) Identify Critical Design Variables
i. Identify Constraints on Design Variables
(b) Generate Candidate Family Platform Designs
(c) Generate Performance and Cost Data for Candidate Family Members
i. Identify Performance/Cost Constraints




(b) Monte Carlo Simulations
(c) Obtain Distributions of Program Value
5. Platform Optimization
(a) Pick value-maximizing platform design
i. One-step solution for one entrant
ii. Sequential Nash Equilibrium Solution for two or more entrants
5.1 Market Environment
5.1.1 Segmentation of Market Space
In this framework, the market space C is represented as a 2-dimensional space with product
specifications normalized to [0,1]. In this particular case, observing the historical trends in
the narrow-body market, focus is on the range and the passenger capacity for a fully-loaded
typical 2-class configuration.
As the next step, the seat-range combinations are normalized so that the values fall
within the range [0,1]. This step is important for having a better explanatory model. As
explained in the next section, when comparing products for quantifying certain factors such
as the demand shift and cannibalization, the Euclidian distance between the design points
on R2 is used. This allows the model to ignore the absolute value changes and focus on
the relative changes with respect to other designs in the same segment. For instance, the
impact of a 10-seat increase in the passenger capacity of a plane has a bigger impact on the
favorability of the model than a 10NM range increase. The market boundaries are selected
to be between 100 to 220 for 2-class typical seating capacity and 2500NM to 4500NM for
the corresponding range at the maximum 2-class seating. The ranges of the design space
thus define the weighting of the importance of variation from the customer points.
To ease the simulations and focus on the design side of the problem where more platform
designs can be tested for their performance, a few number of discrete mission requirements
for design points are fixed. Shown in Table 14, new sub-segments of the narrow-body market
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Table 14: Assumed Market Segments for the Case Study
Segment Seats Range (NM) Fuselage Length (ft)
Narrow-Body I (NB-I) 132 3750 110.4
Narrow-Body II (NB-II) 162 3250 129.6
































Figure 38: Distribution of Current Aircraft and the Case Study on Market Space C
are defined. Even though the framework enables more exhaustive studies where a high
number of design points can be analyzed, due to the “curse of dimensionality”, estimation
of the equilibrium is computationally expensive for those types of comprehensive studies.
Combining this assumption with the Equation 3, the fuselage lengths of the case study
aircraft are directly fixed. It is also directly intuitive to assume the fuselage length is
primarily a function of the number of seats, and the comfort level, therefore the technology
will have little impact on the fuselage dimensions as the concepts explored within this thesis
are all tube&wing configurations.
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5.1.2 The Case for the Evolution of Demand
Market data for the narrow-body aircraft spanning 14 years between 1999-2012 is compiled
from various sources [158, 85][24]. Both delivery and order per year per plane type data
and the corresponding list price were obtained. Number of orders were picked as a market
performance measure. It is possible to object such an approach as some orders are tentative
and can eventually be cancelled. Also, there is usually a lag between the order and the
delivery of the plane. However, number of orders better represent the volatility of the
market and how different customers react to different designs when factors such as the
global economy, demand for air transportation, and fuel prices fluctuate. On the other
hand, delivery values don’t vary greatly throughout the years despite market-wide shocks.
This is primarily due to the backlog and cost of change in production capacity. Aircraft
manufacturers, as strategic players, plan ahead and keep a steady production output.
The data set also includes the list prices of each 8 narrow-body aircraft for the 14 years
in consideration. Obtaining the actual transaction prices is very difficult as these kind of
special deals including green stamps and other discounts are usually made privately. As a
rule of thumb though, Airbus is known to make 43% discount over the list price on average
whereas this percentage is about 45% for Boeing [9]. Discounts and other price variability
are also impacted by the delivery dates as well as the specific cabin configurations. In the
model, the variability in airline specific seating demands are ignored and the focus is solely
on the desired derivative.
Also, “outside goods” are indirectly incorporated in this model. Outside goods are
passively involved as they don’t react e.g. price adjustments but imply that if the prices
in the narrow-body market are too high, the demand may shift to outside the market such
as RJ and even wide-body markets. Outside goods also consist of used-goods market as
second-hand market forms a significant portion of the transactions in the aircraft industry
today. This framework however, can be extended to use quantitative data to model inter-
market dependencies and interactions.
At a given year, the number of orders per vehicle is used as well as normalized product


























Figure 39: A320 Family Number of Orders 1999-2012
space. At each location z ε C , there are Φt(z) number of customers, which each one of
them corresponds to one acquisition. The distribution of the customers is assumed to be
a bivariate normal distribution which can be defined by the mean on x and y (μx , μy),
variances on x and y separately (var(X), var(Y)), covariance on x and y (cov(X,Y)),
and the size of the population Mt which is the integral of the population distributed around
the market space shown in Equation 15. In this example, x represents the normalized range





Since 1980, the demand for air travel, a major factor in the number of new planes
needed, has been steadily increasing despite 4 recessions, 2 financial crises, 2 Gulf wars,
an oil shock, a near pandemic and 9/11 [158]. Forecasting future demand for a complex
industry under both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors is an entirely separate field.
Boeing estimates 26,730 new deliveries in the next 20 years where as the Airbus estimate
is at 22,900 (~1340 and 1145 per year on average respectively) [158, 85]. It is possible to
assume the continuation of Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenarios where the market doesn’t
receive shocks as the shocks such as the ones listed previously are quite unpredictable.
However, some perturbation from the usual case is applied and there are “low”, “regular”,
133
Table 15: Bivariate Normal Distribution Fit Evolution over Different Periods
Period Mean Range Mean Seats SD Range SD Seats Covariance Average Yearly Demand
1999-2000 0.3801 0.3638 0.1434 0.1639 -0.0225 634
2001-2002 0.2897 0.5012 0.1183 0.1655 -0.0170 368
2003-2004 0.3611 0.3874 0.1246 0.1523 -0.0179 384.5
2005-2006 0.3280 0.4186 0.1118 0.1506 -0.0154 1411
2007-2008 0.3117 0.4542 0.0899 0.1208 -0.0096 1722.5
2009-2010 0.2857 0.4691 0.0695 0.1026 -0.0062 692
2011-2012 0.2719 0.5142 0.0990 0.1235 -0.0107 1545
1999-2012 0.3114 0.4523 0.1099 0.1435 -0.01439 965.2
and “high” demand scenarios.
Apart from the overall market demand, the distribution of the consumer demand is
also important. It is possible to argue that over the decades, bigger narrow-body aircraft
such as the mid-size Boeing 757 has become less popular and LCA market has polarized
between more differentiated narrow and wide-body segments. As an additional example,
the Asian narrow-body market, a fast-growing market, prefers larger narrow-body aircraft
[158]. Such factors indicate that the future preferences of airlines will be quite different
than their past or present choices and the new market segmentations may be necessary.
This is also observable in Figure 38 where the new generations of the families can carry
more passengers over longer distances which is, in part, enabled by more efficient designs
which will be explored in the narrow-body case study.
Table 15 is not a result of actual operations but a weighted collection of the maximum
capabilities of sold narrow-body aircraft. It should also be noted that due to wing loading
limitations, family members using the same wing usually have less range at higher seat
capacities. Therefore, since the design points of the aircraft in consideration tend to move
diagonally on the Payload-Range diagram, it is possible to assume that in the future even
the A319neo and B737 MAX7 class may slowly disappear similar to the class of A318 and
B737-600. The overall direction of the market is observed to favor bigger airplanes as the
smaller segments perhaps face a demand shift to RJs or to bigger derivatives because of
increasing fuel costs.
Therefore a market structure assumed has a demand distribution that is mainly focused
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at NB-II segment. On a typical scenario when all firms are present in the market with full
product lines, the NB-II segment represents about two thirds of the total demand. NB-I
and NB-III segments represent about 10% and 25% respectively.
5.2 Performance Model
5.2.1 Screening of Critical Design Variables
In order to create a fully parametric design-for-market environment, there is need for a
notional narrow-body aircraft. To perform this step, NASA’s Flight Optimization Software
(FLOPS) is chosen. FLOPS is a multidisciplinary set of modules for the conceptual design of
aircraft that can estimate the weight, aerodynamics, propulsion data, mission performance,
and cost. Some of the modules rely on empirical data whereas some calculations are physics-
based [126].
Previously the following continuous platform design variables were identified to be crit-
ical in designing an aircraft common platform:
• Wing Area (Sw) [ft2]
• Wing Aspect Ratio (AR), therefore the wingspan (bw) [ft]
• Wing Taper Ratio (TR, λ)
• Wing Leading Edge Sweep [deg] (ΛLE)
• Wing thickness-to-chord ratio (toc)
Since this methodology has the potential to be computationally expensive, it is important
to perform an initial screening to see if any of these design variables are more or less
important than the others. For this step, a representative B737-800 model was used in
FLOPS environment with all the geometry except the design variables in question fixed.
For a simple analysis, their effects on the fuel weight for the 2-class typical seating and
maximum range mission are obtained. A latin-hypercube Design of Experiments (DOE) of
1000 runs are run which is accompanied by a response surface fitting to reach a R2 of 0.999.

























Figure 40: Sensitivity of Fuel Weight to Wing Geometry for B737-800
fuel weight whereas the wing area is observed to have impact only after dramatic changes.
Thickness-to-chord ratio, sweep angle, and taper ratio are found to have insignificant effect.
Even though the aspect ratio is very important, due to regulatory constraints as well as
material and structural flutter limitations , it will be limited leaving wing area as the only
possible design input with some impact. Results are summarized in Figure 40.
5.2.1.1 Addition of Technologies
As Figure 40 suggests, within the narrowed down design space of the narrow-body case
study, the sensitivity of the continuous design variables are limited except the wing area
which is bounded by the structural and regulatory limits. Therefore, the technology k-
factors are introduced as in Technology Impact Forecasting method (TIF) [118]. At this
step, the following observation is also introduced:
Observation 10: Across generations, new families are not necessarily new designs but
improvements with addition of new technologies. At the conceptual design level, design
changes are minimal.
Performance Improvement Packages (PIP) are a common way to improve an already
existing family with reduced development costs. In the case study, the design problem will
be further simplified into a technology selection problem. Keeping the initially specified
design variables constant, now this problem becomes a discrete selection of value-adding
technologies from a given technology portfolio. Originally the mathematical demonstration
of mapping of the design variables to a single value of an expected NPV was shown as:
E[NPV ] = f(Sw, bw,ΛLE , λ, toc, T )
Following the screening process demonstrated in Figure 40, this formulation becomes
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Table 16: A320neo Family Main Characteristics [7]
Specification A319neo A320neo A321neo
Typical Seating 140 165 206
Max Seating 160 189 240
Range (NM) 3750 3500 4000
Max TOGW (lbs) 166400 174200 213800
Max Zero Fuel Weight (lbs) 132900 141800 166700
Max Fuel Capacity (USg) 7060 7060 8700
Overall Length (ft) 111 123.2 146
Cabin Width (ft) 12.1 12.1 12.1
Wing Span (ft) 117.4 117.4 117.4
Horizontal Tail Area (ft2) 333.7 333.7 333.7
Vertical Tail Area (ft2) 231.4 231.4 231.4
only a function of the chosen technology scenarios.
E[NPV ] = f(T )
Technological uncertainty and quantifying its impact in a probabilistic manner have
been throughly investigated in the past [118]. However, within this thesis, the economical
impact of these technologies are investigated in an uncertain market environment. In order
to isolate the uncertainty that is associated with the development cost, duration and the
actual impact of a given technology, deterministic values are assumed for these amounts.
5.2.2 Parametric Design Environment
FLOPS environment is used to design the new hypothetical narrow-body family competitor.
The main issue with using FLOPS for a family design instead of an independent design is
that FLOPS does not have embedded capability for commonality applications. Therefore
A320neo family is picked to test the capability of FLOPS to estimate the published data
via keeping fore-mentioned common specifications and varying derivative-specific variables.
A summary of the fundamental specifications for the A320neo family is provided in Table
16. FLOPS needs to be calibrated to match the published TOGW and the fuel weight of
A320neo. To represent the performance improvements of the new family with “sharklets”,
more efficient engines, and weight savings, new adjustments were done for the calibration
factors in FLOPS.
The aim in this part of the effort was to gauge the reliability of a parametric conceptual
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Table 17: Comparison of the FLOPS Model with Posted Weights
Response Source A319neo A320neo A321neo
Fuel Weight (lbs) Posted 48008 48008 59160
Model 47679 47240 59618
TOGW (lbs) Posted 166000 174000 206000
Model 163053 177976 221725
Empty Weight (lbs) Estimated OEW 89900 93900 106900
Model 77739 86620 106132
design environment in which the “rubber engine” can be sized to meet the thrust-to-weight
requirements, fuselage can be stretched or shrunk to meet cabin area requirements. Airbus
defines the Operational Empty Weight (OEW) as the “Weight of structure, powerplant,
furnishings, systems, and other items of equipment that are an integral part of a particular
aircraft configuration plus the operator’s items. The operator’s items are the flight and cabin
crew and their baggage, unusable fuel, engine oil, emergency equipment, toilet chemical and
fluids, galley structure, catering equipment, passenger seats and life vests, documents, etc.”
[7]. The standard Empty Weight from FLOPS is used although it is recognized that the
OEW would be higher due to the additional components listed.
5.2.2.1 Empennage Considerations
FLOPS uses a slightly different way to estimate the authority of vertical and horizontal tail
on the aircraft stability and control than the ones shown in Equation 16 and 17. Instead of
using more complicated but more reliable forms of estimating the moment coefficients by
using chord lengths, such as the ones shown in Equation 1 and 2, FLOPS uses the fuselage













Using the geometric data of B737MAX and A320neo, the coefficients are estimated for
all family members and shown on Table 18. Figure 41 also shows the impact of the tail
size on empty weight and TOGW implying both the weight and drag penalties for this
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Table 18: Volumetric Tail Coefficients for B737MAX and A320neo
Aircraft Type Vertical Tail Coefficient Horizontal Tail Coefficient
B737 MAX7 2.05 2.54
B737 MAX8 2.40 2.98




Figure 41: Impact of Tail Size on the Aircraft Weight (B737-800 representation)
representation of B737-800. This study is just intended to emphasize the importance of
minimizing the tail size as long as an acceptable coefficient is obtained. Based on the
Boeing and Airbus designs, 2.0 for the vertical tail coefficient and 2.5 for the horizontal tail
coefficient are assumed to be reasonable values for the notional design space.
Based on the volumetric tail coefficients of the existing designs, it is possible to argue
that the tail is sized for the smallest derivative. Perhaps a smaller tail would be sufficient for
the bigger derivatives, if a company only focused in entering the bigger side of the narrow-
body market, without extending the product line to the smaller narrow-body aircraft. It
is also possible to have a family of aircraft sharing the same wing but different empennage
such as the A320 family. However, it is assumed to be economically unreasonable to do so
and proceeding with the single empennage design is expected to be a viable option.
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Table 19: Aircraft Approach Category [34]
Aircraft Approach Category Indicated Airspeed
A Less than 169 km/h (91 kts)
B 169 km/h (91 kt) or more but less than 224 km/h (121 kts)
C 224 km/h (121 kt) or more but less than 261 km/h (141 kts)
D 261 km/h (141 kt) or more but less than 307 km/h (166 kts)
5.2.2.2 Aircraft Approach Category
Aircraft approach category is grouping of aircraft based on the indicated airspeed at threshold[21].
Although not as critical as the wingspan or tail size constraints, it is important to keep
the approach velocity at reasonable values that are within the same range as the comparable
aircraft of today. As the biggest derivatives, both A321 and B737-900 fall within the
category D due to their heavier landing weight. Approach velocity directly influences the
landing field length impacting the utilization of the aircraft at shorter fields. Therefore in
the narrow-body case study, the approach speed is implemented as a constraining element.
Even though not always true, considering the correlation between the maximum takeoff
gross weight and maximum landing weight, the wing loading in this study is limited to that
of B737 MAX9’s. The value obtained from the published data is 144lb/ft2[10]. This is
implemented as a constraint on the size of the wing.









Vapp is the approach velocity
VS0 is the stall speed at landing configuration
ρ is the air density
CL(Landing) is the lift coefficient at landing configuration
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MLW is the maximum landing weight
Sw is the reference wing area
5.2.2.3 Operational Considerations
Even though the aircraft sizing and synthesis is usually influenced by the extreme capabili-
ties of the vehicle which form the edges of the flight envelope, airlines usually don’t operate
close to those edges. Therefore, it is possible to argue, from the airlines perspective, that
the vehicle’s fuel performance is more crucial at those “mid-points” than the extremities.
To better enhance the model, although the sizing is matched to the design points which
indicate the limits of possible flights, it is reasonable to assume that the airlines are more
interested in the fuel consumption of the aircraft at those commonly used operating regimes.
Due to limited data, such an assessment can only be limited to analyzing the domestic op-
erations in US. Using FAA’s T-100 data from 2015, some of the popular routes flown by
B737NGs and A320s are identified. This database, also known as the Air Carrier Statistics
Database is a compilation of the monthly reports of the certificated US air carriers. It is a
publicly available set of data that is used by aviation industry to analyze the patterns and
the evolution in airlines operations.
As presented in Table 20, the bigger variants fly longer distances more often. However,
despite different utilization rates, the majority of the flights are performed by the smaller
models resulting in higher sales. In 2015, the average distance flown by the two families in
consideration was about 1060NM. However, North American sales only form about 16% of
the new generation narrow-body sales [4]. In other prominent markets such as Southeast
Asia and Europe, it is possible to assume the average stage-lengths will be shorter although
some of those will probably be performed by RJs.
5.3 Cost Model





























































































































































































Table 20: Summary of US Domestic Operations in 2015








– Baseline Aircraft R&D cost: The base cost to enter the market
– Derivative Aircraft Additional R&D cost: The optional cost to expand the prod-
uct line
• Production-Related Costs
– Marginal Cost: The average cost of producing a certain aircraft that the firm
already can produce
– Fixed Cost: The production cost even when there is no production in place
5.3.1 R&D Investment
In this game, it will be assumed that all the firms within the market simulation have
already invested a substantial amount in R&D costs. This will be reflected by the initial
investment put into developing the smallest derivative NB-I. This assumption does not only
make sense from a historical perspective such as Boeing starting to develop the B737s by
the smallest B737-100, but also enables a simpler dynamic programming problem. The
calibrated FLOPS/ALCCA environment is used to estimate the development cost in 2015
US dollars. ALCCA is the Aircraft Life Cycle Cost Analysis program developed by NASA
and improved by ASDL. One disadvantage of ALCCA’s estimation is that it is a strong
function of weight. Although this is mainly true, it fails to account for cases such as an
expensive weight reduction technology that would lower the weight of the vehicle in the
expense of increased R&D costs. Using this method, the required investment for a narrow-
body is estimated to be around 9-12 billion USD.
143
For estimating the cost of development for a derivative aircraft, an approach similar
to that of Fujita is used which is presented in Section 4.1.3 [88]. Instead of using the
vehicle component weights independently, the estimated weight-based R&D costs, which
are obtained as if those designs were developed independently, are obtained from FLOPS
as a measure of similarity. It is possible to argue that there may be more complications to
the derivative development cost than just the independent development margins, therefore
a fixed element and a coefficient are introduced to the derivative R&D estimation.
DdNB−II = αd + βd(DiNB−II −DiNB−I) (20)
DdNB−III = αd + βd(DiNB−III −DiNB−I) (21)
where
DdNB-II is the development cost of NB-II from NB-I
DiNB-II is the independent development cost of NB-II (without a prior know-how)
α
d is the fixed development cost of a new derivative
β
d is the coefficient for the variable derivative development cost
It is important to note that these development costs are introduced to demonstrate the
parametric baseline model. For this instance, specifically for the A320neo, Airbus was able
to use the A320 design extensively. This scenario assumes “from scratch” development of a
new family of aircraft. The hypothetical market entrant firm in the case study will develop
such aircraft with no prior know-how. However, in the dynamic simulation environment in
which the discounted cash flow is the main focus, the timing of such investment may have
an impact on the net present value of the program particularly due to discount factors. In
addition to these scenarios, another value, MECi, is introduced as the main entry cost for
the game. Any player present in the game is assumed to have already invested a substantial
amount in R&D. This amount is assumed to be USD 5 billion less than the independent
development cost of the smallest derivative NB-I. This assumption is debatable, however it
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enables reduce a potentially two-stage dynamic entry game into a single stage. The firm
can then invest another DdNB-I to develop the first derivative if wanted.
5.3.2 Production-Related Costs
Reductions in production-related cost savings are an important advantage of product fam-
ilies over independent designs. In Section 4.1.3, a method that can combine the learning
curve effects with commonality effects was shown. In the work of Benkard, it is shown that
the learning curve effects can explain some of the pricing behavior in aircraft market and
can be analyzed by IO models [43, 42]. In this case study, three assumptions are made:
1. Commonality between narrow-body aircraft are so significant that they can be as-
sumed to benefit from the learning curve effects as if they were a single type of
aircraft.
2. Over the program lifecycle, sale numbers in narrow-body market are so high that the
marginal costs can be assumed to reach the Long-run Marginal Cost (LRMC) (Table
21)
3. Excluding the discount rates from the aircraft list prices, aircraft manufacturers tend
to price aircraft quite steadily. Based on the figures, although these are list prices, it is
possible to argue that the pricing is not done over the dynamic marginal cost but from
a more linearized value. Although steady increase in price compared to dynamic cost
fluctuations that occur primarily in the first few years after introduction means big
mark-up changes, it is assumed that this doesn’t influence the decisions of forward-
looking strategic players.
Neglecting the impact of dynamic experience level as a part of the state vector of a firm
helps us reduce the effects of “curse of dimensionality”. The benefits of this assumption is
shown in Section 6.1.2.1.
There is a total of 6967 for B737NG sales and 7931 for A320ceo sales [24]. Even though
new players such as Bombardier is entering the market to reduce the duopoly’s market
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Table 21: Estimated Marginal Costs at Different Production Volumes for Parametric
A320neo Model (in million US Dollars)
Derivative 500units 1000units 2000units 4000 units
A319neo 61.61 58.96 54.45 48.65
A320neo 65.415 62.68 58.03 51.92
A321neo 74.285 71.39 66.41 59.82
share, narrow-body market is growing steadily and roughly speaking, can sustain such high
production volumes per firm.
Since manufacturing cost data is an important, private, and strategic information, man-
ufacturers are reluctant to provide clues. In order to validate these marginal cost values,
assumption of 45% discount rate over the list price of A320neo aircraft in 2015 is used.
These markup values are within the values in literature [103]. Roughly speaking, 6-
7 million USD of profit per plane at 10 billion USD development cost would bring the
breakeven number of planes to about 1500 which would indicate that both B737NG and
A320 families are extremely profitable.
In the dynamic model, prices of vehicles are endogenous control variable that can be
changed every year. Therefore, these static considerations should be only interpreted as
a validation to the weight-based parametric cost calculation. In the IO model, these MC
values will be used as inputs to the simulation although the total number of units sold can
change and is one of the outputs of the IO model. It is possible that not all the designs are
successful enough to accumulate about 4000 unit sales to reach a LRMC and implementing
a feedback mechanism for the production volume would increase the computational burden.
Therefore, as long as the assumed production volume and the total sales values are “close
enough”, these assumptions will be considered to be valid. The fixed (e.g. facility) cost
component is neglected and instead, the assumption is that those are already distributed
amongst the marginal cost. These production volume expectations are justified by the
number of orders and deliveries in the market.
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Table 22: Estimated Markup Values at Different Production Volumes (Prices in million US
Dollars)
Derivative List Price Estimated Transaction Price Markup at 2000 Markup at 4000
A319neo 97.5 53.625 -1.6% 10.2%
A320neo 106.2 58.41 0.6% 12.5%
A321neo 124.4 68.42 3.0% 14.3%
5.4 Demand Model
5.4.1 Value Considerations
In Section 2.7, it was shown how concept of value could vary between different entities. The
following perspectives were specifically considered:
• Manufacturer perspective: The value of the overall aircraft family program (Share-
holder value)
• Airline perspective: The value of a certain vehicle based on the airline operations
(Customer value)
In reality, these definitions are closely interconnected. In Figure 43, a simple schematic is
used to portray their connectivity. If the firms can offer “value”, then this value propagates
through different stakeholders. Considering the Air Transportation System, such a chain
can be extended to airport managers, passengers, governments etc..
It is important to note that, within the scope of this thesis, the revenue side of the
airline operations isn’t analyzed or modeled. From an aircraft designer point of view, we
assume that the operations will be similar as long as the following design characteristics are
kept constant:
• Seats: In each individual segment, even an extra row can significantly change the
ticket pricing, and capacity allocation processes for airlines
• Cruise Mach Number: Faster travel can cause increased fuel burn but increase ASM
per vehicle for a given time period potentially increasing both revenue and cost. Such






















































































































































• Aircraft Design Group: Same ADG ensures the new replacement aircraft can utilize
the ground infrastructure in a similar fashion
5.4.2 Value Transfer
In a competitive environment such as the narrow-body market, manufacturers need to
offer cheaper and more fuel efficient airplanes with an extensive product line. These three
important forces are essential in this experimental setup.
• Some Definitions within Direct Airline Operating Costs
– Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM): Total cost of flying a certain mission
including the capital costs.
– Acquisition Cost: Initial transaction price to obtain the aircraft. These values
will provide the primitives for the IO model. Many airlines lease the aircraft
therefore only incur a mission capital cost, or receive depreciation costs if the
aircraft is actually owned.
– Cash Operating Cost (COC): Cost of flying a certain mission excluding the cap-
ital costs.
– Total Trip Cost: Total cost of a mission including capital costs
Direct Operating Cost (DOC) is the operational expense that can completely be attributed
to the flight in consideration. Due to different sizes and stage lengths of missions, Cost
per Available Seat Mile (CASM) is usually considered to be a more meaningful metric.
However, due to the inefficiencies within takeoff and landing and other issues related to
flight mechanics and fixed costs, CASM usually decreases with distance. Therefore, it is
essential to use CASM with attention and make additional effort to use it to compare similar




CASM can be used not only to compare the operating efficiencies of different airlines on
the cost side but also can be used for airlines to assess a potentially new airplane purchase.
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Table 23: Total Operating Expenses in Q4 2015 for US Airlines [1]
Cost Component % of Operating Expenses
Labor 31.3
Fuel 16.3
Aircraft Rents and Ownership 7.2
Non-Aircraft Rents and Ownership 4.6
Professional Services 8.7







Advertising & Promotion 0.9
Utilities & Office Supplies 0.7
Transport-related per Regional Carrier 12.6
Employee Business 2.0
Other Operating Costs 8.4
We need to quantify and understand the mechanics of those purchase decisions in order to
assess the market performance of the hypothetical family design. For the 4th quarter of
2015, Airlines for America’s study of total operating expense build-up for US Airlines are
presented in Table 23 [1].
Since Table 23 is an overall average breakdown of entire set of airline operations in
US, it is important to note that these percentages are subject to change greatly based on
specific operations. However, it is important to highlight that despite relatively low fuel
costs of Q4 2015, fuel cost still is a very significant component of an airline operating cost.
Labor cost, the biggest component in this breakdown, consists of wages, payroll taxes and
employee benefits of general management, flight personnel, maintenance labor, and aircraft
and traffic handling personnel. Aircraft rents and ownership, another important element,
is the cost of aircraft rentals, depreciation, and amortization of flight equipment including
airframes and parts, capital leases, and other flight equipment. In this section, a market
share model is explored so that:
qilt = Mt ∗MSilt (23)
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where
qilt is the quantity demanded for product l of firm i at time t
Mt is the size of the market at time t
MSilt is the market share of the product l of firm i at time t
For the narrow-body market, due to the similarity of products, it can be assumed that
the fixed operating costs to be very similar between different candidates. For example, it
is reasonable to expect the crew costs for the same flight of A319 and B737-700 to be the
same. Even though it is possible to expect some significant differences for some components,
the majority of the overall impact is caused by labor, fuel, and ownership costs. Therefore,
the product differentiation will focus on two main elements: Fuel and therefore the fuel
efficiency, ownership costs which is a function of aircraft price.
Estimating the actual fuel burn per hour or per seat is not a straightforward task. Figure
44 shows the fuel burn per hour from 2002 to 2015 for A320 and B737NG families in US
domestic operations. It is compiled from US Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
Form 41 Schedule P-5.2. The same dataset also includes other reported statistics such
as maintenance and depreciation. The variations in the data are mainly due to different
variants and configurations of the planes, different Performance Improvement Packages
(PIP), different Origin-Destination pairs and stage-lengths, and perhaps faulty reportings.
Similar to the actual operational fuel consumption, obtaining an estimate of aircraft
ownership cost is complicated. Even though both Boeing and Airbus publishes prices an-
nually, almost none of the actual transactions occur at those “list prices”. Order size and
company loyalty are some important factors that results in an average discount of about
45% off the list prices [6].
Figures 45,46, and 47 show the historical list prices of the major narrow-body airplanes
in this study [158, 85]. Some initial observations are:








































































































































































































































































Figure 47: List Price of A321, A321neo, B737-900, and B737 MAX9
• Airbus aircraft tend to be more expensive and yet still gain more market share in the
narrow-body market
• New aircraft are priced higher than their predecessors.
In an attempt to bridge the gap between the list prices and the fuel efficiency of similar
airplanes, the impact of both on the CASM are estimated. Assuming a monthly lease rate
of 0.85% of the 45% discounted prices, an estimation of a block time for a 1060NM mission
used of 300 hours of monthly utilization can be used [9]. 660NM could also be a useful
benchmark as a representative distance between Atlanta and Newark airports. Another
8.5% can also be added as an insurance cost as a function of the capital costs. For the
fuel burn cost, the total fuel consumption for the mission are simply multiplied by the jet
fuel price of the corresponding year. Finally, since CASM depends heavily on the number
of seats while the stage length is fixed, T100 data is used to estimate the mean number of
seats as of 2015 for the existing narrow-body aircraft. Although, a 2-class typical seating is
a good enough assumption, the actual number of seats give a better definition of airlines’
understanding of CASM. The average seats for A320s are 130.4, 152.6, and 181.7 while it
is 140.7, 162.6, and 175.2 for competing Boeings.
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Table 24: Market Share vs VCASM
Segment A320neo Orders B737 MAX Orders Market Share VCASM Ratio
NB-I 50 60 0.54 0.920
NB-II 3327 2795 0.45 1.015
NB-III 1094 217 0.16 1.0234
Using the values presented in Table 24, a simple measure of sensitivity to both aircraft
price and fuel cost is obtained. When the slope calculation is weighted by the number of
orders, the sensitivity is found to be -8.06224. These results are highly comparable to the
own price elasticities obtained by Keefe for the narrow-body market even though the author
has used delivery data with 1 and 2 year lags [114]. Considering the delivery lead time in
the industry, it is possible to conclude that the estimation is reasonable compared to the
literature [103]. Although this approach is quite simple due to lack of detailed panel data, it
still captures two major components of value relationship between the airlines and aircraft
manufacturers.
FCASMilt =















V CASMilt = FCASMil +MCCASMilt (26)
CASMilt = V CASMilt + FXDCASMilt (27)
where
FCASMilt is the Fuel Cost per Available Seat Mile for product l of firm i at time t
FBil is the Fuel Burn of product l of firm i (a function of μilmiles)
Ptfuel is the jet fuel price at time t
μilseats is the mean number of seats for product l of firm i
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μilmiles is the mean stage-length for product l of firm i
MCCASMilt is the Mission Capital Cost per Available Seat Mile for product l of firm i at time t
LPilt is the List Price of product l of firm i at t
DR is the Discount Rate (Industry Average)
MLR is the Monthly Lease Rate (Industry Average)
VCASMilt is the major Variable Cost per Available Seat Mile of product l of firm i at time t
FXDCASMilt is the major Fixed Cost per Available Seat Mile of product l of firm i at time t
CASMilt is the Cost per Available Seat Mile of product l of firm i at time t
In a market environment such as the narrow-body market, it is possible to have a higher
number of explanatory variables to better fit the historical data. Despite introducing more
terms to the model, due to the complicated nature of those bargains, lack of publicly
available data and “closed-door” discussions, and airline-specific needs, there is not a single
model in the literature that stands out as a reliable explanation. For example, Southwest
favors Boeing aircraft due to fleet commonality and Boeing awards their customer loyalty.
In 2011, Southwest ordered 150+150 option 737 MAXs for around $35m USD per frame
that corresponds to about 65% discount [6]. Such real-world phenomena such as the bias
towards a certain company are hard to quantify. The focus was solely on coming up with
a reasonable technique to award fuel-efficient designs and competitive pricing with higher
market-share. This simple market share model will enable us demonstrate the capabilities
of the IO model. Once the demand evolution is obtained and the state of the market at each
time period can be observed by the players, the quantity demanded is simply the market
share multiplied by the overall demand. These simulations to be performed are in fact
counterfactual experiments using empirical data obtained from the history of the industry.
It is natural to expect some discrepancies in such simulations. Especially for the LCA
market, which is a big and complex environment with many factors affecting the outcome,
the simulation results should not be expected to perfectly match the reality. However,
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this methodology is intended to provide a comprehensive and transparent framework for
forward-thinking, top-level decision makers.
5.4.3 Spatial Utility Bertrand Competition
Even though the sensitivity of demand to some of the major factors in the industry are
estimated, there is still a need for a discrete choice model that can be used in a simulation
environment. In many markets, most of the time, consumers are not allowed to pick their
“ideal product” due to the discrete amount of products offered by firms. In this thesis,
it is assumed that the customers’ decision when picking a product are influenced by these
factors:
• The “quality” of the product vs others
• The price of the product vs others
• The difference between the customer’s ideal product and the product vs others
• How much the customer is willing to deviate from their original target
The demand model in this thesis is a spatial utility model built on the work of Aguirregabiria
and Vicentini which is an enhancement of De Palma’s work [30, 33]. The enhancements
are mainly in allowing different quality values from different firms as well as expanding the
market to two dimensions. On a two-dimensional market space, at every period t, for each
consumer at location z, utility for the product l of firm i can be formulated as:
uilt = ωil − pilt − τ ‖z − zl‖+ υil (28)
where
uilt is the indirect utility of consumer at location z for the product of firm i at
location l
ωil is the quality of product of firm i at location l
pilt is the price of the product of firm i at location l at time t
157
τ is the unit transportation cost
z is the location of the consumer
zl is the location of the segment l
υil is the idiosyncratic preference of the customer for product of firm i at location
l
Assuming υ is independent of z and has a type 1 extreme value distribution, and integrating
Equation 28 over υ, the local demand for product of firm i at location l can be formulated
as:
σil(z, nt, pt) =





l′=1 ni′l′t exp {(ωi′l′ − pi′l′t − τ ‖z − zl′‖)/µ}
(29)
where
nt is the market structure at time t
ωil is the quality of product of firm i at location l
μ is the dispersion parameter
Finally, integrating Equation 29 over the distribution of customers z, the total demand for
the product of firm i at location l at time t can be obtained:
sil(nt, pt, φt) =
ˆ
C
φt(dz)σil(z, nt, pt) (30)
Dispersion parameter μ helps model the impact of non-spatial horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. On the other hand, as the transportation cost parameter τ increases, it will
make customers less willing to deviate from their original positions.
There is an abundance of different discrete choice models in the literature to choose
from. However, a spatial utility model will provide certain benefits specifically to a family
design problem. In such problems, the designs should be sufficiently close to each other so
that the commonality can be utilized. At the same time, they should be different enough
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from each other so in the end, the result is a product positioning problem. Adaptation of
spatial logic to the design space enables a direct representation of such cross elasticities and
perhaps more extensive product positioning assessments.
Sub-game equilibrium is chosen to be a Bertrand price competition. This stage is a
game of complete information where the firm i’s profit-maximizing decision can be shown
as the First-Order Condition (FOC) for each of its prices as:










where the variable profit function Rit is defined as:
Rit(n, p, φ) =
L∑
l=1
(pilt − cilt)sil(nt, pt, φt) (32)
This type of an equilibrium will ensure that multi-product firms maximize the overall
profit of their portfolio and avoid threatening other designs of theirs by aggressive pricing at
certain locations. This sub-game equilibrium can be obtained directly and is independent
of the dynamic game as it is static. Therefore, it can be obtained for all states and used as
an “input” to the dynamic game. The equilibrium may not be unique, in those cases, the
lowest price will be selected.
The solution algorithm is initialized at the marginal costs. In the second step, aggregate
demands and partial derivatives are estimated. The main step for the solution follows




In this Chapter, using the Case IIA example, the focus will be on an example problem of
two incumbents and an entrant. The state transition probability matrices will be generated
to be fed into Monte Carlo Simulations. Results will include distributions of NPV for the
entrant as well as the steady-state market structure at the equilibrium.
1. Market Segmentation
(a) Market Uncertainty-Evolution of Demand
(b) Demand Model
2. Identify Players and Firm-specific Dynamics
(a) Incumbents (with observable designs)
(b) Entrants (with changing designs)
3. Identify Common Platforms
(a) Identify Critical Design Variables
i. Identify Constraints on Design Variables
(b) Generate Candidate Family Platform Designs
(c) Generate Performance and Cost Data for Candidate Family Members
i. Identify Performance/Cost Constraints




(b) Monte Carlo Simulations
(c) Obtain Distributions of Program Value
5. Platform Optimization
(a) Pick value-maximizing platform design
i. One-step solution for one entrant
ii. Sequential Nash Equilibrium Solution for two or more entrants
6.1 Scenarios
For the sake of simplicity, the case study is limited to Case IIA where we only have one
entrant firm. In this section, different directions of counter-factual experiments that can be
conducted on the framework are presented.
Scenario 1: How can the incumbent firms prevent new entries, or minimize the market
share loss caused by additional competition? How does the anticipation of a potential market
entrant influence the decisions of incumbent firm’s program managers?
Richard Aboulafia, an expert in an aerospace advisory firm, states: “Duopolies don’t get
broken by a new player being aggressive, they get broken because the incumbents become
complacent” [5]. Although the narrow-body market is expected to grow to accommodate
more firms, similar statements from experts indicate there are certain managerial decisions
that can be done by the incumbent firms to make it harder for entrants to realize a profitable
program. It is possible to visualize the actions of incumbents in such a case.
Scenario 2: Why do firms exit certain segments? What are the main drivers to these
decisions?
As much as entry deterrence strategies are interesting to analyze, it is interesting to
analyze product level exits. Sales for both B737-600, and A318 were low and both companies
do not replace the smallest sub-segment of narrow-body in the new generation. Numbers
as of 2010 indicate that only 79 A318 were delivered compared to 6532 A320s, and only
69 B737-600s compared to 4394 B737-800s. This is an interesting observation as one may





• Risk reduction (including both investment, and technical risks)
Recalling Figure 6, it is possible to argue the performance constraints at the edges of market
space become more critical. This doesn’t necessarily mean those vehicles can’t perform the
given design missions, but are not competitive in means of price, or efficiency. In fact,
within this framework, the way flexibility is handled is through competitive advantage over
the rival designs by performing the given missions better. Firms won’t be allowed to enter
a sub-segment if the platform design is not suitable to meet the mission requirements, and
the regulatory constraints.
Scenario 3: If an entrant firm offers only one independent design that is optimized for the
given sub-segment instead of a family of products, what are effective strategies to compete
against firms offering families of products?
In this scenario, the entrant has a single design versus a family of designs. The advan-
tages of a single-product entrant are:
• Reduced entry cost
• Vehicle can be optimized only for one segment
• Increasing the competition in a segment may decrease the prices, and steal demand
from other segments.
Similar approach is followed by COMAC and partially by Bombardier as explained in Sec-
tion 3.6
Scenario 4: How does the competition affect the total CO2 emissions when two firm total
fuel burn is compared to a three firm total fuel burn?
In the commercial aviation, one of the interesting issues is the effect of competition on
the environment. In this scenario, the intent is to compare a duopoly case to a triopoly
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case, to identify, and quantify the change in the total CO2 emissions between different types
of competitions.
This study is motivated by the NASA’s Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA)
project goals. There have been studies on vehicle level technology improvements, obtaining
fleet level metrics, and different concepts towards this goal [163]. However, competition, a
reality of the commercial aircraft market is not considered. One possible result is that the
fuel prices may increase the value of efficient aircraft, therefore still decrease the system
level fuel burn despite the competition.
Scenario 5 (This Study): Can this framework be used as a technology valuation tool?
One possible way to handle the scenario suggested in Case Study 5 is through the
modification of the cost elements shown in Figure 29. A new technology program would
likely:
• Increase the R&D cost
• Increase the product performance, therefore market performance, resulting in a higher
revenue
Framework can handle higher, and uncertain levels of R&D cost, and this can be mapped
on the change in the program value distribution. Such a tool would enable top-level decision
makers to identify key technologic improvements early on in the design phase, and utilize
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the corresponding competitive advantage.
In this section, five case studies to test the capabilities of the proposed framework
were suggested. Although some of these case studies need extensive effort to simulate, it
would help validate the proposed framework’s extension capabilities to account for various
scenarios under uncertainty and competition. The focus is on Scenario 5, which as a part
of the design problem, is thought to be interesting.
6.1.1 Benchmarking-Testing the Hypothesis
Hypothesis: Considering the dynamic, stochastic, competitive, and flexible nature of air-
craft family programs, combining an Ericson Pakes class Industrial Organization model of
dynamic oligopoly with Monte Carlo Simulations enables the designer to make risk-informed,
value-driven platform design decisions in the conceptual design phase.
To test and quantify the hypothesis, there is also a need for a benchmark and an exper-
imental setup. For this purpose, the following design techniques are initially considered:
• TOGW minimizing/Family TOGW minimizing
• OEW minimizing/Family OEW minimizing
• Fuel Weight minimizing/Family OEW minimizing
Without a doubt, although simple and static, these techniques have traditionally provided
important insights to both commercial and military aircraft designers. Even from a market-
ing perspective, it is possible to argue that these designs will be quite competitive. However,
to measure the real value, they should be tested when the market is uncertain and com-
petitors can react. Weight-focused methods do not directly translate to economic success.
A fuel burn optimized wing can be shrunk to cost less in means of development and manu-
facturing in expense of additional fuel cost. Eventually, under certain conditions, that may
be a more profitable design. These enhanced definitions form the main focus in this thesis.
In the field of strategic decision making at firm-level for market success, the most basic,
simple, and popular technique is the standard Net Present Value (NPV) method. There-






















































Figure 48: Experimental Plan and Related Methods
deterministic, and one-shot valuations in a sense that they ignore competition, uncertainty,
and managerial flexibility of aircraft family programs. That being said, the traditional NPV
method doesn’t take into consideration the active management of the firm in real-time to
market and firm level shocks. In this context, NPV refers to the technique and not the
value metric used for program success. When the uncertainty grows, the strategic control
elements firms can utilize to adapt to the environment is not considered in NPV. For the
competition case, a program is almost certainly expected to lose value when not responded
to competitive reactions. Even when the program managers react to competitors’ actions,
competitive market simulations will yield a more “realistic” but perhaps a lower program
turnover value. Due to all these potential aircraft program valuation discrepancies, there is
a need to create a common type of market analysis to test different designs on a consistent
platform. That gap is in fact filled by the VDD paradigm which have been extended to
include different elements usually neglecting the active managerial actions throughout the
projects.
In Figure 48, a categorization of the analytical tools used in the design-for-market ap-
proaches is displayed. A substantial amount of effort has been put specifically to robust
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design methodologies to design products that are successful in uncertain market conditions.
As displayed in Figure 11, flexible design approaches are useful when the requirements in
the market are also subject to change. As the competition becomes critical in market sys-
tems, difficulty arises. Under complete information, such competitive methods are usually
assessed by solving Nash Equilibria. When the actions of the competitors are not known,
players have to form beliefs about the uncertain elements. These approaches are investi-
gated with Bayesian methods. Both static competition and Bertrand/Cournot competition
methods traditionally focus on single product designs where the number or variety of the
products offered is out of question. Because of this, product family optimization problems
fall within the domains of product portfolio optimization. In the case of competition, they
are grouped within the “portfolio competition”.
The approach to test the hypothesis using the methodology introduced in Chapter 4 is
comparative assessment. The next section describes the newly created benchmark method
that keeps certain attributes of traditional NPV methods such as static and deterministic
considerations but expands it to a portfolio optimization in a competitive approach. Cre-
ation of a new benchmark method was motivated by the lack of a suitable methodology for
product families which the result from MPE can be compared to.
6.1.1.1 Static, Deterministic, and Competitive NPV
The competition between product families is a game played in a multi-firm, multi-product
environment. Firms use their product platforms as means of exploring derivative options
once invested in the market. This investment is denoted by MECi, this cost is incurred
at t=0. In this version of deterministic NPV, firms, knowing that they are already in the
market, decide at t=1 for the segments to enter and pay the Segment Entry Cost SECil.
No entry or exit happens after t=1 as there is no flexibility involved. Action or portfolio
selection of firm i is ai and ai* is the best response for the firm i.




where similar to the notation in literature [29]:
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πi(ai, a−i;x) = R∗i (ai, a−i;x)− SECil(ai) (34)
where the revenue of firm i ,Ri, at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for products l can be
written as:
R∗i (ai, a−i;x) =
L∑
l=1
ail[p∗i (l, a−i, x)− cil]q∗i (l, a−i, x) (35)
Following these notations, for a static, one-shot game of complete information the Nash
Equilibrium for the segment-level entry problem satisfies:
πi(a∗i , a∗−i;x) ≥ πi(ai, a∗−i;x) (36)
When the firms can observe both the competitors actions a-i, the marginal costs, and
other firm qualities of all the players x, they can see each others’ best responses. NPV
distribution resulting from the game simulation may, or may not yield higher value than
this deterministic result. In both cases though, the same Spatial Bertrand Competition
model that solves the static market equilibrium at the sub-game level is used.
In the example scenario, there are three players with 8 strategies each resulting in a
8x8x8 game. Such games are highly vulnerable to having more than one Nash Equilibrium.
This is a very common problem in these types of games and different methods exist to “pick”
among alternates. It is visually demonstrated that for the high demand market scenario
that there is a single equilibrium and that is when all firms are present in the market with
all their product line. That combination will be picked as the equilibrium product portfolio.
6.1.2 Computation of MPE
As a response to the existing valuation technique of a product family, this valuation involves
solving a multi-stage, multi-firm, multi-product game of incomplete information with exoge-
nous uncertainty in which the firms have to form beliefs about other players’ actions. This
dynamic, discrete game follows Aguirregabiria and Vicentini’s method which follows Aguir-
regabiria and Mira to represent a MPE as a fixed point in a space of choice probabilities is








So that, with the distribution function Gi(.):
Pαi (ait|nt) ≡ Pr(αi(nt, εit) = ait|nt) =
ˆ
1 {ai(nt, εit) = ait} dGi(εit) (38)
Integrated Bellman equation for Viα(nt) can be written as:
V αi (nt) =
ˆ
maxait
πi(ait, nt) + εit(ait) + β∑
a−it






Integrated Bellman υ equation uses choice specific value functions υiP(ait,nt):
υPi (ait, t) = πi(ait, nt) + εit(ait) + β
∑





Therefore mapping of CCPs into CCPs can be written as:








i (a, nt) + εit(a)
}}
dGi(εit) (41)
Best response probability function ψi provides the probability that a certain action is the
best response of the firm given the state of the market and other firms behave according to
their choice probabilities. Under the assumption that the private information shocks εit(a)
are independently and identically distributed (iid) with type 1 extreme value distribution,
the best response probability function becomes:














Since firm i’s best response function is:
αBRi (nt, εit, a−i) = arg max
{
vPi (ait, nt) + εit(ait)
}
(43)
MPE is a set of strategy functions such that each firm maximizes their value functions
given other firms’ strategies. Mathematically, this can be written as:
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α∗i (nt, εit) = αBRi (nt, εit, a∗−i) (44)
Equation 42 is much easier to solve at the expense of a specific type of shock distribution.
Even for the simplified 3-player, 3-products situation, this assumption makes simulations
practical and computationally fast. In addition, the realistic assumption of opening and
closing a maximum of one store per period forms a sparse matrix that reduces the number
of iterations. For certain industries, this assumption would be limiting. However, for the
aircraft industry, it is very difficult to develop multiple derivatives in a single year, which
corresponds to one period of time in these simulations.
Computation of MPE is also solved by using Gauss-Seidel iterations over the best re-
sponse functions. The solution stops with an initalization of the vector of probabilities
which is followed by value function iterations on the Bellman equation. Using the con-
verged value functions, Gauss-Seidel iteration is followed by solving best responses for first
firm, then second firm etc. in a turn by turn fashion until the values converge within a
certain threshold.
6.1.2.1 Curse of Dimensionality
DP approaches are vulnerable to “curse of dimensionality” when the computational burden
of calculating possible future outcomes increase exponentially along the number of state
variables. This greatly limits the number of firms that can be incorporated into the model
[56]. In certain cases continuous-time modeling may have advantages to discrete-time mod-
els in computational efficiency [70]. However, EP model is widely used with discrete-time
approaches. LCA Industry has only a few firms which allows the users of this simula-
tion environment to test multiple scenarios fast. Despite this, there are still ways to make
computations faster:
1. Reduce the number of levels in the action space
2. Define state space so that any recently calculated continuous state variable is rounded
up, or down to a discretized setting.
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IO models offer tremendous capabilities over the simplified models of game theory, and
ROA at the expense of computation burden. To use these benefits, strategy space should
be intelligently limited. Size of the state space for the original plan was to include
• Market Demand Structures (M)
• Experience Level (E)
• Designs (L)
• Number of Firms (I)
For example, size of the state space would then be M × 2(E×I×L) which would correspond
to ≈ 1014 combinations for a triopoly with three products and five experience states on
five market structures. Instead, the assumption related to LRMC is used to avoid using
the experience state. The new state space size then becomes 2560 which is manageable.
This reduction should be made to enable successive iterations on the design on a fast MPE
computation.
Computational speed for the three market types, three firms with three potential prod-
ucts ranged between 50 minutes to 80 minutes on an average computer. This computation
also includes the estimation of the static equilibria of the spatial Bertrand subgame for all
1536 combinations. However, this part is only a small fraction of the overall computation
ranging from 3 to 4 minutes. Considering it takes FLOPS/ALCCA about a second to run
each indivial vehicle and therefore about 3 seconds for a 3 derivative family, bottleneck of
the computations introduced in the methodology is the dynamic game. These speed issues
drive the state space reduction explained in this section.
6.2 Narrow-Body Example (Case IIA)
6.2.1 Incumbents
Apart from having a fixed design, the incumbent firms, just as the entrants, decide on prices
of their products as well as their product lines via entry/exit decisions. The framework could
allow for more than two incumbents, but we avoid this for several reasons. First, there are
not many dominant players in the narrow-body market as of 2016. Second, the complexity
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Table 26: Incumbent Firms’ Unique Properties
Design Variable Firm A Firm B
Wing Area (ft2) 1320 1380
Wing Taper Ratio 0.18 0.22
Wing Thickness-to-Chord Ratio 0.13 0.15
Wing Sweep Angle (deg) 24 26
Wing Aspect Ratio 10.45 10
Horizontal Tail Area (ft2) 335.8 367.0
Vertical Tail Area (ft2) 268.7 293.6
Induced Drag Relative to Baseline -5% 0
Parasite Drag Relative to Baseline +2% 0
Wing Weight Relative to Baseline +5% 0
Development Cost Relative to Baseline +3% 0
Manufacturing Cost Relative to Baseline +3% 0
Table 27: Economical and Technical Performance of Incumbent Firms
Response Firm NB-I NB-II NB-III
Fuel Burn (lbs) Firm A 12030 14155 16452
(For a 1060NM mission) Firm B 12422 14503 16826
Independent Development Cost Firm A 11785 12646 13511
(million US Dollars) Firm B 11562 12406 13243
Marginal Cost @ 2000 units Firm A 55.51 60.89 66.13
(million US Dollars) Firm B 54.64 59.80 64.96
Marginal Cost @ 4000 units Firm A 51.15 55.96 60.78
(million US Dollars) Firm B 50.35 55.03 59.70
of identifying a MPE increases exponentially as more firms are introduced. Third, it is
questionable if the market can sustain too many players and finally even only a few number
of “static”, incumbent firms are enough to demonstrate the methodology.
Incumbent designs in this case study are not necessarily optimized designs. They are
also not representations of any actual vehicles in the industry and do not reflect a certain
year technology level. The reason they are picked to be slightly different is to demonstrate
the capability of the framework to handle heterogeneous and substitutable goods. As in-
cumbents are unable to make design changes, the next step is to estimate the economical
and technical performance of the entire family for both Firm A and B. These values will
provide the primitives for the IO model and stay the same as trade studies are conducted
for the entrant Firm C. Table 27 presents these results.
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Table 28: Technology Impact Matrix (TIM) of Notional Technologies
Technology Impact Composite Fuselage (T1) Composite Wing (T2) Laminar Flow (T3)
Wing Weight -20%
Fuselage Weight -25%
Induced Drag -2% -10%
Profile Drag -2% -2% -5%
R&D Cost +2% +4% +15%
Manufacturing Cost +10% +6%
6.2.2 Entrant Design Alternatives
As explained in Section 5.2, the design problem for the case study was simplified into
selecting a certain technology in an “on and off” style. For this reason, first, a baseline
design for the entrant (Firm C) is generated which will be used as a platform for applying
different technologies. In Table 28, three technologies are exhibited that will be used in
this case study. The assumption is that a firm picks a technology only if it results in a
perceived financial success. Including the baseline design, four candidate family designs
were generated.
Methods such as Technology Impact Forecasting(TIF) usually deals with estimating
potential and usually technical performance benefits of a new technology or a new technology
package. On the other hand, in this case study, the focus is on the uncertainty that is caused
by the market uncertainty and the competitive reactions. For this reason, if a technology is
picked, the technological benefits, such as fuel burn reduction estimation will be assumed
to be exact.
Optimization of geometric variables in an aircraft design problem needs models of rep-
resentative technology levels and available technical information. However, it is possible
to expect, in the presence of a technology infusion, for those optimal points to shift. For
example, a composites technology that can reduce the weight of the airframe can also de-
crease the need of a bigger wing. Within this study, the geometries are kept fixed at the
conceptual level and are not “re-optimized”.
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Table 29: Firm C Baseline Platform Design
Design variable Firm C
Wing Area (ft2) 1350
Wing Taper Ratio 0.2
Wing Thickness-to-Chord Ratio 0.14
Wing Sweep Angle (deg) 25
Wing Aspect Ratio 10.22
Horizontal Tail Area (ft2) 351.3
Vertical Tail Area (ft2) 281.1
Table 30: Performance of Firm C on Different Technology Scenarios
Response Technology NB-I NB-II NB-III
T0 (Baseline) 12231 14287 16639
Fuel Burn (lbs) T1 11600 13500 15636
(For a 1060NM mission) T2 11605 13554 15755
T3 11403 13285 15438
T0 (Baseline) 11506 12345 13188
Independent Development Cost T1 11432 12243 13062
(million US Dollars) T2 11695 12560 13429
T3 13062 14028 15004
T0 (Baseline) 50.01 54.72 59.41
Marginal Cost @ 4000 units T1 52.63 57.44 62.26
(million US Dollars) T2 51.26 56.18 61.02
T3 49.39 54.06 58.83
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Figure 49: Fuel Savings corresponding to Technologies
A perhaps not surprising result following the technology scenarios is that even though
the family members benefit similarly from implementation of a new technology, the NB-III
derivative benefits the most. This is due to the well-known impacts of scale effects. In
addition, specifically for NB-III, the longest derivative, the benefits of a composite fuselage
technology is bigger. This result is found intuitive.
6.2.3 Simulation Primitives
The representation power of microeconomic models rely on the quality of cost and demand
models. LCA market remains as one of the most difficult areas to model due to high
percentages of private-kept data. IO models can be used specifically with estimation tech-
niques which, as long as data is available, allows “reverse-engineering” certain drivers of the
industry. In this thesis,
In these simulations, there are three different types of market structures: Low, normal,
and high demand scenarios that are all centered at the same location in the market space
































































Figure 51: Notional Market Center (Blue Cross) and Example Case Study Locations
addition some outside good with a net utility of 0.1 is assumed to be present. Although it
depends on the customer distribution, an example Price Elasticity of Demand (PED) is also
presented here in Equation 47. With the assumed coefficients, a trend consistent within
different analyses in the literature is obtained. Calibrating such functions and obtaining
the coefficients depend on the abundance and quality of panel data. With proper data,
there are methods in the literature for estimation of such coefficients for logit models such




















Quality term ω is used as a proxy for the fuel efficiency. As the demand is assumed to
increase as the fuel burn for the representative mission drops, this metric is formatted as
a value that increases as the fuel efficiency increases. This metric can be considered as a
deduction of Fuel Cost per Available Seat-Mile from the Revenue per Available Seat-Mile
(RASM ). Assuming these are the only drivers airlines use for selecting one aircraft over
another, the relationship between FCASM and MCASM presented could imply that the
fuel price is a very important exogenous factor. For the simulations that last 20 years, based
on the forecast on Figure 25, an average fuel price of $3/gallon is picked and assumed to
be fixed throughout the scenarios.
Results from the solutions of Bertrand-Nash equilibria show markup values around 15%.
Firms tend to price more fuel efficient planes higher and the markup values also go up when
the competitors don’t completely cover the entire market.
Initial state of the market is given as:
state =
 FirmC FirmA FirmBφt NB − I NB − II NB − III NB − I NB − II NB − III NB − I NB − II NB − III
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
 (48)
The incumbent firms (Firm A and Firm B) are already in the market with the smallest
derivative, Firm C is attempting to enter this market. For the entry cost, the high cost
scenario is used.
6.2.4 Results
Keeping the same incumbents, a total of 4 technology scenarios are simulated. Once the
state transition matrix was obtained from these runs, 1000 Monte Carlo Simulations were
run for each scenario resulting in a distribution of NPVs as well as separate discounted
cumulative cash flows. Additional visual enhancement was used to show common paths of
cash flows. In addition, a distribution of breakeven years is also obtained. Any simulation
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Table 31: Program Values Obtained from Different Techniques (USD 100 millions)
Method T0 T1 T2 T3
NPV -6.920 1.201 -3.472 26.181
Dynamic Game -2.152 6.824 1.840 33.958
that doesn’t break even within 20 years is considered to be unsuccessful. These numbers
are compared to the values that come from the standard NPV method.
For the example problem, it is possible to see that the values are quite comparable. It
is also possible to argue that the difference between the values don’t fluctuate significantly.
This is mainly due to the usage of enhanced method of NPV that takes the weighted market
average as well as solving a complete information portfolio problem. Standard NPV method
that is used in this comparison also utilizes the same sub-game Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium
as the dynamic game approach. In addition, this example problem included relatively
favorable market conditions in a sense that the MPE and Nash Equilibria are comparable.
What the standard NPV methods can’t perform is inclusion of the real-time decisions.
With the assumption of being able to enter one segment at a time, competition, market
uncertainty as well as private-information shock, some interesting results are observed.
Typically, firms enter “the heart of the market” first. Then, in the next years, it is observed
that their choice of segment depends on their product’s competitive strength. This indicates
that the firms with “lower quality” products are less sure about their value-maximizing
strategies. For example, the reactions of the Firm C at different decision epochs are shown
in Figures 52, 53, and 54. The primary pick of the Firm C at the second decision epoch is
going for the derivative NB-III although there is also some chance of going for the smallest
derivative NB-I. On the third epoch, the chance of not doing anything increases as the firm
starts questioning whether it is a good option or not to go for 10% of the market. By the
time the firm is at the decision epoch 4, it is very likely that a full market coverage has
been reached, waiting seems to be the only option. In this scenario, the development cost
of NB-I is assumed to be USD 1b whereas the development cost of NB-III is in excess of
USD 2b. There is no fixed cost of waiting in this model.
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Figure 52: Firm C’s behavior at 2nd Decision Epoch (1000 Runs)
















Additional Investment (USD 100 Millions)
Figure 53: Firm C’s behavior at 3rd Decision Epoch (1000 Runs)

















Additional Investment (USD 100 Millions)
Figure 54: Firm C’s behavior at 4th Decision Epoch (1000 Runs)
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Figure 55: Steady-State Probability Distribution of T0 Scenario
6.2.4.1 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In Figure 55, the steady-state probability distribution of the market for the T3 Scenario is
shown. There are three market structures with 8x8x8 states each. It is possible to see from
this plot that the most likely outcomes are states 512, 1024, and 1536 indicating cases that
all 3 firms are fully present in the market.
In Figure 56, for the high demand T3 Scenario, the payoffs of the firms for all 512
combinations are plotted. Color-coding is also used to indicate the probabilities on the
steady-state distribution. Instead of the single, deterministic result of the complete infor-
mation Nash Equilibrium (shown as the bigger dot). In this part, only the payoffs related
to one of the three market scenarios are demonstrated. Due to a combination of perceived
market uncertainty, beliefs about competitors’ actions, product quality, and entry cost un-
certainty, a distribution of probabilities is obtained instead of a single point.
6.2.4.2 Program Risk
There are different measures of risk. Some of them are:
• Breakeven Year
• Total Investment (Sunk Cost)
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Figure 56: Payoffs for T3 Scenario and High Market Demand
• Volatility of the Returns
• Probability of Making a Loss at the End of the Program
From distributions of DCFs, it is possible to obtain each one of these values. However, the
risk is picked to be the probability of the family program making a loss after 20 years in
the market. The distribution of breakeven years is also demonstrated.
Risk = P (NPV ≤ 0) (49)
The baseline scenario results in a slightly negative expected value for NPV. The prob-
ability of making a loss for Firm C in the baseline technology scenario is 56.2%. The firm
can increase the chances of having a successful program to 58.5% by investing in composite
fuselage technology T1. The composite wing technology T2 can bring about 49.7% chance
of success. Laminar Flow technology T3 seems to be a good investment considering it brings
the probability of success to 87.3%.
In Figure 57, the breakeven year distribution is shown assuming a program is a failure
if the anticipated returns don’t occur within 20 years. Figure 58 presents the distribution
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Figure 57: Baseline Technology Firm C Breakeven Year (1000 Runs)














Figure 58: Distribution of NPV for the Baseline Technology Firm C (1000 Runs)
182






















































































of NPV for the baseline technology scenario for Firm C. Due to the usage of discount
factors and critical nature of decisions made in the first few years under competition, NPV
distribution forms “steps”. This is an interesting find as other Monte Carlo methods that
doesn’t involve discrete actions during the program lifecycle would perhaps not result in
such situations. A typical response would resemble a normal distribution in most cases.
Figure 59 helps visualize this observation. The decisions as well as the market outcome
in the first few years open series of likely cash flow situations. However as the program
continues, the distribution gets smoother.
6.3 Readdressing the Primary Research Question and Hypothesis
In summary, the following organic curiosity and investigation process were followed:
1. Commercial aircraft markets are dominated by aircraft families sharing common parts
2. Firms compete by introducing new derivatives resulting in a multi-firm, multi-product
oligopoly
3. Demand is volatile, firms actively readjust strategies
4. From a designer’s perspective, how can we quantify value when it depends on the
decisions of the program managers after the design is fixed?
Formally the research question was identified as:
Research Question 1: For a given oligopolistic market system with inherent uncertainty,
how can an aircraft manufacturer evaluate the expected family program value? How can we
use this valuation technique to assess program risk of a new design?
The literature review showed a series of new techniques within the domains of microe-
conomics that formally deal with the interaction of multi-product, multi-firm markets, and
their entry/exit decisions. A cross-fertilization between engineering design and economics
was thought to benefit the financial evaluation of aircraft projects. The status quo of such
studies has been the technique of Net Present Value. Some of its disadvantages were identi-
fied and at the expense of computational complexity, the methodology created was a generic
product family design methodology for market systems. Figure 33 shows the methodology.
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Hypothesis: Considering the dynamic, stochastic, competitive, and flexible nature of air-
craft family programs, combining an Ericson Pakes class Industrial Organization model of
dynamic oligopoly with Monte Carlo Simulations enables the designer to make risk-informed,
value-driven platform design decisions in the conceptual design phase.
It was shown that the methodology developed to test the hypothesis resulted in similar
program values. However, due to multi-stage, competitive nature of such methods, now it
is possible to have an extra information about a possible order of introduction for different
derivatives. Even though the market risk is still a key driver in the outcome of these
simulations, now it is possible to explicitly show the program risk instead of a single point
of valuation for the program.
In the example case study, an experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis via
comparative assessment. It is demonstrated that the standard Net Present Value methods,
the benchmark, would lead to different decisions compared to the outcomes of the method-
ology presented in this thesis. It is also shown that the existing methods fail to quantify
the risk which is defined as the probability of the program not breaking even. For certain
technology scenarios, it is also demonstrated that the benchmark method could result in
opposite signs of perceived returns for the program possibly influencing the top-level deci-
sions. This was particularly highlighted for T2 Composite Wing Technology where the signs
of program value estimation from two different methods were opposite. Without adequate
risk quantification, this would result in a “go” situation for E[NPV] method and “no-go”
for NPV method. Even with the positive sign that is obtained from the computationally
more expensive but more comprehensive methodology introduced in this thesis, the high





Designing for value is a popular concept. However, every program has its unique character-
istics with different implications on the value metric. In this thesis, the characteristics of
aircraft family design programs both on the technical and marketing sides were identified.
It was seen that due to the multi-stage, multi-product, uncertain, and competitive nature
of the aircraft market, standard valuation techniques such as NPV is not adequate to use
as a single value metric. Instead a stochastic, dynamic, discrete game of incomplete infor-
mation was solved to observe a distribution of outcomes. The problem was considered from
a designers’ perspective. In order to measure the added value and risk associated with a
certain technical change, certain rules of the game were assumed as well as the mechanics
of how the program managers would act in a dynamic market. The results were presented
and compared to the traditional NPV technique.
The valuation methods for aircraft programs with after-design implications typically
utilize real-options. The inability of real options techniques to directly deal with the com-
petitive nature of such markets was shown from the literature review. Even though those
techniques are proven and commonly used in many financial valuation studies, this method-
ology took a different path due to fore-mentioned specifics.
The problem was extended to a product portfolio management problem to show how
firms may act different in dynamic, uncertain situations compared to static, deterministic
situations. The example scenario included only three design points for the firm to enter
which were quite desirable in means of ROI, however it was still possible to demonstrate
that, due to the stochastic nature of the game rules, firms may hesitate, delay, or go for
different strategies with certain probabilities.
The multi-firm, multi-product competition and market uncertainty that characterizes
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the narrow-body market were investigated. Unlike the wide-body market, narrow-body
market is easier to enter for smaller firms but the competition is stronger with very similar
products. As the similarity of the products increases, due to strong competition, firms
meet the demands of customers via product families which share common parts. This helps
reduce the development costs as well as manufacturing costs and allow reduced time to
market as the product platforms act as a “springboard” for development of similar products.
Industrial Organization models such as Ericson-Pakes models combine inherent elements of
the commercial aircraft market in a structured fashion to support analytical and rational
decision making.
As a part of the solution to the subgame competition, a spatial utility model was applied.
Though spatial models have originated to explain the consumer choices over geographic
locations, the same analogy was used to define a spatial choice environment over the payload-
range diagram for design missions of different candidate vehicles. This type of an approach
is not very common in the field of econometrics as well as design-for-market-systems.
Three sub-questions accompanied the primary research question and answering those
relied mainly on the literature review and the observations from the industry. This docu-
ment could also serve as a rapid review source for researchers that would like to work on
this topic.
Economists often deal with the steady-state distributions of the market structure whereas
the interest in this thesis has been mainly on the evolution of the market year by year. This
way, it is now possible to help identify the likely, value-adding steps in the development
of a product family. Even though the steady-state probabilistic distribution of the market
structure which occurs after a “sufficiently” long time can provide useful insights, it doesn’t
present the necessary information to a researcher who is interested in certain aspects of a
program such as the breakeven year and the discounted cash flow.
7.2 Future Research Directions
Using interdisciplinary methodologies in aircraft design offers promising benefits for identi-
fying key strategies to maximize market success. However, such models often underestimate
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the complex nature of the reality. More complicated models, specifically a family-specific
cost model or a detailed narrow-body demand model would help increase the confidence
level of those counterfactual experiments. For future reference, this framework can act as
the cohesive environment if such models are available. Calibrating such models usually
require firm-specific proprietary data which is unavailable to the public. In fact, accurately
pinpointing the exact marginal production cost of a single aircraft is difficult to measure
even for the manufacturer itself. On the other hand, it is very straightforward to assume
the companies will have a full knowledge of the transaction value every time a new aircraft
is sold. What is perhaps not completely certain to a manufacturer is the pricing of the
competitors as well as the transactions in the used aircraft market.
Industrial Organization models are complicated models that are naturally capable of
modeling imperfect competition. However, “curse of dimensionality” remains as a significant
obstacle to using such techniques for more extensive applications. For this specific case, the
real limitation was not in means of the number of firms in the market but in means of the
number of design points, market structures, and dynamic cost elements. In a grand fashion,
combined with detailed data, it would be an advanced and fully realistic study to apply to
the entire LCA market and investigate the interactions on a bigger scale. Such an analysis
would require large amounts of cost, transaction, and performance data as well as much
exhaustive computations. Recent developments in the field of Industrial Organization and
better-tailored algorithms as well as rapidly increasing computational power at researchers’
disposal can be the key to enabling such simulations. Advancements in the field of Industrial
Organization will not only benefit the design for commercial aviation markets, but also the
entire field of design for market systems.
In Section 6.1, five scenarios that can be simulated on this framework were identified
but only one scenario was picked. Curious researchers will find it interesting to investigate
specifically the Scenario 4 in which the regulations/goals and perhaps government subsidies
impact the competition. In a game-theoretical sense, it may make sense for the players in
an oligopoly setting not to invest in newer technologies as long as no one makes a move
first. Provided that the outside good doesn’t contest strongly, value-maximizer firms may
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choose to stay at a current technology level. This could hold true especially for the wide-
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